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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation argues that in the 1990s and beyond, the 
character and functions of regions and regionalism have 
experienced a major transformation.  This requires a re-
conceptualisation of regions and regionalism that transcends 
state-centrism.  The argument here is that the definition of regions 
and regionalism needs to recognise that other actors also 
participate in the construction of regions and the practise of 
regionalism.  Up to now, however, theories of integration 
incompletely deal with outcomes appropriate to developing 
countries, states and regions. 
 
In the context where people remain vulnerable to top-down forms 
of regionalism driven by the forces of globalisation, this calls for a 
new approach in the analytical study of regionalism in a 
transnational context.  The contention is that new regionalism, and 
its variant, developmental regionalism pay attention to the role 
those organised civil society actors and those marginalised by 
both globalisation and regionalisation play in promoting 
regionalism in a transnational context. 
 
Historically, state-centric regionalism in southern Africa was not 
aimed at achieving developmental objectives.  In the case of 
SACU, the argument is that South Africa used its economic 
strength in a hegemonial way.  To counter-act apartheid South 
Africa’s economic hegemony, SADCC was formed.  SADCC 
achieved limited success in the fields of infrastructural 
development and in attracting donor aid.  The end of the Cold War 
and the downfall of apartheid compelled these organisations to 
recast their objectives and purpose.  For SACU this meant 
changing from an organisation dominated by South Africa to a 
fully-fledged inter-state one. Disconcertedly, however, about the 
reforms undertook by SACU, is that the disposition of member 
states remain important in determining the content and scope of 
regionalism.  SADC, on the other hand, has also not sufficiently 
reform itself to achieve the ambitious goals it set-out for itself.  
Moreover, while SADC has since its inception in 1992 set-out to 
involve non-state actors in its regional integration efforts, limited 
 vii 
institutional reform in 2000 and beyond, and elites at the forefront 
of institutional restructuring make it difficult for non-state actors to 
contribute to sustainable regional integration. 
 
In conclusion, this dissertation maintains that sustainable 
regionalist orders are best built by recognising that beyond the 
geometry of state-sovereignty, civil society organisations with a 
regional focus and the ordinary people of the region also 
contribute to regioness and as such to the re-conceptualisation of 
regional community in southern Africa.               
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1. Defining Regions and Regionalism 
 
The end of the Cold War has posed a new challenge for both 
international relations theorists and practitioners.  The test, which 
confronted them, was how to establish a new international order 
that reflected the changing global political landscape not 
characterised by bipolar rivalry.  Regions and regional concerts 
were seen as the edifice upon which such a new international 
order was to be built.  Not surprisingly, therefore, since the end of 
bipolar rivalry, the idea and organisation of the concept ‘region’ 
has elicited renewed international attention1.  
This resurgence in the study of international regionalism is 
exemplified by the revival of old regional organisations, the 
formation of new ones and the deepening of existing regional 
arrangements.  This renaissance in the study of regionalism is, 
however, not only limited to the study of regional bloc formation by 
states alone.  Because of the increasing obviousness of 
transnational and non-state phenomena in the post- Cold War era, 
contemporary studies of regions and regionalism recognise the 
need to transcend purely state-centric notions of regionalism.  Phil 
Cerny (1999b) argues that the study of regionalism should also be 
driven by politics: by ideology, by the actions, interactions and 
decisions of state actors, their private sector interlocutors and the 
wider public.  This calls for recognition that the conception of 
regions and the practice regionalism are not only state-centric 
projects.  The conception of regions and regionalism needs to 
                                      
1
   Concern with regional patterns and with regionalism did not suddenly begin in the 
1990s: it has been the focus of study and political action since the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Cerny, 1999a). 
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recognise that other actors also participate in the construction of 
regions and the practise of regionalism.        
The above recognition that other actors also participate in the 
construction of regions and the practise of regionalism, is 
prompted by an awareness that both globally and regionally: “… 
state-society nexus is based on multiple actors that are linked 
together in hybrid networks and coalitions, together creating a 
wide range of complex regionalization patterns…” (Grant and 
Söderbaum, 2003:1)2.  This calls for a fundamental re-construction 
of regions and regionalism.  The recognition that the conception of 
regions and the practise of regionalism is no longer only a statist 
project, presupposes that the conception of regions and the 
practise of regionalism should be expanded, to make allowance 
for such new insights.   
An expanded conception of regions and regionalism is 
necessitated by the challenge posed to traditional views 
concerning the state-centric regional system, by, inter alia, 
transnational networks built around economic ties and cultural 
identities.  For Philip Cerny an expanded conception of 
regionalism is necessary because: “… the nation-state as a 
structural framework for politics is poorly adapted to cope with the 
imperatives of an unevenly globalising polity.” (1999b:152).  In 
responding to the challenges posed by uneven globalisation, 
regions and regionalism need to be re-conceptualised.  A broader 
definition of regions and regionalism, which such a re-
conceptualisation would entail, presupposes an inclusive typology 
of both state-based and society-based actors. 
To arrive at an inclusive typology, demands a multi-level and multi-
purpose definition that moves both beyond geography and the 
state.  Several authors define and perceive the notion of a region 
differently.  Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum assert that: “It is 
conventionally held that a region minimally refers to a limited 
number of states linked together by a geographical relationship 
                                      
2
   Maxi Schoeman contends that: “… regionalization is a process encompassing 
evolving interactive relationships between states and/or other actors who operate 
from within and across state borders…” (2001:139).  These actors lend new meaning 
and value to the region and the notion of regional communities, and in doing so also 
re-scales identities and social relations.  
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and by a degree of mutual interdependence” (2000:462; Helen 
and Milner, 1997)3.  This state-centric definition of regions 
underestimates the role of non-state actors in the construction of 
regions and regional community.  As a result, this definition of 
region is inadequate since: “… regions disappear and reappear as 
they are transformed by various economic, political and cultural 
forces…” (Väyrynen, 2003:25)4.  Because regions disappear and 
reappear as they are transformed, we can conclude, like Björn 
Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum do, that: “There are no ‘natural’ or 
‘given’ regions, but these are created and recreated in the process 
of global transformation.” (2000:461)5.  This presupposes that 
social and political forces that transcend the state, also contribute 
to an expanded conception of regions and the notion of 
regionalism.  In the 1990s, the character and functions of regions 
and regionalism have experienced a major transformation.  This 
requires a re-the conceptualising of regions and regionalism that 
transcends state-centrism.     
In re-conceptualising regions and regionalism that transcends 
state-centrism, one needs to consider various economic, political 
and cultural forces, which shape and reshape regions.  In doing 
so, one could argue, like Andrew Hurrel does, that: “The range of 
factors that may be implicated in the growth of regionalism is very 
wide and includes economic, social, political, cultural and historic 
dimensions” (1995:333).  Such an expanded regional space 
provides for a different and multifaceted conception of regions and 
the notion of regional communities.  This suggests that what is 
needed, in the 1990s and beyond, is a new type of regionalism 
that is, among others, open and inclusive and driven by both state 
and non-state actors.   
                                      
3
 Raimo Väyrynen posits that: “Physical regions refer to territorial, military and 
economic spaces controlled primarily by states, but functional regions are defined by 
nonterritorial factors such as culture and the market that are often the purview of 
nonstate actors” (2003:27). 
 
4
 Moreover: “… regions are shaped by the spillover of domestic conditions across 
borders.” (ibid, p32). 
 
5
  In this regard, Fredrik Söderbaum notes that: “Just like states, regions are social 
constructs and may involve a large number of countries in macroregions or a more 
limited number grouped in subregions or smaller cross-border microregions. At the 
same time, the socially constructed nature of regions implies that they are politically 
contested.” (2003:411).   
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Social constructivism, which informs definitions of regionalism in 
the 1990s, and as such has displaced previous approaches, views 
regions as social and political constructs, formed by both states 
and non-state actors.  Stephen Walt asserts that: “From a 
constructivist perspective… the central issue in the post-Cold War 
world is how different groups conceive their identities and 
interests.”  For constructivist the crucial aspect during the post-
Cold War period is: “… how ideas and identities are created, how 
they evolve, and how they shape the way states understand and 
respond to their situation” (1998:9).  In re-conceptualising 
regionalism, however, it is crucial not only to look at how states 
understand and respond to their situation, but also to look at the 
cultural, economic, political and security factors and the multiple 
actors, which necessitates such a response.  New approaches to 
the study of regionalism, which take place across a number of 
dimensions, accommodate such a re-conceptualisation.       
The above re-conceptualisation of regionalism is necessitated by 
the fact that: “…the existence of regions is preceded by the 
existence of region-builders” (Niemann, 1998:115).  Region-
builders, which is made up of both state and non-state actors 
should, therefore, recognised that: “Regionalism is a 
heterogeneous, comprehensive, multi-dimensional phenomenon, 
taking place in several sectors and often ‘pushed’ (or rather 
constructed) by a variety of actors (state, market and 
society)”(Grant and Söderbaum, 2003:6)6.  This suggests that 
social and political forces beyond the state also drive regionalism.  
In the case of southern Africa, it will be contended that non-state 
actors also contribute to the definition and organisation of social 
space and political community taking place in the region.  As such, 
they contribute to the constitution of the social reality that gives 
meaning to the notion of region and regional communities.   
Daniel Bach notes that: “Regionalism refers specifically to the 
idea, ideology, policies and goals that seek to transform a 
geographical area into a clearly identified social space.  
Regionalism also relates to the construction of an identity and 
                                      
6
  Andrew Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum define regionalism as: “… the body of ideas, 
values and concrete objectives that are aimed at transforming a geographical area into 
a clearly identified regional social space. In other words, it is the urge by any set of 
actors to re-organize along regional lines in any given issue-area.” (2003:7).   
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carries as a result, a strong cognitive component.” (2003:22).  This 
invites us to re-examine both the theoretical and normative 
foundations of the study of regionalism.  The construction of an 
identity is not only the prerogative of states, but also of non-state 
actors.  It is the construction of an identity, which informs the 
definition of regions and regionalism in the 1990s.     
Important for the conception of regions and regionalism in the 
1990s was: “… how political actors perceive and interpret the idea 
of a region…hence the conclusion is that… regions are socially 
constructed and hence politically contested…” (Hurrel. 1995:334).  
For southern Africans, the social re-construction of regions should 
make allowance for: “… the growth of societal integration within a 
region and to the [often-undirected] processes of social and 
economic interaction, which, result in complex social networks as 
a result of the increasing flow of people, which eventually lead to… 
the creation of a transnational regional civil society.” (Ibid)7.  Such 
a transnational regional civil society posits that the poor and the 
marginalised are forging an identity among themselves not bound 
by national boundaries in their search for a modicum of protection 
and livelihood.  In demonstrating their social significance, they are 
socially reconstructing southern Africa.  The social re-construction 
of regions and regionalism, therefore, should recognise that a 
regional civil society gives new meaning to the notion of regional 
communities.  
The study of regional integration in southern Africa has hitherto, 
however, largely been conducted within the confines of inter-state 
integration.  The imposition of SAPs in most southern African 
countries and economic globalisation has seen the growth in 
transnational relations8.  In the context of southern Africa, a ‘new’ 
approach to the study of regionalism opened-up possibilities for 
recognising that regionalism in its contemporary form is a 
multifaceted process that involves both state and non-state actors 
                                      
7  Lesley Blaauw (1997) explores the possible evolution of a regional civil society in 
southern Africa.  
 
8
  Six states within SADC have implemented SAPs under the aegis of the WB and 
IMF.  These countries are Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Others such as Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa 
and Swaziland have voluntarily introduced elements of SAPs into their economic 
policies (Tsie, 1996; Lee, 2003).  
 6 
and occurs within the institutional space provided by states, but 
also outside of such space.  This would entail re-configuring the 
definition of southern Africa, to make allowance for such insights.      
In socially re-constructing the southern African region, thus, 
regional analysis should focus on the role of both state and non-
state actors.  In addition, if we view regions as social and political 
constructs, we should bear in mind the various cultural, economic 
and political factors, which contribute to the growth of regionalism.  
Re-conceptualising regionalism in southern means we should 
move beyond the historical definition of regionalism as a statist 
project.    
 7 
1.1.2 Regionalism in southern Africa: Old and New  
 
 
 
The formation of the southern African region centred historically on 
South Africa.  The discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa 
enabled that country to construct the region based on its own 
needs.  Labour migration, mining expansion, trade and transport, 
inter alia, all enhanced by the discovery of minerals, assisted 
South Africa to establish a political region to suit its own needs.  
The implications of the above, is that southern Africa, as a region 
did not evolve naturally or organically.  With reference to southern 
Africa and drawing on Historical Sociology, Peter Vale contends 
that: “… states in the region were not born of natural ordering but 
were the products of constantly changing political, economic and 
strategic considerations.” (2003:42; 2005).  This suggests that 
states are social and political constructs, which are constantly 
created and re-created.  Moreover, state formation in this context, 
is a multifaceted and comprehensive enterprise, taking place 
across a multi-level framework.    
By similar extension regions and the formation of regional 
communities are also social and political constructs, which takes 
place in the context of complex economic and social linkages, 
among multiple actors.  These linkages may be historically 
embedded.  Referring to the afore-mentioned, Peter vale asserts 
that: “… across the face of southern Africa community identities 
exist that predate and, perforce, defy the fragmentation 
represented by colonial borders.” (2003: 153).  This suggests that 
regional identities may be historically deep-seated.  Moreover, it 
points to the fact that the regional frontier is not defined by states 
also.  The possible discovery of a common past that lies beyond 
the geometry of state sovereignty is embedded in the shared 
history of colonialism and the process of decolonisation.  
For southern Africans: “The use of common cultural identities to 
define regions grew out of the process of decolonisation.” 
(Väyrynen, 2003:26).  This shared history of colonialism points to 
the existence of an inherent region, which could be used to 
enhance regionness.  Björn Hettne posits that: “… there may be 
an ‘inherent regionness’ from precolonial times which form the 
basis for latent, informal regions transcending the current state 
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system.” (2001b:92).  New approaches to the study of regionalism 
also recognise the specific historical experience of a particular 
space.  This inherent regionness presupposes that regions are 
also re-defined by “the people” who are conscious of their 
transnational past and form a transnational community in doing so.  
This makes the contemporary conception of southern Africa as a 
regional state system only, contentious.    
In the case of southern Africa, the conception of a southern 
African ‘region’ has remained a contested concept.  This begs the 
question: what type of region does contemporary southern Africa 
constitute?  Notwithstanding the renewed dynamism of regions, 
Solomon and Cilliers (1996) argue that southern Africa lacks the 
characteristics of a region in important respects.  Their argument 
is informed by a perception of heterogeneity in the domains of 
religion and language, as well as a lack of economic and political 
homogeneity.  Such a conception of the region, ignores the fact 
the trans-border activities of the people of southern Africa, which 
predates colonialism, lend new meaning and value to the region 
and the notion of regional communities and in doing so provide or 
make allowance for the conception of regionalism, which 
transcends state-centrism.    
The above suggests that the conception of a region by Solomon 
and Cilliers (1996) in such narrow terms is based on dominant and 
indeed very conventional thinking on regionalism as a purely 
statist project9.  This thinking, Peter Vale contends, has been 
crucial in: “The development of the region’s state system, and the 
community its state-makers have constructed…  This has 
consequently… separate[d] southern African from a shared 
history.”  The conception of a region, and indeed: “… the discovery 
of a common regional purpose is through the theoretical and 
political openings offered by the local, the immediate, even the 
personal- not… the statist.” (2003:140).  This implies the need to 
rethink the relationship between governmental and non-
govermental actors along much more fundamental lines in 
southern Africa.  More critically, it exhorts us to consider the 
                                      
9
  Writing on southern Africa Peter Vale and Khabelo Matlosa assert that: “… 
interstate community-building is inevitably a prisoner of the national ambitions of 
governments. These governments inevitably operate on narrow political agendas that 
stand in the way of regional cooperation.” (1995:2).  
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agency of non-state actors and transnational forces.  This non-
statist emphasis requires a re-interpretation and expanded form of 
regionalism in southern Africa, which embraces non-state actors 
as well.   
The shared history of the peoples’ of southern Africa could be 
used to re-interpret the conception of regionalism in southern 
Africa, from a non-state centric viewpoint.  These historically deep-
seated identities, brought about by social contacts facilitate some 
sort of regionness.  This suggests that non-state actors have a 
role to play in the construction of regions and regional community. 
Regionalism in southern Africa is also re-defined by “the people” 
who are conscious of their transnational past and form a 
transnational community in doing so.  The awareness of a 
transnational past in southern Africa is embedded in social 
relations, which are historically constituted.  Monnakgotla (1997) 
argues that the history of colonialism, which resulted in English 
and Portuguese being the core lingua francas of the region, could 
be used to reinforce common cultural identities, increase 
regionness and as such contributes to the formation of a 
transnational community10. 
The formation of a transnational community, which transcends 
state-centrism in southern Africa, will arguably, lead to: “… the re-
scaling of identities and social relations…” (Taylor and 
Söderbaum, 2001:677).  The re-scaling of identities and social 
relations are fuelled by the existence of: “… informal economic 
and sociocultural cross-border interaction among small and private 
business, traders and people, ethnic and cultural networks, and so 
forth more or less all over Southern Africa.  Well-known examples 
include the cross-border interaction in Southern Malawi and 
Mozambique; eastern Zimbabwe and Mozambique; southern DRC 
and Zambia… Some of these cross-border activities arise for 
sociocultural and historical reasons, as a consequence of the 
                                      
10
   Moreover, Venda and Sotho are spoken by South Africans and Zimbabweans; 
Kalanga, Tswana and San are spoken on the borders of Botswana and Zimbabwe, 
whilst Tonga is the medium of interaction between Zambians and Zimbabweans 
(Monnakgotla, 1997). Language can indeed serve as a powerful tool in re-
constructing a southern Africa community. For example: “… the Sotho-Tswana 
people of southern Africa are scattered across several international borders… inter 
alia… those of Lesotho, Botswana, and South Africa…” (Vale, 2003:153). 
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irrelevance of current national borders, while others are based on 
price and institutional differences between countries with common 
borders.” (Söderbaum, 2001b: 111-112)11.  The actions of these 
non-state actors not only leads to transforming the region’s 
economic and political landscape, but also implies that social 
relations include a regional dimension.  As such, using state-
centric lenses to define southern Africa, suggests a poor basis for 
understanding the region.  New approaches to the study of 
regionalism point to the need to recognise the reflexive inter-
relations of multiple actors operating at multiple levels within the 
region.  
Because the actions of these actors compel us to re-conceptualise 
regionalism, they remind us that the region is not only made up of 
institutions which promote co-operation, but also of non-state 
actors which contribute to the formation of a regional identity that 
lies beyond the geometry of state boundaries.  In this trajectory, 
the conception of regionalism consists of a complex set of inter-
locking institutions, norms and values, formal and informal 
relations, governmental and non-governmental actors that serves 
to make the rules for the regional order.  Such trans-border activity 
from below lends new meaning and value to the region and the 
notion of regional communities and in doing so re-scales identities 
and social relations.  This re-scaling of identities and social 
relations, are also mirrored in the migration patterns of farm 
workers and mine workers and those in search of a modicum of 
relief in the face of growing poverty and displacement.    
 
The above re-scaling of identities and social relations suggests 
that: “In the midst of growing economic uncertainty and social 
strains, people in southern Africa have established or renewed 
regional connections as protective strategies.  Of late there has 
been a noticeable increase in informal transborder trade and in the 
migration of people.  While many such movements are 
economically driven, there have been increased numbers of 
political refugees fleeing civil war… and of ecological refugees 
forced out of homelands by drought and soil depletion.  In many 
instances, the nature and source of the problem, like the 
                                      
11
  This allows us to view the region as a social system: “… which imples translocal 
relations of social, political, cultural and economic nature between human groups. 
These relations may be positive or negative, but, either way, they constitute some 
kind of regional complex.” (Hettne, 2001a: 157-158). 
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responses, are also regional.” (MaClean, 1999:945).  Such 
interconnections have implications for domestic as well as inter-
state politics, and contribute to the re-scaling of identities and 
social relations.  
 
This re-scaling of identities and social relations are crucial for: “… 
the development of shared understanding, transnational values 
and transaction flows to encourage community-building.” (Adler 
and Barnett,1998:4).  The development of shared understanding 
and transnational values beyond the geometry of state sovereignty 
by non-state actors are contributing to raising awareness that new 
approaches to the study of regionalism is also concerned with 
regionalism from below.  Regionalism from below contributes to 
regionness and an expanded conception of regions and the notion 
of regional communities beyond state boundaries12.   
 
The above implies that: “… regions do not need fixed boundaries. 
Regional clusters of actors can be defined by their mutual 
externalities, common identities, or the interactions among 
domestic coalitions. But even state-based regions expand and 
contract.” (Väyrynen, 2003:40).  For southern Africa, this creates 
the opportunity to re-interpret the conception of region and 
regionalism. In simple terms, it offers southern Africans the 
opportunity to construct a ‘new’ region that transcends state-
centrism.   
It needs to be recognised that southern Africa as a region consists 
of both social forces and states.  This compels us to re-create and 
re-conceptualise southern African regionalism.  Re-
conceptualising regionalism in southern Africa should include the 
poor and the marginalised.  The contention here is that 
regionalism in southern Africa will only be enduring if it is 
underpinned by the realisation that both social forces and states 
have roles to play in strengthening regional institutions and 
processes.  For the above to be achieved, recognition must be 
given to sub-national and transnational communities, which exist 
alongside states.  This requires new analytical tools to define the 
concepts region and community.   
                                      
12
   As regards the region’s borders, Peter Vale asserts that: “… the borders that 
separate one southern African state from another are more incidental than real- more 
obstacle that the facilitator of peace and progress” (2003:12).  
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One of the most potent symbols that could be used in constructing 
a ‘new’ region, that transcend state-centrism and as such a ‘new’ 
community in southern Africa is the liberation struggle.  Due to the 
liberation struggles waged by the people of the region, a degree of 
cultural assimilation took place.  The threads of southern Africa’s 
history are indeed densely intertwined.  History could, therefore, 
assist southern Africans in the possible discovery of a common 
past13.  This in turn will enable southern Africans to talk more 
constructively about a common future.  Ken Booth and Peter Vale 
note that: “By facing up to their past, southern Africa’s peoples can 
shed their legacy of bitter conflict; and, by looking at security 
through fresh eyes, they can participate in the complex task of 
building a regional community out of a set of generally embattled 
and impoverished states.” (1995:299).  Talking more 
constructively about a common future will lend new meaning and 
value to the region and the notion of regional communities and in 
doing so re-scales identities and social relations.     
   
Lending new meaning and value to the region and the notion of 
regional communities will heighten the awareness that historically 
in southern Africa: “… actors share values, norms and symbols 
that provide a social identity…” (Adler and Barnett, 1998:3).  By 
sharing a social identity, communities are allowed to broaden the 
definition of a region.  Accordingly: “… regions arise from the 
redefinition of norms and identities by governments, crime groups, 
and business firms.” (Väyrynen, 2003:26).  Regions are, therefore, 
also re-defined by ‘the people’’ who are conscious of their 
transnational past and form a transnational community in doing so.  
Here the burden of the region’s apartheid past, however, remains 
a huge obstacle in re-conceptualising southern Africa. 
The existence of apartheid in southern Africa created a clear 
regional divide between South Africa and her neighbours, and a 
striking paradox.  On the one hand, we had the apartheid 
government and its private economic actors, and part of South 
African civil society, seeking to actively promote the national 
                                      
13
   The possible discovery of a common past is embedded in the shared history of 
colonialism.  For southern Africans: “The use of common cultural identities to define 
regions grew out of the process of decolonisation.” (Väyrynen, 2003:26). Indeed: “… 
there may be an ‘inherent regionness’ from precolonial times which form the basis 
for latent, informal regions transcending the current system.” (Hettne, 2001b:92).   
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interests of that government.  On the other, we had the liberation 
movements of South Africa and some sections of civil society, 
predominantly black, actively opposed to all ventures beyond the 
parameters of the apartheid state.  Neighbouring countries in 
southern Africa also actively attempted to oppose the penetration 
of the apartheid state and, especially its private economic actors. 
This response by the rest of the region to the apartheid state was 
exemplified by the formation of a community of resistance and 
common purpose14.   
For the people of southern Africa, the formation of a community of 
resistance and common purpose was considerably aided by a 
common British administrative past. This in turn has contributed to 
a common interdependence contributed to a sense of regionness, 
which lies beyond the geometry of state sovereignty.  Writing on 
this common British past, Stephen Burgress notes that: “The 
southern African structure was created by British imperialist 
forces, consolidated after the Anglo-Boer War, and centered on 
cooperation with the Union of South Africa.  The region was bound 
together by British capital, the mining economy, and railroads, 
extended to Angola in the Northwest and to the border of 
Tanganyika in the Northeast, and featured European settlers and 
Portugal as junior partners.  After the defeat of Germany in World 
War 1, a unipolar, hierarchical structure prevailed which ensured 
that there were no internal or interstate wars in the region until the 
1960s.” (1998:43; Martin 1990)15.  These developments, arguably, 
point to the historical existence of a common interdependence, 
which in turn contributed to a sense of regionness. 
                                      
14
   In the domain of security, this suggests that: “… the search for community in 
southern Africa seemed to be remarkably straightforward.” (Vale, 2003:137). What 
this highlights in the aftermath of the Cold War, is that narrow state-driven 
regionalism: “… has not produced community but has given instead, and ideological 
and geopolitical shape to regional affairs.” (ibid, p139). 
 
15
 With respect to geography, Vale maintains that: “The countries of Southern Africa 
are hide-bound to each other in the same way as are Canada and the United States, or 
France and Germany.” (1989:3).  In the realm of political economy, he views the 
erection of a railway across the continent, to ostensibly transport gold from South 
Africa to the world market, as creating a pattern of  (inter) dependence. 
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The above socio-cultural cross-border interaction circumvented 
state imposed anti-apartheid trade restrictions.  This socio-cultural 
cross-border interaction may lay the basis for broader, non-state 
centric forms of co-operation in the region16.  Peter Vale and Ken 
Booth posit that for the establishment of broader non-state centric 
forms of co-operation in the region: “The key lies in the 
development of a common sense of purpose among the societies 
across the region.” (1995:290).   This requires a re-interpretation 
and expanded conception of regions, which includes economic, 
social, political, cultural and historic dimensions.   In southern 
Africa, however, regional co-operation and integration historically 
meant state-promoted regionalism.  This could, by and large, be 
attributed to the minimal role non-state actors have played in such 
integration projects17.  Observers have not as yet interviewed or 
considered sub-regional actors about how they view the region.  
States have hitherto occupied the central focus of regional 
analysis in southern Africa.    
State-promoted regional co-operation has formed an integral part, 
if not the only part, of regional integration attempts in southern 
Africa.  What is significant to note is that inter-state integration in 
southern Africa: “… can be developed to secure welfare gains, to 
promote common values or to solve common problems… with a 
view to enhance… the conceptualisation of confidence-building 
measures, to the negotiation of a region-wide security regime.” 
(ibid. p336).  A region-wide security regime, should however, not 
only concern itself with the security of the state, but also the 
security of individuals and groups within and between it.  
Therefore, regional security must be conceived in terms of the 
extension of the notion of community18, to include the poor and the 
marginalised.   
 
                                      
16
    Increasing non-state interaction may lead to: “A deeper thrust towards regional 
civil society will follow upon the intermingling of southern Africa’s peoples outside 
the activities of their governments.” (Booth and Vale, 1995:300). 
 
17
  More ominously: “The post-apartheid recreation of Southern Africa has tended to 
stress that the borders which are said to separate its states are fixed, determine the 
points of entry to, and exit from, a regional state system.” (Vale, 1999:19). 
 
18  Karl Deutsch has argued that: “… a security community grows out of the mutual 
compatibility of values; strong economic ties; the expectation of more; multifaceted, 
social, political and cultural transactions…” (Ken Booth and Peter Vale, 1995:290).  
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A number of developments offer the opportunity to re-interpret and 
expand the notion of security in southern Africa.  For Peter Vale: 
“Sites that offer an exchange of sovereignty are much in vogue in 
southern Africa: peace parks, spatial development projects, and 
the sharing of power grids are forcefully advanced as a rational 
way to resolve regional tensions, to dissolve ecological worries, to 
create jobs, and to grow the region’s economy.  All these, it is 
often asserted, will deepen the prospects for regional peace and 
community.” (2003:144). These regional tensions not only affect 
inter-state relations, but also communities in the region.  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, communities in southern Africa are at the 
forefront of constructing trans-border or transnational peace parks 
and spatial development projects.  The actions of these actors 
require the broadening of the conception of regions and 
regionalism in southern Africa.      
 
 
 
1.1.3 Re-conceptualising regionalism in southern Africa 
 
 
 
The formative force of regions and the conceptualisation of 
regionalism in the 1990s, it has been argued elsewhere, are not 
states alone.  In this trajectory, new approaches to regions and 
regionalism make allowance for a much more broader and 
comprehensive definition of these processes.  Broadening the 
conception of regions and regionalism presupposes: “… that a 
number of domestic and transnational problems… are… 
approached in terms of security.  Even at regional level, concern… 
needs to focus on the ‘new’ security threats such as: “… 
population growth; the environment and competition for scarce 
natural resources; mass migration; food shortage; drugs; disease 
and AIDS; ethnocentric nationalism; crime and small arms 
proliferation; the crises of liberal democracy; the role of the armed 
forces; poverty and economic marginalisation.” (Söderbaum, 
2001:29).  These problems are central to most southern African 
states and societies and are critical determinants in contributing to 
the new conception of regionalism in the region.  
 
The contention here is that three elements should inform our   
understanding of the conception of regionalism: “First, there is a 
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common historical experience and sense of shared problems 
among a geographically distinct group of countries or societies: 
this effectively gives a definition of a ‘region’.  Second, there are 
close linkages of a distinct kind between those countries and 
societies…. Finally, there is the emergence of organizations, 
giving shape to the region in a legal and institutional sense and 
providing some’ rules of the game’ within the region: this element 
of design and conscious policy is central to ‘regionalism’.” (Smith, 
1997:70-71).  This suggests that expanded forms of regions and 
regionalism need to recognise that domestic, regional and the 
security of groups and individuals are inseparable.    
 
The expansion and broadening of the conception of regionalism in 
southern Africa, and the definition of the region itself needs to bear 
in mind that: “… the region’s people are in search of communities 
that lie beyond the privileges that have until now been accorded to 
the region’s states and their governing elites.” (Vale, 2003:158). 
The conception of regions and regionalism in southern Africa, 
therefore, need to be moulded to accommodate the poor and 
marginalised.  It is, thus, necessary to recognise that: “The relative 
strength and mutual relationships between the top-down and 
bottom-up forces determine the dynamics of regionalism and 
regionalization in Southern Africa.” (Söderbaum, 2001:106). This 
creates the opportunity for co-operation and inclusion, which in 
turn could strengthen regionness.   
Fredrik Söderbaum notes that: “The profound implications of 
globalization, regionalization, and the restructuring of the nation-
state have made it necessary to transcend the conventional 
obsession with national government and recognize the emergence 
of new and revised authority and governance structures, both 
“above” and “below” the level of national government.” (2004:410).  
Regionalism in southern Africa should also, therefore, concern 
itself with political and social communities, which exist outside or 
on the fringes of states or who are the subject of exclusion.  We, 
therefore, need to recognise more complex and multi-level modes 
of governance in which both state and non-state actors play a role.  
Globalisation and regionalism are according communities the 
opportunity to find solutions to pressing problems in transnational 
structures.  This is because globalisation and regionalism are 
intimately connected, and together are shaping the emerging world 
order. 
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  1.2. The Rationale for Regional Integration 
 
 
 
1.2.1. The Global Context 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the activities of civil society 
actors have become increasingly important in giving us a lead 
about the changing nature of multiple referents in a transnational 
context19. Developmental activists, trade unionists, gender 
advocates, environmentalists, human rights watchdogs, groups of 
indigenous people and even drug syndicates, are helping to define 
interests that were once considered the exclusive domain of the 
state.  This has given rise to a growth in societal activities.   
 
Renewed growth in non-state actor activity is often attributed to 
the process of globalisation20.  To James Mittelman: “What sets 
                                      
19
   There is no shortage of definitions of civil society, Gramsci, Hegel and others have 
written on the subject. In this context, civil society embodies that space between 
constituted authority and the household. The conception of civil society in this 
context is understood: “… as a space where the public and private are more closely 
intertwined.” (Hopgood, 2001:1). However, civil society is also distinct from society 
in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to, inter 
alia, express their interests and make demands on the state and hold state officials 
accountable. Civil society encompasses a vast array of organisations. For the purpose 
of this dissertation, the developmental and issue-oriented nature of civil society is 
critical. Larry Diamond asserts that the developmental function of civil society is 
performed by: “…organizations that combine individual resources to improve 
infrastructure, institutions and the quality of life of the community.” While its issue-
oriented function is performed by: “… movements for environmental protection, 
women’s rights, land reform, or consumer protection.” (1994:6).      
 
20
   Globalisation has a long lineage. Yet, in the last three decades of the twentieth 
century, it has become more pronounced (Mittelman, 2000:918). To Stephen Gill: 
“Globalisation has a long lineage, which coincides with the development of 
capitalism.” (1996:209). The first phase of globalisation commenced at the end of the 
fifteenth century and was characterised by expanded European hegemony over the 
Western Hemisphere and sea routes becoming global. The second phase started 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century and was characterised by imperialism, 
and by a tremendous increase in trade and investment during the Industrial 
Revolution. The third phase commenced at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
with the integration of capital markets (Keohane and Nye, 2000).  
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the context for conflict and cooperation in the post-Cold War 
period is an integrating yet disintegrating process known as 
globalization.” (ibid. p3).  Globalisation needs to be understood as 
a multifaceted process, in which a range of actors try to address a 
variety of issues.  Globalisation as a phenomenon on the ground 
is embedded in a large diversity of economic, political and social 
questions.  Because globalisation takes place not only in a state-
centric set-up, but also within a multi-level framework it: “…has 
undermined the authority of conventional political structures and 
accentuated the fragmentation of societies.” (ibid. p27).  This 
highlights the richness and complexity of interconnections, which 
transcend states and societies in the global order.  New 
approaches to the study of regionalism, because of its 
comprehensives and multiplicity, also recognise the richness and 
complexity of contemporary forms of regionalism.  As such, new 
approaches to the study and practise of regionalism, is intimately 
linked to globalism.     
 
 
 
1.2.2 Globalisation Defined 
 
 
 
Globalisation21 represents one of the most significant aspects of 
current international relations.  The concept of globalisation is a 
contested one, which is obscured by a pervasive conceptual 
fuzziness.  Louise Amoore (et al, 1997) postulate that definitional 
clusters of the concept globalisation might include: economic 
processes; political processes; world culture processes; and 
global civil society processes.  For our purpose, the concept 
globalisation denotes the economic, cultural, political and 
technological processes which generate a multiplicity of linkages 
and interconnections between states and societies which make up 
                                                                                                         
 
21
  Conceptually, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye contend that it is necessary to make 
a distinction between globalism and globalisation. The former, they argue, refers to: 
“… a state of the world involving networks of interdependence of capital and goods, 
information and ideas, and people and forces, as well as environmentally and 
biologically relevant substance (such as acid rain or pathogens). Globalisation and 
deglobalisation refers to the increase or decline of globalism.” (2000:105).  
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the modern world system (Held and McGrew, 1993:262).  This 
suggests that globalisation, like new approaches to regionalism, is 
a multifaceted and comprehensive process that involves both 
state and non-state actors, and covers a wide range of issues, 
ranging from politics to economics.  While there is agreement that 
globalisation encompasses a variety of issues and involve 
numerous actors, it is often narrowed down to the neo-liberal 
project of economic globalisation.  When globalisation is narrowed 
down to the neo-liberal project of economic globalisation then the 
contours of the definition becomes clear. 
 
 It is indeed often argued that the globalisation process is 
ostensibly, but not exclusively, driven by economic 
considerations22.  Globalisation as an economic force centres on: 
“… the spatial reorganisation of production, international trade, 
and the integration of financial markets.” (Sideri, 1997:38)23.  The 
economic triad- the EU, NAFTA, and the regionalism as practised 
in Asia-Pacific- exemplifies this re-organisation of the global 
political economy24.  For Björn Hettne (1997) economic 
globalisation is fundamentally about the extension and 
intensification of capitalist global relations on a global scale, 
specifically after the Cold War.  Globalisation is, thus, in this 
context, shaped by the ideology of neo-liberalism.     
 
The end of the Cold War has accentuated the ideology of ‘free 
markets’ or neo-liberalism which extended: “… the Reaganite-
Thatcherite idea of neo-liberalism… from Anglo-America to other 
                                      
22
  To Sandro Sideri, the economic concerns of this process centre around: “… 
multilateral trade liberalisation and trade policy.” (1997:39) 
 
23
  Globalisation is, however, more than an economic force. Stephen Gill notes that it: 
“… is part of a broad process of restructuring of state and civil society, and of the 
political economy and culture.” (Gill, 1995:405).    
 
24
  Philip Cerny notes that: “Globalisation as a political phenomenon basically means 
that the shaping of the playing field of politics itself derives from… state 
boundaries.” (1997:253). Yet, these regions do not drive the new wave of 
regionalism. Indeed: “The most important characteristic of the new regionalism is its 
truly worldwide reach, extending to more regions, with greater external linkages.” 
(Palmer, 1991:2).  This suggests that the new regionalism is developing in a 
multipolar context. The multipolar nature of the new regionalism suggests that: “The 
relationship between these regional schemes and between regional and broader global 
initiatives is central to the politics of contemporary regionalism.” (Hurrel, 1995:332).    
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parts of the world, eroding barriers, relaxing restrictive frameworks 
for cross-border transactions, and allowing information, goods and 
labour to flow more easily across national boundaries. (Mittelman, 
2000:919)25.  This type of globalisation is synonymous with the 
liberalisation of production and trade, the extensive use of digital 
information technology to facilitate fast flows of information and 
rapid or instant telecommunication26.  These developments have 
been seen as catalytic in promoting economic globalisation, 
promoted by especially the neo-liberal state. 
 
 
 
1.2.3 Globalisation and the State 
 
 
 
The de-territorialisation of economic and political space, has led to 
a growth in global forms of governance.  This suggests that the 
state is no longer the key structural agent, which can initiate action 
and exercise structural power in its own right.  Resultantly, states 
need to respond in innovative ways to the proclivities of 
globalisation.  In response to the diminution of its role as an 
initiator of global economic action, the state needs to re-position 
itself.  In re-positioning itself, the state at times actively participate 
in the process of economic globalisation.  This gives the state a 
particular neo-liberal posture.   
 
The neo-liberal state has been viewed as an active promoter of 
economic globalisation27.  Philip Cerny argues that:  “… the state 
has always been to some extent viewed as a promoter of market 
forces…” (2003:208).  For states, this implies that globalisation is 
re-constituting or transforming the functions and authority of the 
                                      
25
  Resultantly: “The globalisation of neo-liberal capitalism dismantles the state’s 
power to regulate its national economy…” (Rosow, 2000:32).  
 
26
  David Held and Anthony McGrew assert that: “This globalization of economic 
forces has transformed the parameters within which national economic management 
is pursued.” (1993:269).  
  
27
   Philip Cerny notes that: “Economic globalization contributes not so much to the 
supersession of the state by a homogenous global order as to the splintering of the 
existing political order.” (2003:214). 
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nation-state.  Cerny suggests that: “The main task or function of 
the contemporary state is the promotion of economic activities, 
whether at home or abroad, which makes firms and sectors 
located within the territory of the state competitive in international 
markets.” (ibid.).  The state, in this context, reproduces itself in the 
face of domestic and international challenges.   
 
In simple terms, the state is being fundamentally transformed 
within the wider structural context of global transformation.  To 
James Mittelman, this suggests that: “In a globalized division of 
labour, the state no longer primarily initiates action in, but rather 
reacts to worldwide economic forces.” (1996:7).  Globalisation 
involves a complex process of de-territorialisation and re-
territorialisation of political authority.  The role of the state in this 
trajectory is, therefore, defensive.    
 
In addition, Philip Cerny contends that neo-liberalism actively 
promotes the ‘market-state’ by positing that: “… state structures 
today are increasingly being transformed into market-oriented and 
even market-based organizations themselves, fundamentally 
altering the way that public and private goods are produced.”28  
Economic globalisation is transforming the conditions under which 
state power is exercised.  Robert Cox observes that the above has 
resulted in: “The loss of effective sovereignty by states in 
economic policy…” (1997b:59).  Conversely: “… states have 
promoted the formation of a web of transnational regimes and 
other linkages which have increasingly been developing the 
capacity to operate autonomously of those states.” (ibid.).  This 
implies that interactions and processes at various levels also 
shape and change state responses to globalisation.   
 
From the above, the globalisation process produces a 
contradiction for states: “States and intergovernmental 
organization play a role in enforcing the rules of the global 
economy and in enhancing national competitiveness, but their 
powers of shielding domestic economies from negative effects of 
globalization have diminished.” (Cox, 1996b:26-27).  The loss of 
                                      
28
   This suggests that: “… we may be witnessing the transmutation of the state from a 
civil association into a more limited form of enterprise association…” (Cerny, 
2003:208). 
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effective sovereignty by states in economic policy, brought about 
by economic globalisation, means that the state is seen as less 
able to provide for the development needs of its people.   
 
The inability of the state to perform its developmental role is made 
more pronounced by what Richard Sandbrook (2000) terms 
pragmatic neo-liberalism, which posits that: “…the state assumes 
responsibility for providing minimally adequate safety nets for 
those individuals who cannot market themselves effectively” 
(2000:1070)29.  This suggests that the state is here engaging in 
welfare action instead of development, which is an effect of 
globalisation and the neo-liberal ideology.   
 
The above, Richard Sandbrook claims, “… purveys a false 
promise to the poor and socially excluded” (ibid: 1071).  In protest, 
the poor and socially excluded challenge this exclusion, brought 
about by globalisation.  This in turn, gives rise to resistance from 
social forces30.  By and large this resistance from social forces 
suggests the need for a ‘new’ recognition of the role of non-state 
actors. Simply put its calls for the recognition that international 
relations are not conducted by states only, but by a complex array 
of non-state actors, formal and informal political processes, and 
levels of sub-national, national, regional, international, and 
transnational polity as well.  Balefi Tsie forcefully argues that 
states may no longer be seen as the primary unit of analysis in 
international relations since: “… there may be other equally 
important or even more powerful actors in the international political 
arena than the state…” (2001a:114; Skocpol 1979; Halliday, 
1994),)31.  Often change in the international system does not 
simply revolve around states.   
                                      
29
  Writing on the impact of disciplinary neo-liberal globalism, Stephen Gill observes 
that: “… market civilisation involves patterns of social disintegration and 
exclusionary and hierarchical patterns of social relation.” (1995:397).  
  
30
  In this sense, not only production and the state, but also civil society is being 
globalised. James Mittelman asserts that: “The globalization of civil society involves 
resistance from disadvantaged strata in a changing division of labour.” (1996:10). 
    
31
    Stephen Rosow argues that: “States remain the primary political units, however 
they are more stringently disciplined by global markets and international managerial 
organisations to deregulate production and capital flows, reduce social programmes 
and limit organised labour.” (2000:32). 
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Other authors, like David Held et al (1990), contend that after all 
globalisation does not bring about the end of the state.  To them, 
globalisation has also encouraged a more realigned activist state.  
Philip Cerny asserts that: “… state actors and institutions are 
themselves promoting new forms of complex globalisation in the 
attempt to adapt state actions to cope more effectively with what 
they see as global ‘realities’.” (1997:251). This argument posits 
that the power of national governments is not necessarily 
diminished by globalisation.  States remain important actors in 
national, regional and global politics.  They have been joined, 
however, by numerous non-state actors that address a multitude 
of issues beyond territorial politics.   
 
From the above, power of national governments is being 
reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing 
complexity of processes of governance in a more interconnected 
world. To Philip Cenry, the political response of the state to 
globalisation: “… does not lead to a simple decline of the state but 
may be seen to necessitate the actual expansion of de facto state 
intervention and regulation in the name of competitiveness and 
marketization.” (ibid.).  This suggests that states remain central to 
shaping international economic relations.  In pursuance of its 
economic goals under the neo-liberal economic rubric, however, 
states have to deal with a complex array of economic relations.     
 
It explains the state’s preoccupation with market-related economic 
matters32, which indirectly promotes civil society formation.  States 
in having to re-organise economic space need to go regional. 
Simply put, states respond to the structural pressures of 
globalisation, by turning to regionalism33.  This is because: “… 
regionalism both shields domestic society from and integrates it 
into the global division of labour…” (Mittelman, 1996:11)34.  Seen 
                                      
32
  Implicitly is the recognition: “… that globalisation transforms political and not just 
economic life.”  (Rosow, S, 2000:38).  
 
33
  To Tom Mertes this result in a process of ‘de-globalisation’, which demands the 
building of: “… strong regional markets within the South that would have some 
autonomy from global financial interests.” (2002:3).   
 
34
  Regionalism can, therefore, be a defensive or an offensive state strategy or it can 
combine elements of both. Resultantly, it is a conscious political project. Björn 
Hettne postulates that regionalisation is: “… the political corrective to globalised 
market-driven disorder and turbulence, not only on the level of the world but also in 
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in this light, the emergence of new approaches to regionalism take 
place against the background of the comprehensive structural 
transformation of the global system, characterise by a multi-level 
pattern of governance.  In this trajectory, globalisation and 
regionalisation are intimately connected. 
 
 
 
1.2.4 Globalisation and Regionalisation 
 
     
 
Regionalism takes place within the overall context of globalisation.  
As such, regions are created and re-created in the process of 
global transformation.  One of the consequences of such 
transformation is the internationalisation of the state.  The 
internationalisation of the state requires it to respond to multilevel 
pressures: ranging from local, regional to the international context.  
In this trajectory, the argument for regional co-operation35 and 
integration36 becomes persuasive as the only way to deal with the 
challenges of unbridled market forces spawned by globalisation.  It 
is in this context that Gibb and Michalak remark that through 
regionalism states are trying: “… to control at the regional scale 
what they increasingly failed to manage at the national and 
multilateral levels.” (1996:447; Fawcett, 2004:439)37.  In simple 
                                                                                                         
local systems.” (1999:xxxi).    
  
35
   Björn Hettne notes that: “Regional cooperation through a formal organisation is 
sometimes rather superficial, but at least the framework for cooperation is created.” 
(2001a:158). In addition: Regional cooperation may involve the creation of formal 
institutions, but it can often be based on a much looser structure, involving patterns of 
regular meetings with some rules attached, together with mechanisms for preparation 
and follow-up… Unlike some brands of regional integration, such cooperative 
arrangements are very clearly statist, designed to protect and enhance the role of the 
state and the power of the government.” (Hurrel, 1995:336). 
 
36
  Regional integration on the other hand is defined: “… as the gradual elimination of 
political and economic barriers between [and among] participating countries” (Dieter, 
1997:201).  Fredrik Söderbaum and Björn Hettne contend that: “… although both 
processes form an integral part of the current transformation of the global system, 
regionalization has a stronger element of political reaction to the basically 
market-driven globalisation process.” (1998:4).    
 
37
  Gamble and Payne argue that: “…nearly all states now seek, as it were, to ride two 
 25 
terms, therefore, regionalism is the political response to 
globalisation.  Jean Grugel posits that as a state-initiated project: 
“New regionalist associations of this sort may also be a way to 
avoid marginalisation.” (2000:8). This suggests that for states, 
globalisation has necessitated the construction of new types of 
inter-state organisation38, at a regional level. 
 
The above explains why a shift towards regionalism and bloc 
formation is increasingly apparent at both the global and regional 
levels39.  The rise of regionalism not only represents an attempt to 
militate against the possible negative consequences of globalism, 
but also seeks to influence the form that globalism is taking.  In 
doing so new forms of regionalism has to incorporate non-state 
actors.  Contemporary regionalism differs from older forms of 
regionalism, which was primarily concerned with inter-state 
relations, in both content and scope40.  
 
Whereas old regionalism was either economically or inter-
governmentally driven, new regionalism is broader and multi- 
dimensional.  The multifaceted nature of regionalism, and the 
                                                                                                         
tigers simultaneously: they have to respond to the structural power of international 
capital, which demands the continuing openness of the world economy, and to the 
continuing pull of national interests of various sorts, which requires that they compete 
for relative advantage in the global economy as effective as possible.” (1996:16).  
   
38
  The above illustrate that states now shares governance with societal actors as well. 
David Held and Andrew McGrew conclude that because of this increasingly complex 
forms of governance we now have:  “… -a divided authority system- in which states 
seek to share the tasks of governance with a complex array of institutions, public and 
private, local regional, transnational and global, representing the emergence of 
‘overlapping communities of fate’ (1998:221). 
     
39
  In this context, Björn Hettne suggests that: “The contemporary context of the 
mercantilist logic is no longer the nation-state, however, but the international political 
economy, in which ‘the political’ refers to a transnational framework of economic 
transactions…” (1993:212).  This compels us: “… to see regionalism as a return of 
the political, the need to control, in a transnational context.” (ibid.). This implies that: 
“Neo-liberalism then, cannot ignore the political issues it raises, issues about the 
reconceptualisation of democracy and about the possibilities of global 
democratisation.” (Rosow, 2000:34). 
   
40
   Andrew Hurrel (1995) contends that new regionalism is distinct from older forms 
of integration as a result of its multidimensional character; its scope and level of 
analysis embraces North/South regionalism, and creates regional consciousness. 
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uncertainty of political phenomena, opened-up space for actors 
other than states to influence global and regional events.   Hettne 
illustrates that global structural transformation was also 
occasioned by the addition of: “… non-state actors [that] are active 
and manifest themselves at several levels of the global system.” 
(1996:161). The ‘new regionalism’ therefore, embraces a range of 
issues and actors, which cover a variety of spectrums in the 
domains of economics and politics.   
 
The developments that have ushered in the rise of new 
regionalism are informed by a growth in economic, social and 
political interdependencies, involving both state and non-state 
actors41.  The terms of engagement vary from one region to 
another, depending on each region’s structural location and its 
role in the global economy42.  What the new regionalism intends to 
achieve is a change in the terms of engagement for the 
developing world.  Björn Hettne argues that new regionalism- and 
one of its variants- developmental regionalism: “…imply regional 
economic regulation without going to the extent of delinking from 
the world economy.” (1997:230).   
 
The above suggests that: “There is no doubt that the ‘new 
regionalism’ represents an attempt by states to forge a form of 
governance different from but not necessarily opposed to 
multilateralism43.  In that sense, it is a new strategy dealing with 
                                      
41
   The genesis of new regionalism is to be located: “As a building block of global 
social theory…which allows us to… somewhat simplistically speak of a marriage 
between development theory and international political economy, (or rather political 
economy, since “international” does not need mentioning anymore. Such a merger 
may ultimately strengthen an emerging “new” or “critical political economy of 
development,” dealing with historical power structures and emphasizing 
contradictions in them, as well as change and transformation expressed in normative 
terms, that is, development. In the broadest sense the NRA is compatible with various 
theoretical perspectives, ranging from neorealism to postmodernism.” (Söderbaum, 
2001:104).  Notable contributions to the NRA have been made by (Cox, 1997a, 
Gamble and Payne, 1996; and Hettne1995a, b). Ultimately, like new regionalism: 
“Globalisation is rooted mainly in cultural, transnational, and international political 
economy approaches.” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:7).    
 
42
  This is because: “Globalisation had a differential reach and impact reflecting 
existing asymmetries in the geometry of global power relations.” (Held and McGrew, 
1993:263).  
 
43
  In a multilateral world, one view is that globalisation and regionalisation is viewed 
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rapidly changing conditions in the global political economy and 
might lead to a revamped or improved multilateral system.” (Tsie, 
2001:12).   This suggests the fostering of forms of governance, 
which acknowledges the existence of a multipolar world. 
Governance in this context: “… is constructed by certain actors for 
certain purposes.” (Söderbaum, 2003:13).  Regionalism, the 
above posits, is therefore, a political response to the economic 
consequences of globalisation (Bøås, 2001; Mittelman, 1996; 
Fawcett, 2004).   
 
Processes of regional integration are, thus, for states crucial as 
both an international and national development strategy.  In the 
developing world in general, the resurgence of regionalism must 
also be viewed as a response to the perceived threat of global 
marginalisation.  In this regard, Louise Fawcett points out that: 
“For weaker states regionalism has provided a point of entry into a 
western-dominated order in which their interest are often 
perceived as marginalized, and also a forum where interaction and 
agenda-setting are possible.” (2004:439; Hettne, 1996b:89)44.    
 
To achieve the above, the state needs to respond in innovative 
ways to both these global and regional pressures, ostensibly 
because the state is located at the interface between the 
international and the national.  Towards this end, the state: “… 
looks both inward and outward, and in the process derives 
considerable power and autonomy, often playing each spatial 
dimension off against the other.” (Hobson, 1997:253-4)45.  This 
dual role compels the state: “… to locate itself within the 
globalising order… it also has: “… to respond to local, national and 
extra-national organisations and civil societies, especially as 
democratisation gets underway.” (Grugel, 2000:6).   New 
                                                                                                         
as mutually reinforcing (Hettne, 2001a). This suggests that: “Regionalism is one 
possible approach to multilateralism…” Ostensibly because: “World regions rather 
than nation states may in fact constitute basic units in a future multilateral world 
order.” (Hettne, 2001a:156).   
  
44
   Martin Bøås asserts that: “Regionalisation, as a political strategy… is an attempt 
by nation-states to recuperate governance over a globalised international political 
economy through regional management.” (2001:28) 
  
45
  This suggests that the state is detached from neither national nor international 
forces. 
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approaches to the study of regionalism shed light on how the 
region is constructed in the interplay between states, markets and 
civil society in various areas.  The attempt by the state to locate 
itself within the interplay of these various forces, has led to a 
diminution of the role of the state as an economic provider 
engaged in development and security.  
 
The above polarisation results in increasing insecurity, which 
manifest itself in economic and social polarization.  To find 
solutions to pressing economic and social needs, people look 
beyond the confines of the territorial state.  In doing so, they 
establish a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between 
societies.    This expansion of the political and social space for 
civil society has resulted in the growth of independent 
organisations.  These independent organisations espouse new 
directions of development, which transcend state-centric notions 
of globalisation and regionalism.           
 
 
 
1.2.5 Globalisation and Non-State Actors 
 
 
 
Globalisation has, arguably, altered the relationship between the 
individual and the state.  The transformation of the relationship 
between state and national citizens, gives rise to a growth in 
independent organisations.  These independent organisations 
grew as a result of the insecurity caused by globalisation46.  Such 
insecurity manifests itself in conflict, economic and social 
polarisation, and humanitarian emergencies.  In addition, such 
insecurity transforms the role of the state as an economic 
provider.  This transformation causes states to become even less 
able to provide for the multiple economic and social needs of 
people.  To address their multiple economic and social needs, 
people look beyond the territorial confines of their respective 
states47.   
                                      
46
   Such independent organisations are generically referred to as civil society. Robert 
Cox posits that: “Civil society is now understood to refer to the realm of autonomous 
group action distinct from both corporate power and the state.” (1999:10). 
 
47
   In this context: “… civil society has become the comprehensive term for various 
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In reaction to ‘deterritorialisation’48- a reconfiguration of social 
space- brought about by globalisation, people foresee an 
emancipatory role for civil society.  The emancipatory role for civil 
society, Jan Aardt Scholte contends, results from the fact that: 
 
“In a territorial world, people normally have most of their 
interactions and affiliations with others who share the same 
territorial space. The novelty of globalisation allows for a 
proliferation of social connections that are at least partly- and often 
quite substantially- detached from a territorial logic.”49 (2000:47). 
 
James Mittelman argues that de-territorialisation brought about by 
globalisation leads to the search for: “… alternative and bottoms-
ups forms of cultural identity and regional self-organization and 
self-protection, such as pro-democracy forces, women’s 
movements, environmentalists and other civil societal 
movements.” (2000:225).  The proliferation of social connections, 
it is contended here, makes allowance for civil society to perform 
its emancipatory role.  The emancipatory role of civil society posits 
                                                                                                         
ways in which people express collective wills independently of (and often in 
opposition to) established power, both economic and political.” (Cox, 1999:10). This 
is because: “… globalization leads to a growing disjuncture between the democratic, 
constitutional and social aspirations of the people- which are still shaped by and 
understood through the frame of the territorial state- on the one hand, and the 
dissipating possibilities of genuine and effective collective action through 
constitutional political processes on the other.” (Cerny, 2003:214).   
 
48
   To Richard Falk: “… territorial sovereignty is being diminished on a spectrum of 
issues in such a serious manner as to subvert the capacity of states to control and 
protect the internal life of society, and non-state actors holds an increasing proportion 
of power and influence in the shaping of world order.” (1997:125).  
 
49
  Stephen Rosow contends that: “The various stories of globalisation which follow a 
logic of territorialisation depoliticise democratic transnational democracy…” 
(2000:44). Indeed: “…contemporary social movements-for example, those that 
concern environmental destruction, women’s rights and indigenous people’s rights- 
appear to bypass the state in search of transnational or global solutions.” (C. Chin and 
J. Mittelman, 1999:39-40). Ultimately, thus: “Globalisation’s hallmark is 
acknowledgement of the independent role of both transnational entities- corporations, 
non-governmental social and political organisations of many kinds- and 
intergovernmental organisations and regions. The state is often a player in these 
networks, but it does not necessarily, or even usually, control them, and is 
increasingly enmeshed in and penetrated by them.” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:7).      
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the need to act as a counter-force to top-down globalisation50.  In 
other words, it allows us to construct a new global approach to 
development, which includes the poor and the marginalised.  
 
Thus in a bottom-up sense civil society needs to become: “… the 
realm in which those who are disadvantaged by globalization of 
the world economy can mount their protest and seek alternatives.  
This can happen through local community groups that reflect 
diversity of cultures and evolving social practices worldwide.  More 
ambitious still is the vision of a ‘global civil society’ in which these 
social movements together constitute a basis for an alternative 
world order.” (Cox, 1999:10-11).  Such an alternative world order 
posits an emancipatory role for civil society, which could play an 
active role in the re-interpretation and expansion of the notion of 
development and security in southern Africa.  
 
The emancipatory role for civil society could potentially contribute 
to creating an alternative global structure.  In this context, civil 
society- representing here a different type of political or social 
economy- becomes the most promising arena in which to seek the 
potential for change and development.  For as Cox reminds us: 
“… the social economy is precisely the area in which different 
forms of human organization, including the language and the 
concepts that make human organization intelligible, mesh with 
technologies and material resources to create viable 
communities.” (2001:224).  This view is in contrast to the top-down 
approach, in that it calls for the globalisation of people, instead of 
globalisation driven by states and market forces only.    
 
This allows not only for the ‘globalisation of people’- to invoke 
Patrick Bond’s (2001) phrase- but also for the further expansion of 
political and social space in which civil society could develop.  In 
the above-mentioned scenario, individuals are accorded the 
opportunity to interact with the wider region and the rest of the 
world as a means of advancing economic and political goals.  
                                      
50
   In a top-down sense: “… states and corporate interests influence the development 
of this current version of civil society towards making it an agency for stabilizing the 
social and political status quo.” (Cox, 1999:11).  Graig Murphy (2000) asserts that 
private bond-rating agencies, global oligopolies in re-insurance and global 
telecommunication networks, inter alia, are all contributing to reinforcing top-down 
globalisation. 
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Blaauw and Bischoff (2001) contend that in a region such as 
southern Africa this makes it possible for the formation of regional 
communities, engaged in development possible.   
 
They propose that in the context of southern Africa, it is best to 
develop: “A regional policy framework to address the 
consequences of these trends, of reduced loyalty region-wide, 
[which] includes refocusing on a commitment to democracy, 
development, building loyalty in the context of regional 
cooperation…” (2001:56). The suggestion is that regional 
organisations and regionalism are political constructs.  As such, 
they can be moulded to accommodate the marginalised and begin 
to address broad-based development.    
 
The above suggests that economic globalisation has not only 
altered the relationship between state and state, but also between 
state and civil society.  Andrew Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum 
assert that the changed in state-civil society relationship have 
caused: “… legitimacy, loyalty, identity, function and even 
sovereignty are transferred up or down in the system to political 
entities other than the state… This makes it necessary to… think 
in terms of a more complex, multi-level political structure in which 
states assumes different functions and in which regionalism needs 
to be integrated into multi-level framework.” (2003:11). In 
recognising that regionalism takes place within a multi-level 
framework, new regionalism has to incorporate non-state actors.   
 
For example, new regionalism acknowledges that as a result of 
uneven globalisation some communities that exist on the fringes of 
states take care of their own survival and as such of change.51  To 
illustrate: “In some poor countries of Africa and Southeast Asia, 
community organizations, often led by women, endeavour to meet 
basic needs on a local level, turning their backs upon states and 
international organizations that are perceived as acting against 
people.” (Cox, 1999:13).  This implies that the role of non-state 
actors needs to be recognised in a world where local and 
                                      
51
  This premise suggests that from: “… the scope and intensity of global 
interconnections… it is evident that national communities by no means exclusively 
“programme” the actions, decisions and policies of their governments and the latter 
by no means simply determine what is right or appropriate for their citizens alone.” 
(Held and McGrew, 1993:264).   
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international non-state actors are also critically engaging states, 
and where through its transnational actions these actors are 
shaping state behaviour52. 
 
For James Mittelman: “… the impetus for resistance seemed to 
emanate from civil society, which began to scale up and thrust 
across borders.” (2000:919)53.  The poor and the socially excluded 
are compelled to look beyond the state for means of economic 
survival and to address their mass economic and social needs.  In 
doing so, the poor and socially excluded form alliances with other 
non-state actors. 
 
Consequently, these actors, such as community organisations, for 
example, fill the void left by state retreat.  This suggests that non-
state actors are enmeshed and entrenched in complex structures 
of overlapping relations and movements.  These non-state actors 
give rise to new independent organisations.  For Robert Cox: 
“New independent organizations of protest grew into the political 
space that was opened up by the disruption and uncertainty of 
political authority.” (1999:8-9)54.  This means that the political and 
social space in which civil society could develop was expanded.  
This suggests that the political project of integration needs to 
entail, for example, workers and peasant’s mobilization, changing 
leadership attitudes or getting the international community to 
recognise people-centred forms of development.  This requires 
greater non-state actor participation in international affairs.   
 
                                      
52
   Philip Cerny asserts that: “Political globalization involves reshaping political 
practices and institutional structures in order to adjust and adapt to the growing 
deficiencies of nation-states as perceived and experienced by such actors.” 
(1997:253).  Organisations such as Amnesty International and the various 
environmental movements are making constructive contributions in changing state 
behaviour.   
 
53
   Hettne claims that: “… the present phase of neo-liberal hegemony and social 
marginalisation… causes … civil society… to become more important again, simply 
as a mode of survival when the protective redistributive political structures break up.” 
(1995a:5). He further suggests that: “social movements can also be seen as a 
protective measure in an era of extreme market dominance.” (ibid.). 
 
54
   In this sense: “… the dynamics of globalisation are gradually disembedding the 
domestic social contract between the state and society…” (Falk, 1997:130).  
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The demand for greater non-state actor participation in 
international affairs, bring into relief the issue of regionalism, not 
only as a purely economic issue, but also a politically driven 
project.  The contention here is that regional organisations and 
regionalism in southern Africa, is a political construction.  As such, 
it can be moulded to accommodate the marginalised and begin to 
address broad-based development.  This is because development 
is a key issue in the region, and the realisation that one way of 
reversing the history of lopsided economic development can only 
be by regulated regionalism55.  For a new global developmental 
coherence, which embraces popular needs, to evolve, there is a 
need to regulate both the global economy and the regional political 
economy of southern Africa. 
 
New forms of regionalism, which is multifaceted in nature, requires 
the state to play an active role in the regional integration process.  
Whilst, this new form of regionalism or ‘new regionalism’ is 
underpinned by the conviction that engagement with the world 
economy is unavoidable, new regionalism, also lend scope and 
provide guidance to the developing world on how to change the 
terms of engagement.   
 
This seems an appropriate response to the unfettered operation of 
market forces in the regional context.  Regionalism in southern 
Africa should therefore be a manifestation of both old and new 
processes of regional integration.  For states, this suggests that 
regionalism should be pursued as an attempt to create a political 
framework for a variety of forms of economic activity.  The new 
dimension to regionalism should seek to involve non-state actors 
in the integration process.  Non-state actor involvement in the 
integration process compels us to re-interpret the concept of 
regions and regionalism.   
 
In southern Africa, the re-interpretation of the region and 
regionalism is necessitated by the growth of social and economic 
interaction among the ordinary people. Such interaction, which 
leads to the development of complex social networks might 
                                      
55
   Björn Hettne states that new regionalism allows for: “… a certain amount of 
interventionism… in the form of an organized transfer of resources from rich to poor 
countries.” (2001b:19). 
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eventually lead to: … the creation of a transnational regional civil 
society.” (Hurrel, 1995:334).  However, state-promoted regional 
economic integration in southern Africa has hitherto achieved 
modest success, ostensibly because non-state actors have played 
a minimal role in such integration projects56. 
To date the study of African integration has largely been 
conducted within the confines of inter-state integration.  Two 
products of inter-state regionalism in Africa are the Southern 
African Development Community and the Southern African 
Customs Union. Writing on SADCC, Ibbo Mandaza rightly 
observes: “that Southern Africa has in general enjoyed such a 
healthy state of inter-state interaction…” (1995:25)57.  As such, 
SADCC’s state-led integration was limited and circumscribed to by 
the wish to preserve one’s sovereignty.  Similarly, the SACU 
arrangement also points to the limits of conventional integration.    
 
The above schemes were, by and large, state-centric and 
premised on political considerations58.  Hettne (2001a) reminds us 
that interaction among countries of southern Africa, suggests a 
level of organised co-operation. Generally, conventional studies of 
integration among states in SADCC were essentially premised on 
attempts to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa, 
and to counter-act the security risk posed by that country59. 
   
However, this form of regionalism ignored the involvement of 
actors other than states, and defined economic, political and 
security issues in rather narrow terms.  This statist approach 
                                      
56
   More ominously: “The post-apartheid recreation of Southern Africa has tended to 
stress that the borders which are said to separate its states are fixed, determine the 
points of entry to, and exit from, a regional state system.” (Vale,2001:19). 
 
57
  The genesis of SADCC was to act as the principal rear base in support of primarily 
state-based liberation struggles in southern Africa.  
 
58
   By and large, however, interaction among countries of southern Africa, suggests a 
level of organised co-operation (Hettne, 2001a). 
 
59
  A defining feature of organised co-operation is: “… the unidimensionality which 
characterises this stage of regional cooperation.” (Hettne, 2001a:158). Indeed: 
“Regional cooperation through a formal organisation is sometimes rather superficial, 
but at least the framework for cooperation is created.” (ibid.). 
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towards regionalism neglected the role played by non-state actors 
in regional integration.  To counter-pose conventional studies on 
regional integration, the emergence of a study of new regionalism 
in the late-1980s must be understood in a historical context.  
 
What is significant to note is that inter-state integration in southern 
Africa: “… can be developed to secure welfare gains, to promote 
common values or to solve common problems… with a view to 
enhance… the conceptualisation of confidence-building measures, 
to the negotiation of a region-wide security regime.” (ibid. p336).  
This requires an expanded and maximalist conception of regional 
security community.    
Because of the failure of southern African states to involve the 
regions’ people: “… the region remains poor and impoverished, its 
people trapped by both the ideas of politicians and the practices of 
security state makers.  In contemporary southern Africa, therefore, 
security remains a slave to the preordained limits of a state 
system that is partial, lopsided and entirely inappropriate to the 
needs of the region’s people.” (Vale, 2003:17).  This is to a large 
extent due to the fact that the economic history of southern Africa, 
its political economy and structure was based on South Africa’s 
mining (Legum, 2000).  To move-away from such reliance a new 
maximalist regional order in southern Africa should embrace non-
state actor participation.   
 
It is instructive to note that new approaches to the study of 
regionalism, focuses not only on integration between sovereign 
states, but recognises that: “… regionalism flows from the idea 
that various nongovernmental factors can induce increased levels 
of economic and political activity among countries (Mansfield and 
Milner, 1997:4)60.  The most salient distinction between old and 
new regionalism is that the latter: “… involves more spontaneous 
processes that often emerge from below and within the region 
itself, and more in accordance with its peculiarities and problems.” 
(Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998b:7).  This requires that the 
conception of regionalism in southern Africa should transcend 
state-centrism.   
                                      
60
 New regionalism concerns itself with: “… the growth of societal integration within 
a region and the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction.” 
(Hurrel, 1995:334).  
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1.2.6 The Southern African Context 
 
 
The force of globalisation61 and the fear of marginalisation62, 
coupled with Africa’s integration into the global political structure63, 
are defining features accounting for the growth in transnational 
activity.  Historically, Africa has been integrated into the global 
political structure in an asymmetrical manner.  Christopher 
Clapham postulates that: “… Africa had in a sense been 
‘globalised’ in the late nineteenth century by European 
colonialism, which had imposed structures of economic 
production, systems of government, and cultural changes in 
language and education, which linked (at the same time 
subordinated) them to the process of global capitalist 
development.  From this viewpoint, the increased external control 
exercised from the 1980s onwards, through economic and political 
conditionalities64… represented a return to familiar conditions of  
                                      
61
   The fashionable discourse on globalisation has held that Africa has, and is being, 
‘marginalised’ or ‘disconnected’ due to its ‘bad policies’ (Jordaan, 2001, Robertson, 
1992, Scott, 1995).  Paul Taylor notes that: “…globalisation inevitably involved 
exploitative relations between North and South and that, therefore, the various 
regions in the South should be encouraged to develop stronger relations 
economically and politically among themselves.” (1993:11).  In the case of Africa, 
this could serve to reverse its marginal role in the global economy.  
 
     
62
  To Tim Shaw: “… it is undeniable that Africa’s place in the global political 
economy is less central than any other region.” (2000:98). For example: “From 1948 
to 1999, Africa’s share of world merchandise exports fell from 7.4 per cent to under 2 
per cent.” (WTO, 2001:3). Similarly, international investment in: “… Africa is almost 
totally neglected in the global competition for international capital, and in 2000 it 
attracted just 0.7 per cent of world foreign direct investments.” (Gibb, 2003:885).    
 
63
   Historically, Africa has been incorporated into the global economy not on its own 
terms, but on the terms of the developed world.  This was achieved through, amongst 
others, policies of Structural Adjustment Programmes (Amin, 2001; Bayart, 2000). 
  
64
 Alex Thomson defines political conditionalities as: “The demands of ‘good 
governance’ to which aid donors required recipient states to conform.” (2000:163).  
These political conditionalities normally result in political liberalisation.  Balefi Tsie 
notes that: “… political liberalisation entails a transition from authoritarian rule 
whereby the civil and political liberties of citizens are restored, enabling them to 
participate freely in political decision-making processes without fear of being 
repressed by the coercive agencies of the state.” (2001b:104). 
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subordination…” (1998a:24).  The above viewpoint suggests that 
Africa had become the victim of globalisation. 
 
Africa’s integration into the global political structure cannot be 
viewed in such simplistic or reductionist terms.  Patrick Chabal 
rightly asserts that: “Africa is… not simply the victim of 
globalisation.  Its elites are active participants in the informal world 
market, the underside of the globalised economy.” (2001:112)65.  
This suggests that African states and its political and economic 
elites actively participate in the global economy.   
 
To actively participate in the global economy: “African states… 
found themselves increasingly drawn into the international arena, 
in a search for the resources to protect themselves against the 
consequences of domestic political and economic failure.” 
(Clapham, 1998b:146)66.  In addition, Africa’s own international 
and transnational relations reflect the growing challenges faced by 
relatively vulnerable states67.  The vulnerability of African states68, 
could possibly be reversed by, inter alia, renewed attempts at 
regional integration on the continent. 
                                                                                                         
    
65
   For Christopher Clapham, the participation of African countries, and especially 
African rulers in: “… international relations actually was important… because their 
access to international resources played a critical role in their own survival 
strategies.” (1998b:145). 
  
66
   Christopher Clapham asserts that: “For those significant social groups for whom 
the state has been absolutely central- politicians, bureaucrats, soldiers and their 
intellectual supporters and affiliates- it has been essential to preserve the institutional 
entity on which they depend.” (2001:4). 
   
67
  Christopher Clapham notes that the implications of this are that: “International 
politics affects these states and people in ways that often differ appreciably from the 
ways in which it affects the people and governments of more powerful states.” 
(1998a:3).  Paradoxically, while the states in Africa became more vulnerable: “… the 
state’s role in the economy has continued to grow in OEDC countries in the 1990s.” 
(Friedman, 2003:19).  
 
68
   Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver observe that: “because of these weaknesses a variety 
of nonstate actors and entities… have remained vitally in play as sources of social 
and political authority and economic activity.” (2003:222).  The implications are that: 
“In understanding post-Cold War security in Africa, this emergent pattern of nonstate 
actors may well hold more of the future than the decaying state system.” (ibid, p223).   
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Writing on African economies in general, Christopher Clapham 
asserts that: “… old economy-led approach to regional integration 
in Africa flew in the face of both global economies and African 
politics…” Their regional partners had economies very similar to 
their own, and the lumping together of a number of (in global 
terms) tiny African economies did not provide either viable 
market/s for a process of internal industrialisation, nor did it enable 
them to form any influential bargaining capacity to strengthen their 
relations with the outside world.  Politically, arrangements for 
regional integration fell foul of the intense concern of the rulers of 
newly independent African states for the maintenance of their own 
sovereignty, and indeed for the preservation of their own power 
within their states.” (2001:60)69.  This makes the goal of 
establishing viable regional orders at an institutional level a 
daunting task. 
 
Nonetheless, the fear of marginalisation has made the goal of 
establishing viable regional orders on the continent, even for 
states, more urgent.  Fantu Cheru cautions that: “Africa will find 
itself even more vulnerable and isolated if it chooses (or is 
obliged) to remain a collection of fifty, small, competing exporters, 
dependent on… regional markets and rationalising existing 
resources… by establishing viable sub-regional economic 
integration schemes.” (1992:1).  To date, however, the failure of 
regional projects is, by and large, due to the weaknesses of 
African states and its subordinate nature in the global economy.   
 
Despite the weaknesses of African states and its subordinate 
nature in the global economy, these states: “… developed the will 
to control virtually all aspects of international relations, though few 
developed the capacity.  As such, non-state international actors 
often operated beyond the jurisdiction of states, which is to say 
they undertook their activities illegally.” (Reed, 1995:140)70.   
                                      
69
  This suggests that: “… the origins of regionalism in Africa were more political 
than economic.” (Lee, 2003:29).  The contention here is that the political dimensions 
of regionalism are as important as the economic ones, since new approaches to 
regionalism posit regionalism is a comprehensive and multi-faceted process.    
 
70
  This begs the question: “Whether even diminished African regimes can come to 
accept a more modest international posture in which non-state relations- from NGOs 
and civil societies or ethnic nations to informal sectors and environmental 
communities- are facilitated, even encouraged, remains to be seen.” (Shaw, 
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Furthermore, the imposition of SAPs71 has encouraged the 
liberalisation of economic and political forces.  This in turn has 
contributed to recasting state-society relations in Africa72.   
 
Recasting-state-society relations revolve around re-legitimising the 
state.  The latter is contingent on: “State efforts to forge new links 
with civil society in the wake of the crises of legitimacy and 
governance.” (Thomson, 2000:240)73.  Political liberalisation 
brought about by SAPs resulted, inter alia, in the loss of a 
significant amount of state power.  The state lost significant power 
because in a liberalised political set-up civil society actors are 
allowed to participate freely without the fear of repression. This 
liberalised political set-up allowed civil society to expand, which in 
turn led to a re-definition between the role state and society.  The 
recasting state-society relations in Africa now involve taking a 
broader view of development and, as such accommodate non-
state actors. 
  
Towards this end: “African and non-African states and non-state 
policy-makers have to recognize that, at the turn of the millennium, 
                                                                                                         
2000:109).   
 
71
  SAPs are programmes of conditional lending. Initially African governments, who 
were recipients of loans, were only required to make changes to their economic 
policies. In the mid-1990s, political conditionalities were also imposed. Kenya, 
Malawi and Mauritius were the first states to introduce SAPs at the start of the 1980s. 
By the mid-1990s almost all other African countries had followed suit. Even those 
countries, such as Tanzania and Zambia, which initially tried to pursue socialist 
development strategies, had succumbed by this date (Thomson, 2000).    
  
72
  In this regard, Cyrus Reed suggests that: “The imposition of liberal economic and 
political reforms legalized tremendous arenas for activity in civil society which 
linked actors there directly with other international actors.” (1995:144). This does not 
suggest, however, that societal actors do not also engage with states. To the contrary, 
during the 1990s, intensive political struggle for democratisation and state power, 
serves as evidence that: “The state remains a potent and highly prized force in Africa, 
its tattered condition notwithstanding.” (Mkandawire, 2001:67).  However, it needs to 
be recognised that in Africa: “… power transits essentially through the informal 
sector. Or rather, it is in the interplay between the formal and the informal that the 
kernel of politics is to be found on the continent.” (Chabal, 2001:110).    
 
73
   The state in Africa has been variously defined as criminal (Bayart, 1999); fragile 
(Clapham, 1998a); an unequal and opportunity state (Bayart, 1993); non-emancipated 
and undifferentiated (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). 
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the continent’s development, foreign and security agenda has 
been quite redefined.” (Shaw, 2000:96).  In this regard, three 
defining features are particularly relevant:  
 
• “Transformed states, especially state-economy/society 
relations, with special reference to… the… rise of civil 
society…” 
 
• The rise of sub-and supra-state actors from internal as well as 
international ‘civil society’ in response to novel challenges and 
opportunities as the state declines;  
 
• Popular pressures for sustainable democracy at all levels, 
from sub-to supra-national- i.e. from local communities/NGOs 
to non-and inter-governmental organizations at regional and 
global levels…” (Shaw, 2000:96). 
 
It is in this context that broader forms of regional organisation 
need to be considered74.  Tim Shaw contends that a number of 
emerging trends are discernable in Africa at the end of the 
twentieth century.  These trends are, inter alia, the following:  
 
1. “Redefinition and diminution of the African state given the 
interrelated pressures of globalization/regionalism…” 
 
2. “Recognition of the potential yet also limits of the market…” 
 
3. “Reaction to the increasing tension between pressures for and 
against democratisation, centred on the new space for civil 
society…” (Ibid, p97). 
 
From the above, it is found that: “The strengthening of civil society 
is thus an indispensable step toward improving public life in Africa 
and by extension, toward improving the social and economic 
                                      
74
  In fact regionalism seems to be the only viable alternative at the disposal of 
Africans to reverse the tide of global marginalisation. Margaret Lee posits that: “As a 
result of the realities in Africa, regional cooperation continues to be viewed as a 
viable means for developing regions. There is no substitute for regional nations 
pooling their resources to develop regional infrastructure, transport networks, food 
security, electricity, etc.” (2003:28).    
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conditions there.” (Chazan, 1992:52)75.  In a similar vein, this 
makes the inclusion of actors from civil society critical for 
proposals on regional restructuring and revitalization.  The 
argument here is that for southern Africa, economic and political 
change, brought about by the politics of SAPs, has opened a new 
window of opportunity to recast state-society relations, in building 
new regional capacity, involving both state and non-state actors. 
 
In addition, the end of the Cold War provided the impetus for the 
emergence of more pluralistic political economies in the southern 
African region.  Writing on southern Africa, Larry Swatuk contends 
that: “… various factors… are… facilitating and pressing for a ‘new 
regionalism’; the end of the Cold War and apartheid, globalization 
and the growing sense of urgency among the people in the 
region.” (2000:210-11). This compels states in the region to follow 
global trends, which suggest that it is crucial to include non-state 
actors in region-building efforts76. 
 
Towards this end, Paul Bischoff notes that regionalism in southern 
Africa and the rest of the continent should be characterised by a 
two-pronged approach: “… it… should be both state-sponsored 
activities and those driven by the need for economies of scale; on 
the social front, the search for physical and economic security is a 
source of transnational activity.” (2004:5)77.  This requires a 
maximalist conception of regionalism and regional integration. 
 
                                      
75
  It needs to be recognised, however, that: “Civil society in Africa cannot thrive 
unless opportunities for intergroup communication are also expanded considerably.” 
(Chazan, 1992:52).  This requires the forging of links around issue-networks. 
 
76
  To achieve this: “An alternative approach would be to identify where regional 
cooperation exists at the level of civil society, and the extent to which these patterns 
of behaviour grow out of, or exist in spite of relations between states at the official 
level.” (Reed, 1995:145). 
 
77
  Writing on southern Africa, Bertil Odén notes that: “It may be that SADC develops 
into a two-track organization: on the one hand following open-regionalism in the 
areas of trade, investment and capital flows; and on the other, following more 
regionally-based activities in regional goods sectors, security, environment, culture 
etc.” (1999:70). This suggests that regionalism in southern Africa, should cater for 
both state-led processes of integration and more organic forms of regionalism. 
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In the case of southern Africa: “… a maximalist conception of 
[regional] order… should involve… more extensive schemes of co-
operation to safeguard peace and security, to promote economic 
development, to solve common problems, and to sustain common 
values.” (Hurrel. A. And Fawcett. L, 1995:309).  This requires an 
almost paradigmatic shift from a state-centric conception of 
regional integration, to a more broad-based conception that 
involves non-state actors as well78.  Such a shift is necessary to 
reverse the history of exclusion and uneven economic 
development.     
 
The regional consciousness79 and indeed the history of regional 
economic integration are a history of unequal economic 
development80.  The point of departure in the development of an 
inclusive regional order in southern Africa, should acknowledge 
the disparities and inequities in existing relations.  At the same 
time there needs to be a commitment to overcome these81.  This 
suggests that in southern Africa, we need a normative 
understanding of regionalism.  This would assist us in the 
construction of interaction based on principles of equity, mutual 
benefit and interdependence.  This is necessary to reverse the 
history of lopsided economic development, which at the moment 
favours South Africa, in southern Africa82.   
                                      
78
  This requires a recognition of: “… informal economies and encourage informal 
polities: civil societies at regional and/or continental levels.” (Shaw, 2000:109). 
 
79
   Regional consciousness is here defined as: “… the political processes by which 
regionalism and regional identity are constantly defined and redefined, and on shared 
understanding and the meanings given to political activity by the actors involved.” 
(Hurrel, 1995:335). 
 
80
  By and large therefore: “… regionalism in Africa is also likely to be characterized 
by two contradictory tendencies… firstly the … imperative of economic co-
operation… and secondly… incidence of political dominance.” (Shaw, 2000:108). 
 
81
  Various policy documents-, which will be referred to elsewhere-, commit both 
SADC and SACU to achieve this.  In addition, the new regionalism, and one of its 
variants- developmental regionalism- explicitly states that as a political project, 
regionalism should include an element of redistribution, i.e. regional funds or 
specialised banks in the regionalist project (Hettne, 1999b). 
 
82
  To Patrick Bond: “Among the most obvious casualties of uneven regionalism has 
been the Southern African environment, shaped as it is by cross-border ecological 
processes- particularly in relation to water and energy flows…” (2002:367). 
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One of the most enduring qualities of regionalism in southern 
Africa hitherto is embedded in the acute regional awareness of 
South Africa’s regional dominance83.  Her GDP is four times the 
size of all other SADC member states84.  South Africa’s GDP 
dominance in the region is reflected in both the GNP and trade.  
 
Richard Gibb succinctly illustrates the dynamism of the region’s 
inequalities by providing the following: “In 1999, approximately 
75% of Southern Africa’s GNP was produced within South Africa, 
which had approximately 13% of the land, 23% of the population 
and 85% of manufacturing output.” (2001:79).  Despite this, it was 
widely expected that some positive spill-over would be the result 
of South Africa joining a regional grouping.  The FTA, however, 
signed between South Africa and the EU cast serious doubt about 
the commitment of the country to regional integration in the sub-
region. 
 
South Africa entered into an FTA with the EU, anticipating that the 
agreement would significantly improve South Africa’s access to 
the EU market85.  The SA-EU agreement was also informed by the 
realization that: “South Africa will experience limited benefits as a 
result of the SADC FTA, further economic growth dictates that 
South Africa must look beyond the region in order to enhance its 
economic growth.” (Lee, 2003:217).  In seeking to enhance its 
own economic growth, South Africa’s agreement with the EU is 
likely to exacerbate inequality in the southern African region86. 
                                                                                                         
 
83
  Writing on southern Africa, Björn Hettne notes that: “The levels of regionness of 
the regions in the process of being formed will continue to be uneven, but only the 
future will decide where the levels will be… political will and political action will 
certainly play their part.” (1999b:xxvii). 
 
84
  Between 1990-2000, South Africa’s annual GDP average growth was 2 percent, 
whereas that of the rest of SADC was 1,7 percent (World Bank, 2002). 
 
85
  This increased market access to the EU market is limited to a number of sectors 
only. Robert Davies opines that: “… the agreement will open up a number of 
opportunities for manufacturing industries. Steel and steel products, ferro alloys, 
aluminium products, furniture and automotive products are all industries that have 
been identified as potentially significant beneficiaries.” (2000:10). 
  
86
  This suggests that: “… in the affairs of the region, South Africa continues to 
dominate…” (Vale, 2003:137). 
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Paul Goodison outlines the consequences the SA-EU FTA 
agreement will have on SADC in general, and SACU in particular.  
With regards to SACU, Goodison points out that: “If government 
revenues decline as a result of an FTA this could mean cuts in 
funding for schools and health clinics, public sector workers could 
be laid off, road infrastructure could deteriorate, or alternatively 
sales tax would have to substantially increase to make up the 
shortfall in government revenue.” (1999:90).  This suggests that 
the SA-EU agreement could enhance South Africa’s regional 
dominance at the expense of the region in general, and SACU in 
particular.        
 
South Africa, however, has much to gain by constructively 
engaging her neighbours87. Carol Thompson, for instance, 
contends that South Africa: “… needs a viable and prospering 
Mozambique for its own growth.” (1992:144, Robert Davies, 
1992).  Writing generally on interdependencies between South 
Africa and the region, Maphanyane asserts that: “South Africa 
needs the markets of the region which currently absorb 50 percent 
of its non-mineral exports and its natural resources such as water, 
power etc.  The rest of the region needs South Africa’s large 
market, and its advanced technology.” (Odén, 1993:180).  
Moreover, by ensuring the well-being of neighbouring countries, 
South Africa will considerably alleviate the burden of migration 
pressure, and by pooling resources into a regional market, South 
Africa will, inter alia, aid the region in attracting foreign 
investment88. 
 
This needs to be transformed to a more equitable regional order.  
Lastly, there is widespread agreement that a democratic regional 
order, which will come about once the civil and political liberties of 
the region’s citizens are restored, will address, amongst others, 
unequal economic integration.  A democratic regional order- it will 
                                                                                                         
  
87
 South Africa, which is arguably the biggest economy on the continent, is also- to 
paraphrase Susan Strange (1997)- vulnerable to transnational business through trade, 
investment and financial movements. 
 
88
  Bertil Odén postulates that: “The ongoing discussion on new regionalism in 
Southern Africa is mainly based on the open regionalism concept, with the theoretical 
framework taken from trade integration and direct investment theory.” (1999:167). 
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be contended here- needs to allow civil society space in solving 
issues such as regional migration, the harmonisation of labour 
practises, etc.  To achieve this, what is required is a: “… process 
of regionalisation from below resulting largely from internal 
transformation within emerging regions.” (Hettne, 2001a:157).  
Regional integration in southern Africa, and elsewhere in the 
developing world, should be politically directed89.  This implies a 
process- in the words of Björn Hettne of autonomous regionalism-, 
which is relevant in discussing the new regionalism.     
 
For southern Africa, therefore, the strategic challenge is to relate 
the development needs of the sub-region to the challenges of an 
emerging and unregulated liberalised world economy.  The 
manifestation of a process of new forms of regionalism in southern 
Africa, while it should grow from within, is ultimately also linked to 
a new global situation.  This is because even if initiatives are taken 
within the region, the factors, which make these initiatives 
necessary, are global.  Björn Hettne (1997) reminds us that 
regionalism is a multifaceted phenomenon that takes place at the 
level of the world system, the level of intra-regional relations and 
the internal pattern of the single region.  The multifaceted nature 
of regionalism manifests itself at each of the above-mentioned 
levels, and as such contributed to the rise of regional integration.   
 
For southern Africa, this suggests that regionalism should be more 
than limited trade integration.  Paul Bischoff and Lesley Blaauw 
contend that in the case of southern Africa, new forms of 
regionalism should: “… concern itself with the broad tapestry of 
development.” (2001:56).  The strategic challenge in this respect 
is to use the regional framework to develop and diversify 
economies, improve production, productivity and export 
capacities.  Regional integration as a development tool must also 
be used as an important structure with which to redress the gross 
imbalances created not only within, but also between countries of 
the region.  But up to now, state actors have historically driven 
political regionalism.  This has excluded and marginalised the 
                                      
89
  Bertil Odén asserts that: “In Southern Africa… the two processes of economic 
globalization and political regionalism are going on simultaneously. The former 
refers to… trade integration and development integration issues… while the latter 
include… both environmental and security issues.” (1999:169). 
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majority of the people in the region also represented by civil 
society in the region.   
 
As such, the institutional frameworks of both SADC and SACU 
need to be reformed to match the ambitions of non-state actor 
participation in regional endeavours90.  By reforming existing 
regional blocs, states are attempting to manage on a regional level 
what they are unable to regulate on a national and global scale.  
Indeed, regional economic bloc formation and the liberalisation of 
trade in the developing world are predicated on the assumption 
that such countries will be increasingly marginalized if they fail to 
engage the world economy as a collective unit. 
 
In the case of southern Africa, the argument - a forceful one - is 
that regionalism, unlike elsewhere in the world, must not only be 
market driven, but should have a strong political element driven by 
states and non-state actors of the region91.  For southern Africa, 
the evolution of spontaneous processes entails the broader 
participation of the people of the sub-region.  This is particularly 
critical in view of the fact that: “… Southern Africans believe that 
the state system no longer offers solutions to their everyday 
problems: it neither delivers security nor satisfies a desire for 
community.  As a result, they are driven to find fresh terrains of 
regional intercourse, like cross-border trading, and to explore old 
ones, like cross-border migration.” (Vale, 2003:135)92. 
 
                                      
90
   Institutions such as SADC seem to realise the critical role that non-state actors in 
general, and the private sector in this particular case, can play. Indeed: “Within 
SADC, which according to its treaty and other policy documents should be closer to 
the new regionalism concept, and interesting change is taking place. During the last 
few years… the importance of the private sector for creating growth and development 
in SADC countries has been emphasized.” (Odén, 1999:169). 
   
91
   In this regard, Linda Weiss reminds us that: “… efforts to analyse or demonstrate 
economic change- the extent to which national economies have become more 
interconnected through trade, production, finance, and the growing web of 
international rules and institutions- are often a prelude to the political project.” 
(1999:59). 
 
92
  In terms of the level of regionness, this suggests that the Southern African region is 
evolving into a social system: “… which implies translocal; relations of social, 
political, cultural and economic nature between human groups.” (Hettne, 2001a:157).   
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Writing on southern Africa, Paul Bischoff argues that: “… southern 
African states which are at various stages of democratisation 
largely remain outside the grasp of organised civil society.” 
(2002:283). The imposition of SAPs, have made the 
developmental role of the state more daunting.  The case of 
Zambia is illustrative of how the state was unable to take care of 
its developmental duties as it managed to do in the past.  Because 
the economic conditionalities, which accompanied SAPs required 
the Zambian government to curtail spending, the social impact of 
SAPs in that country resulted in, inter alia, increased 
unemployment reduced health spending and a reduction in school 
enrolment93.  Alex Thomas (2000) postulates that the removal of 
subsidies in Zambia brought the greatest disadvantage to the 
most vulnerable.  The inability of the state in Zambia to take care 
of its developmental duties resulted in increasing insecurity.      
 
Sandra McClean asserts that SAPs: “… have contributed to 
regionalist pressures by forcing people to revive old, or establish 
new, associative ties as counters to material shortage, 
unemployment, and so on.” (2001:126).  The multiplicity of 
linkages and interconnections between societies has contributed 
to expanding the political and social space in which civil society 
actors could develop (Cox, 1999).   
 
Graig Murhpy notes that the expansion of political and social 
space is aimed at: “… both the deepening of democratic 
processes and the extension of democratic forms beyond the 
nation-state.” (2000:790).  In southern Africa, this presupposes the 
building of regional networks, among both state and non-state 
actors, which are aimed at constructing new approaches to 
development.      
 
Writing on southern Africa Sandra McClean observes that: “Some 
NGOs which operate at the regional level are actively and 
consciously engaged in the project to construct a new global 
                                      
93
   Carol Thompson notes that: “Invalidating political discourse has also been the 
agenda of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) which demand the removal of 
the state from regulatory functions, from protection of locally-defined ‘commons’ 
and from strategic productive activities.” (2000:44).  New approaches to regionalism, 
however, recognise that states, in tandem with other non-state actors must mutually 
enable each other for the process of regionalism to be successful.  
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approach to development and human security.  In Southern Africa, 
Mwelakeo Wa NGO (MWENGO) is an example of such an 
organisation- regionally based to establish information webs, 
stronger advocacy positions in national and international fora, and 
connections between NGOs and research institutes and 
universities in the region…Other NGOs which are primarily 
concerned with specific human security issues such as gender 
and human rights may unintentionally be fostering a global 
citizenship identity and, at the same time, promoting regionalism.” 
(1999:949).  States should recognise that sub-national and 
transnational non-state actors are proliferating and that they are 
re-shaping, and re-defining the parameters and content of 
regionalism. 
 
The involvement of non-state actors in regional affairs is not only 
decisive for the development of a trans-boundary civil society94 in 
southern Africa but is a critical element for the success of the 
emergence of a new regionalism that we are investigating here95.  
It is through mutual enablement between state and non-state 
actors, that the development of regional manufacturing and 
transport capacities, for instance, are contingent.  Thus, what is 
needed is a process of inward-development as opposed to out-
ward development.  New approaches to the study of regionalism 
recognise that a region needs to develop according to its own 
peculiarities.     
 
Lastly the developmental aspect of the new regionalism focuses 
on: “… activities such as the conscious fostering of 
complementarities, industrial projects, joint investment in 
                                      
94
  A trans-boundary civil society comes about as a result of: “… a cluster of practices 
that are described as ‘informal’ or ‘unrecorded’ trade, the ‘underground’ ‘second’ or 
even the ‘real’ economy; ‘smuggling’ or ‘re-exportation’; and ‘popular’ or ‘bottom-
up’ regionalism.” The development of such a civil society: “…may be understood as 
a corollary of the range of opportunities generated by the frontier lines. These are 
exploited, in turn, through chains of social relations that are autonomous, though not 
disconnected, from institutional procedures.” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001:8). 
  
95
  Paul Bischoff notes that: “In Southern Africa, with its investment in democracy, 
direct state involvement in the economy and regional economic projects would seem 
to be on the wane.” (2001: 4).  New approaches to regionalism see the state as 
playing a central role, alongside non-state actors in building durable and sustainable 
processes of regional integration. 
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transport, infrastructure, etc.” (Hettne, 1996b:160).  This would 
require the energies of both state and non-state actors, since as 
was pointed out elsewhere, regionalism flows from the idea that 
the contributions of non-state actors are critical for igniting 
economic and political activity among countries.  This is important 
for southern Africa if the history of lopsided economic 
development is to be reversed.  
 
In southern Africa, this regional consciousness is fed by a history 
of uneven or lopsided economic development.  André du Pisani 
cautions that: “In the case of Southern Africa levels of 
dependence, the asymmetrical nature of relations of power and 
the different resource endowments of the various countries, would 
- at least for some time - work against economic and political 
integration characteristic of a common market” (1992:184).  This is 
of significance to the thinking on regional co-operation96 and 
integration in southern Africa. 
 
Moreover, regionalism and the need for sustainable development 
are made necessary not just by globalisation, but also by the 
lopsided regional economic development of the past.  Regional 
trade and social imbalances in southern Africa now require 
”…regional mechanisms and instruments to ensure a balanced 
distribution of benefits from increased regional interaction, as well 
as corrective measures to promote development in the 
peripheries…“ (Tjønneland.E. 1992:xiv; Muzorewa.B.1997: 27)97. 
In this regard, Ibbo Mandaza has reminded us that: “… without a 
                                      
96
  Co-operation: “… refers to a range of situations in which individual states share or 
make available to each other resources, technology or expertise, collaborate in joint 
projects or act together in external economic relations.  Such cooperation… Robert 
Davies has pointed out… may or may not be undertaken with the aim of promoting 
economic integration.” (1994:12). For Jens Haarlov, regional co-operation entails: 
“… a process whereby nation states in common solve tasks and create improved 
conditions in order to maximise internal and external economic, political, social and 
cultural benefits for each participatory country.” (1997:15). Regarding the evolution 
of common economic, political and social values in the Southern African region, one 
can only say that what exists of common economic values, for instance, is a 
consequence of external IMF and WB pressure than a result of mutually shared 
normative developments.  
    
97
  This suggests that in order to consolidate the structure of interdependence: “… a 
certain amount of intervention would be needed: for instance, in the form of an 
organized transfer of resources from rich to poor countries.” (Hettne, 1999a:19).    
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satisfactory degree of equitable economic development and co-
operation among member states, there can be no peace and 
security.” (1995:29; Davies. R. 1993 and Keet. D. 1994). 
 
 
 
1.2.7 The Goals of the Research 
 
 
 
In view of the above it is critical to determine to what extent new 
regionalism and new forms of regional organisation can achieve 
what conventional regionalism with its focus on inter-state regional 
organisation could not. It is also necessary to ascertain what 
constitutes the limits and possibilities to employ what Hettne 
(1996b), De Melo and Panagariya (1993) term “developmental 
regionalism” in Southern Africa.  Towards that end, this thesis will:     
 
 Explain that an expanded definition of regions and regionalism 
that includes both state and non-state actors is needed to best 
describe southern Africa; 
 
 Investigate whether the theory of ‘new’ regionalism, because of 
its comprehensiveness and multifaceted nature, offers state 
and non-state actors the opportunity to build new regional 
capacity;  
 
 Look at the historical imperatives which informs regionalism in 
southern Africa, and argue that the goals of the organisations, 
although policy documents state this, were not developmental; 
 
 Uncover whether the reform of SACU and SADC adequately 
cater for the development of non-state actors and the goals of 
new and developmental regionalism; 
 
 Investigate whether beyond the geometry of state sovereignty, 
non-state actors also contribute to raising awareness that new 
approaches to the study of regionalism is also concerned with 
regionalism from ‘below’ that contributes to regionnes and an 
expanded conception of regions and regionalism.  
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1.2.8 Methodology and Techniques of Research 
 
 
 
The basis for this research project will be primary and secondary 
research material. 
 
My research technique will involve the:  
 
 
 Review of literature on integration in southern Africa; 
 
 Conducting of interviews with key stakeholders: national 
officials dealing with integration, private sector interests, 
international partners and civil society; 
 
 Conducting of interviews with officials in both SADC and 
SACU.   
 
 
 
1.2.9 Chapter Outline  
 
 
 
This study consists of six chapters.  Chapter One deals with the 
conceptual issues.  It argues that in the 1990s, the character and 
functions of regions and regionalism have experienced a major 
transformation.  This requires a re-conceptualisation of regions 
and regionalism that transcends state-centrism.  The argument 
here is that the definition of regions and regionalism needs to 
recognise that other actors also participate in the construction of 
regions and the practise of regionalism. 
 
Chapter Two contends that the theories of integration incompletely 
deals with outcomes appropriate to developing countries, states 
and regions.  In the context where people remain vulnerable to 
top-down forms of regionalism driven by the forces of 
globalisation, this calls for a new approach in the analytical study 
of regionalism in a transnational context.  The contention is that 
new regionalism, and its variant, developmental regionalism, pays 
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attention to the role that civil society actors play in promoting 
regionalism in a transnational context. 
 
Chapter Three focuses on the history of integration in southern 
Africa.  Its major thrust is that historically state-centric regionalism 
in southern Africa, was not aimed at achieving developmental 
objectives.  In the case of SACU, the argument is that South Africa 
used its economic strength in a hegemonial way.  To counter-act 
apartheid South Africa’s hegemony, SADCC was formed.  SADCC 
achieved limited success in the fields of infrastructural 
development and attracting donor aid. 
 
Chapter Four looks at the reform which SACU and SADC 
undertook in the early 1990s.  The argument is that SACU has not 
as yet transformed sufficiently to achieve the goals of 
developmental regionalism.  Similarly, the institutional structure of 
SADC has not been sufficiently transformed to achieve the 
ambitious goals it set-out for itself. 
 
Chapter Five maintains that sustainable regionalist orders are best 
built by recognising that beyond the geometry of state-sovereignty, 
organisations with a regional focus and ordinary people in the 
region link by culture and the search for economic survival, also 
contribute to regionness and as such contribute to the re-
conceptualisation of regional community in southern Africa. 
 
Chapter six constitutes the conclusion of this study.           
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1.3 Conclusion 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, regions and regional concerts 
were seen as the basis upon which a new international order was 
to be built.  In the post-Cold War period, the study of regions and 
regionalism need to recognise that only states participate in the 
construction of regions and the practice of regionalism.  The 
definition of regions and regionalism needs to recognise that other 
actors also participate in the construction of regions and the 
practice of regionalism.  A broader definition of regions and 
regionalism, which such a re-conceptualisation would entail, 
presupposes an inclusive typology of both state-based and 
society-based actors.  
      
Such an expanded regional space provides for a different and 
multifaceted conception of regions and the notion of regional 
communities.  This suggests that what is needed, in the 1990s and 
beyond, is a new type of regionalism that is, among others, open 
and inclusive and driven by both state and non-state actors.  
Social constructivism, which informs definitions of regionalism in 
the 1990s, and as such has displaced previous approaches, views 
regions as social and political constructs, formed by both states 
and non-state actors.  The study of regional integration in southern 
Africa has largely been conducted within the confines of inter-state 
integration.  As such integration in the region has not catalogue 
non-state actor integration. 
In the context of southern Africa, a ‘new’ approach to the study of 
regionalism opened-up possibilities for recognising that 
regionalism in its contemporary form is a multifaceted process that 
involves both state and non-state actors and occurs within the 
institutional space provided by states, but also outside of such 
space.  This would entail re-configuring the definition of southern 
Africa, to make allowance for such insights.  In the context of 
southern Africa, a ‘new’ approach to the study of regionalism 
open-up possibilities for recognising that regionalism in its 
contemporary form is a multifaceted process that involves both 
state and non-state actors, and covers a range of issues. 
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Up to now, mainstream theories of integration have historically 
concern itself only with the role of the state.  It is, however, 
necessary to probe how integration theory accounts for a change 
in regionalism in the 1990s and beyond. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
2. Integration Theory 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
To-date the study and practice of regional integration has largely 
been conducted from a state-centric point of view.  Viotti and 
Kauppi assert that integration theory concerns itself: “… with 
explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how 
and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their 
neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while 
acquiring new technologies for resolving conflict between 
themselves.” (1987:387).   Conventional approaches to regional 
integration, therefore, promote a central role for the state, at the 
expense of other actors. 
If development is a key objective of integration, for states and 
societies, in southern Africa, as will be argued here, then 
mainstream theory and practice of regional integration98 only 
incompletely deals with outcomes appropriate to developing 
countries, states and regions.  In the context where people remain 
                                      
98
   Karl Deutsch, writing in the European context, asserts that integration seeks: “… 
the attainment of institutions and practises strong enough and widespread enough to 
assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its 
population.” (J. Nye, 1971:25).  Ernst Haas on the other hand, defined integration: 
“… as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national 
state.” (Ibid.).  Alluding to integration in southern Africa, Rob Davies conceptualises 
economic integration - the prime purpose of regional integration - as: “… referring to 
a process in which the economies of individual states are merged (in whole or in part) 
into a single entity.” (1992:2; 1994:12).  To Peter Vale, regional integration (between 
states) seeks: “… to reverse the cohesive force of nationalism, giving states and their 
citizens greater access to a wider experience, wider resources within the community 
of states” (1989:4).  In the case of southern Africa, both economic and political 
aspects can serve as frontiers to reverse marginalisation, and to increase 
competitiveness in the global economic order.   
 56 
vulnerable to top-down forms of regionalism driven by the forces 
of globalisation, this calls for a new approach in the analytical 
study of regionalism in a transnational context99.  Integration 
theory ought to pay more attention to the role that civil society 
actors play in promoting regionalism in a transnational context.     
 
This transformation of the world economy, in the context of 
globalisation, marks the end of an era in which states were seen 
as central to the interpretation of global events.  This calls for a 
new approach in the analytical study of regionalism in a 
transnational context.  This stems from the realisation that 
solutions to emerging problems such as drug trafficking, 
environmental degradation and human rights abuses, amongst 
others, are increasingly to be found in transnational approaches. 
These networks and linkages forged by transnational forces have 
circumscribed the autonomy of state action.  
Transnational forces have not only circumscribed the autonomy of 
state action.  These transnational forces are generally playing a 
crucial role in re-defining the conventional state-centred 
conception of co-operation and security.  A more broad-based 
conception of security is therefore seen to emanate from: “… 
communication processes and transaction flows between peoples 
[that] become not only “facilities for attention” but factories of 
shared identification.  Through transactions such as trade, 
migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, and the 
use of physical communications facilities, a social fabric is built not 
only among elites but also the masses, instilling in them a sense 
of community…” (Adler and Bennet, 1997:7).  For southern 
Africans, this sense of community, which in part pre-dates 
colonialism, should be used to transcend state-centrism in building 
new regional capacity. 
                                      
99
   Thomas Kuhn suggests that: “… when the world changes, the paradigm changes 
too”… or conversely “… when the paradigms change, the world itself changes with 
them.” (1970:11).  This requires that theorists give account of how a certain order 
came into being, or how it may be changing.  To account for a contemporary concern 
with more pluralistic and more responsive forms of governance, theorists are 
concerned with the issue of participative democracy.  Robert Cox (1996) suggests 
that participative democracy is informed by the organisation of civic life that forms 
the basis of a variety of self-governing groups that deal with the whole range of 
people’s substantive concerns. 
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The above presupposes that the study of regionalism or the 
practice of it by those wishing to put together a region should not 
be limited to state co-operation100.  It needs to take into account 
wider regional processes at work.  A regionalist project is not an 
ethereal thing but one that is concrete, consciously driven by 
either analysts who want practitioners- states mostly- to create a 
framework through which both state and non-state actors through 
new fora or institutions contribute to ‘new regionalism’.  This not 
only ensures that non-state actor activity corresponds with regions 
defined by governments, but can also provide the impulses upon 
which a new developmental coherence, embracing both state and 
non-state actors, in southern Africa can be built. 
 
Thus, the study of regionalism needs to reflect a concern: “… with 
the configuration of regional spaces by both state and non-state 
actors engaged in intergovernmental, transgovernmental, state-
non-state actor and importantly, transnational, ‘organic’ business-
to-business or people-to-people relations.” (Bischoff and Blaauw, 
2001:53).  This implies that the study of regionalism in southern 
Africa should be simultaneously state-led, embrace the market 
and sensitive to the concerns of civil society.  
 
The need for the re-configuration of regional spaces by both state 
and non-state actors illustrates that regionalism and regional 
organisation are extremely complex phenomena that do not only 
require state participation.  The contemporary study of regionalism 
in southern Africa should be: “…an all-embracing phenomenon, 
which amounts to far, more than the existence of regional 
organisations in which only governments participate.” (ibid.).    To 
accommodate the marginalised and begin to address broad-based 
development, there needs to be an acknowledgement that both 
social and political forces need to drive regionalism in the sub-
region.  This requires a re-definition of both the needs of state and 
non-state actors. 
                                      
100
   Eric Wolf asserts that: “It is periodically incumbent on a discipline to review the 
ideas that it has found useful in the past, and to reconsider if they will serve its 
purpose in the future” (Lipschutz. R. 1992:389).  Simply put, all intellectual advances 
are the result of a dynamic contest with the past, in which old orthodoxies give way 
to new ones.  This happens when communities of intellectuals/scholars start using 
different parameters in order to define and explain sociological issues.   
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Conventionally, however, regionalism was prescribed by states.  
In the contemporary context, it is now co-determined by 
transnational activity and a variety of transnational actors both 
economic and social.  New approaches to the study of regionalism 
shed light on how the region is constructed in the interplay 
between states, markets and civil society in various areas.  These 
interactions, which take place within the framework of formal 
institutions and informally, modify citizens’ relationship to their own 
state, to citizens of other states and to regional institutions.  As a 
result, these exchanges have loosened the bonds between 
individuals and the state, traditionally defined by the sovereign 
state.  New approaches to the study of regionalism need to 
recognise this.  Traditionally, however, integration theory has 
focussed on the study of state integration only.    
 
Two theoretical approaches, which have not only dominated the 
study of European integration and integration per se, but were 
concerned with state integration are Neo-Functionalism101 and 
Transactionalism102.  These two approaches were primarily 
concerned with understanding economic, cultural, political and 
social aspects within the context of territorially-bound units (nation-
states).  Jakob Ohrgaard posits that the central concern of these 
approaches was to ascertain whether: “… the institutional 
framework of European integration, is supranational or 
intergovernmental.” (1997:1).  However, in not addressing 
integration in the South, it not only embodied a limited framework 
of analysis, but also fell short of accounting for the role that non-
state actors in general have to play in the integration process103.  
The growth in transnationalism in southern Africa, due to 
                                      
101
   David Mitrany is credited for having first used the concept Neo-functionalism. 
 
102
   For Peterson: “The term ‘transnational relations’ was used variously to cover 
direct cross-border contacts among individuals and groups, the diffusion of ideas 
through increased communications and media circulation, and the effects stemming 
from continued existence of stable networks of cross-border transactions,” 
(1992:373).  Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye originally used the term transnational 
relations. 
  
103
   Peterson suggests that: “Such a state-centric view of world politics would 
ignore… a view that sees states as sharing a transnational public space with other 
actors…” (ibid, p376). 
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globalising influences, necessitates theoretically developing on 
these theories of integration.    
 
Neo-functionalism, Transactionalism and the New Regionalism 
approaches differ on the methodology to be applied to achieve 
integration. 
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 2.2. Neo-Functionalism 
 
Neo-Functionalism was developed in the late 1950s and early 
1960s to explain ostensibly the emergence of the European 
Community104. Ernst Haas, one of the founding fathers of this 
approach, argues that Neo-functionalism is primarily: “… the 
process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions 
possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states.” 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen; 1991:3).  
For David Mitrany, the intellectual father of neo-functionalism, 
integration comes about by linking: “… particular activities and 
interests, one at a time, according to need and acceptability, 
giving each a joint authority and policy limited to that activity 
alone.” (1965:135)105.  Larry Swatuk and Peter Vale (2001) posit 
that such an incremental process, which manifests itself through a 
series of shared projects across borders, creates habits of co-
operation and reveal the advantages of pooling efforts.   
 
This in essence, will set in motion a process of regional co-
operation.  Andrew Hurrel notes that: “Regional cooperation may 
involve the creation of formal institutions, but it can often be based 
on much looser structures, involving patterns of regular meetings 
with some rules attached.” (1995:336).  This not only creates 
interdependence in one sector, but will necessarily create interests 
in cooperation.  The end result would be a shift in loyalties, which 
would set in motion a process of supranationalism. 
    
Supranationalism, Leon Lindberg contends is: “… the process 
whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign 
                                      
104
   The focus of neo-functionalism, therefore, was contextual rather than general and 
universal. 
 
105
   The central thesis of Neo-functionalism is to be located in the postulate that: “… 
integration within one sector will tend to beget its own impetus and spread to other 
sectors.” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen; 1991:4) 
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and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking 
instead to make joint decisions or to delegate their decision-
making process to new central organs and the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift 
their expectations and political activities to a new centre.” (1963:6; 
T. Taylor, 1978:243).   These supranational institutions had a 
specific role to play in the process of political integration.  Andrew 
Hurrel asserts that: “Supranational institutions were seen as the 
most effective means of solving common problems, beginning with 
technical and non-controversial issues, but ‘spilling over’ into the 
realm of high politics and leading to a redefinition of group identity 
around the regional unit.” (1995:348).  Neo-functionalists view 
‘spill over’ as central to deepening the process of integration106.   
Sectoral integration, the theory claims, will result in functional, 
political, and cultivated spill-overs107.  Political spill-overs will come 
about as a result of a transfer of loyalties from the national to the 
new supranational centres.  Cultivated spill-overs are essentially a 
task of the central institutions.  Primarily, it involves attempts to 
“upgrade common interests” among members.  Hodges (1978) 
posits that by redefining elite interests in regional as opposed to 
national terms, supranational institutions become perceived as the 
best to satisfy pragmatic interests.  These then lead to calls for 
further integration, due ostensibly to the spill-over effect.   
                                      
106
   Deepening integration through a spill over process could only materialise by 
involving interest groups, public opinion and elite socialization (Hurrel, 1995). 
 
107
  SACU never had any supranational centre to which loyalty could be transferred. 
SADCC, because it was not a legally binding treaty, never compelled its members to 
transfer loyalties to the new supranational centre. Common interests were confined to 
“delinking” economies dependence on South Africa, oppose its apartheid policies and 
improve infrastructure in the region.  The southern African experience of regionalism 
differs from this conventional wisdom since state security and the protection of 
sovereignty superseded other consideration such as economic co-operation, and the 
involvement of non-state actors in regional endeavours.  Functional spill-overs are a 
consequence of interdependent economies.  In the case of SADC/C, functional spill-
over are not discernible because of economic complementarities.  SACU by its very 
nature was deliberately developed to create dependent rather independent economies.  
The New Regionalism, and its variant Developmental Regionalism, seeks to 
consciously foster, inter alia, regional industrial development.             
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Two types of ‘spill over’ will deepen the process of integration.  
Andrew Hurrel notes that: “First there was functional spill-over 
whereby partial small initial steps down the integration road would 
create new problems that could only be solved by further 
cooperation.  Partial integration represented an unstable half-way 
house, and the increased complexity of interdependence meant 
that cooperation in one area would force governments to expand 
their cooperative endeavours into further areas.  Second, there 
was political spill-over, whereby the existence of supranational 
institutions would set in motion a self-reinforcing process of 
institution-building.” (1995:348)108.  This self-reinforcing process of 
institution building will be strengthened by sector-to-sector 
integration.     
Neo-functionalism as a theory was subjected to severe criticism109.  
Firstly: “… it underestimated the resilience of the nation-state and 
of loyalties at the national level…” (Hurrel, 1995:349).  Secondly: 
“…it ignored the great differences between matters of ‘low politics’, 
which may be subject to technocratic management, and matters of 
‘high politics’ that remain essential to national sovereignty…”.  It 
furthermore: “… ignored the changing role of external factors, 
political, economic and security (and also the influence of shifts in 
economic cycle); and that it was overly deterministic, technocratic 
and apolitical with little ability to explain the nature of power-
political and distributional conflicts between member states and 
the choices between different means of managing them.” (ibid, 
Brown, 2005:124). 
Another criticism of the Neo-functionalist theory is that it: “… has 
always had re to say about the ongoing role of institutions than 
about the factors that explain the birth of regionalist schemes…” 
(Hurrel, 1995:349).  In the case of southern Africa for instance, 
                                      
108
   Neo-functionalists: “… view institutions not simply as formal organizations with 
headquarters buildings and specialized staffs, but more broadly as recognized patterns 
of practice around which expectations converge.” (Young, 1980:337). 
  
109
   While the theory was developed to explain the evolution of the European 
Commission/Union: “… it failed to predict the evolution of the EC…” (Hurrel, 
1995:349). 
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regionalism at the outset was not geared towards 
supranationalism, but was prompted by a different logic.   
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2.2.1 Neo-Functionalism and southern Africa 
 
 
The logic, which underpinned SACU and SADCC at their 
formation, was purely political, and was driven by political leaders 
and senior technocrats.  All the same, neo-functionalism has 
played an integral role in understanding political co-operation and 
solidarity among nation states in southern Africa.  André du Pisani 
contends that the faith that SADCC had in: “… collaboration on 
smaller issue areas would provide a basis for cooperation in larger 
spheres…” (2001:201), bears further testimony to the fact that 
neo-functionalist precepts underpinned the organisation since its 
inception.   In the case of SADCC, it may be argued that the 
organisation in addition played an important role in conflict 
resolution and trying to co-ordinate states’ activities.  Integration 
was also seen by governments as a strategy to enhance national 
development.   
For Percy Mistry, writing in the context of Africa in general: “The 
implications, costs, benefits and opportunities of integration were 
neither fully understood nor supported by all levels of government 
nor by a sufficiently broad spectrum of public opinion.” (2000:559).  
In the southern African context this explains the initial reluctance 
to subject sovereignty to a supranational institution.  
Following the Neo-Functionalists logic: “… participants in SADC 
were not geared, nor were they prepared, to surrender their 
sovereignty.  Rather, the SADC project sought to consolidate 
areas in which state loyalties might be transferred- for example, in 
fisheries or transportation and communications development.” 
(Vale, 1999:23).  Sharing a series of projects across borders is an 
essential Neo-functionalist characteristic.  In the case of SADCC, 
however, technical co-operation was not meant to lead to political 
integration and political community instead the organisation was 
primarily inter-governmental.  SADCC remained essentially an 
inter-governmental entity.  However, some economic benefits 
were to be had from SADCC’s sectoral co-operation.  Sectoral co-
operation did not, however, go far enough, since it did not entail 
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giving up sovereignty.  Furthermore, it did not involve non-state 
actors in decision-making.   
Like SADCC, SACU was not geared towards the establishment of 
a supranational body110.  On the contrary, unilateral decision-
making by South Africa ensured that it became the hegemon of 
the Customs Union.  Importantly also, loyalty was not supposed to 
shift to the Customs Union, but to South Africa111.  As such, it 
became the hegemon of the Customs Union.   
Supranationalism in southern Africa as elsewhere demands the 
need to transcend the arena of national interests, through some 
sacrifice of the principle of sovereignty, in pursuit of regional 
economic and political reciprocity.  This is to be achieved through 
definitive economic/trade, institutional, legal and technical 
arrangements that prescribe the content and parameters of 
regional integration.  
As yet, the political leaders in southern Africa seem unaware of 
the economic and political propositions needed for neo-
functionalist integration to succeed.  This makes new regionalism 
as a theory relevant to the building of a political community and 
the plotting of a path towards economic and political integration.  
This is because the actors in the new regionalism no longer 
include only national governments, but also private non-
governmental entities.  
                                      
110
   This suggests that in the cases of both these organisations there has not been a: 
“… transposition of the pluralist polity from the national to the regional levels.” 
(Rosamund, 1995:393). 
  
111
  More critically, the genesis of a Customs Union as established in southern Africa 
undermined the goal of the creation of a supranational institution.  Generically:  “A 
Customs Union is established within two or more countries if all barriers (such as 
tariffs or quotas) to the free exchange of each other’s goods and services are 
removed, and at the same time, a common external tariff is established against non-
members.” (Bannock et al., 1970:109). 
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For Peter Mistry (2000) this reluctance by [southern] African 
governments to subordinate their immediate national political 
interests to a regional centre, contributed to a failure to achieve 
long-term regional economic goals.  Both SACU and SADC/C 
were inter-governmental at formation.  In that sense, regionalism 
in southern Africa had no built-in commitment to supranationalism.  
The second reason why Neo-functionalism only partially 
succeeded in southern Africa, relates to: “… its expectations about 
the declining role of the state in relation to central institutions 
[which] seem radically at variance with the very heavily statist 
orientation of most regional arrangements outside the EC.” 
(Hurrel, 1995:349).  For instance, in the case of both SACU and 
SADCC, key domestic and foreign policies remained the preserve 
of the different member states112.  This has had profound 
implications for the development of these institutions as 
supranational bodies, since some of the building blocks to 
supranationalism were missing.  Creating effective and inclusive 
regional communities requires going beyond the simple 
harmonisation of programmes and policies.   
What confounds the selective development of supranationalism 
and reflects the overt statist nature of SACU and SADCC, relates 
to the   capacities of states in southern Africa to fulfil conditions of 
statehood.  Generally, states in southern Africa are weak, and 
therefore do not fulfil conditions of statehood (Lodge, 1998).  This 
explains why states in the region guard their sovereignty so 
jealously.  The inability of states to partially surrender their 
sovereignty made only political co-operation, not 
supranationalism, possible as a regional strategy113.   
A third criticism of neo-functionalism is that it: “… views institutions 
as fundamental and is thus difficult to relate to the relatively low 
levels of institutionalisation found in many regional schemes.” 
                                      
112
   This suggests a minimalist approach to regional co-operation and integration that 
builds consensus among members without binding agreements or commitments. 
 
113
   André du Pisani asserts: “… that cooperation prevents and mediated conflict (a 
neo-functionalist precept) (2001:201). 
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(Hurrel, 1995:349).  SADCC operated on the basis of a 
memorandum of understanding (du Pisani, 2001, Mandaza and 
Tostensen, 1994), whereas SACU was used by South Africa to 
exert its political and economic hegemony.  The institutional fabric 
of both these organisations, were, despite low levels of 
institutionalisation, underpinned by strong political elements.   By 
and large, neither SACU nor SADCC used this strong political 
element to involve non-state actors, which ultimately would have 
deepened both the institutionalisation and the integration process 
in southern Africa.    
Moreover, the logic that underpinned both organisations, although 
strategic, was not developmental.  The genesis of SADCC was to 
reduce its economic dependence on South Africa.  This was to be 
achieved through infrastructural development, and political co-
operation and solidarity among regional states.  From the outset, 
SADCC focused on intergovernmental co-operation, and limited 
economic co-operation.  This corresponds with the defining 
feature of Neo-functionalist integration that political integration 
leads to the establishment of a political community, albeit among 
states.  To achieve its objectives, SADCC opted for sectoral 
functional co-operation among its members.   
If one measures the above proposition against the experience of 
southern Africa, the genesis of SADCC was underpinned by 
sectoral co-operation, especially, but not exclusively, in the field of 
infrastructural development114.  Until recently, poor intra-regional 
infrastructure, counter-productive to the enhancement of intra-
regional trade and growth, was a hallmark of the southern African 
region115 (Mistry, 2000).  It could, however, be argued that SADCC 
achieved modest success in its regional sector co-operation, 
especially in the field of infrastructural development.   
                                      
114
   For James Mittelman (1999) the logic that underpinned SADCC at formation was 
neither security nor economic considerations. 
 
115
   SACU members are the exception to this rule and have a well-developed 
infrastructure, which served specifically, but not exclusively, South Africa well. 
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Tom Østergaard (1993) argues that interest groups have an 
important role to play in infrastructural development.  Interest 
groups have, despite some integration so far, however, been 
excluded in southern African integration efforts.  Instead, national 
rather than regional development has remained the preoccupation 
of leaders in southern Africa.  South Africa earlier on, for instance, 
was more concerned with developing its own industrial base than 
that of other members of the Customs Union.  Similarly, SADCC 
member states were more concerned with national as opposed to 
regional development and co-operation. 
If regional development and co-operation is to be achieved, 
economic integration must be driven by the need to regulate and 
re-direct market forces.   In this context, new regionalism, and its 
variant developmental regionalism, has a particular role to play in 
directing policy.  New regionalism posits that the reversal of 
uneven economic development is only possible, through the 
regulation of regional economies. This regulation of regional 
economies is not only done by state, but numerous private, non-
governmental entities.    
The theory of new regionalism recognises that regional integration 
is not led by state and their governments alone, but is 
accompanied by awareness that many regional interests 
accommodate processes which are transnational in nature.  These 
regional interests and processes: “… spill over borders, involving 
contacts between groups who are located in different national 
societies, but who are linked by economic, cultural and political 
needs.” (Smith, 1997:74).  This implies that decision-making about 
economic, political and security policies, which may lead to deeper 
political and regional integration, goes beyond inter-
governmentalism.  
History, however, illustrates that in the case of SACU, economic 
co-operation did not lead to political integration, whereas with 
SADCC it was hoped that political co-operation and limited project 
co-ordination would lead to economic integration.  Because the 
focus of these programmes was national instead of regional in 
focus, SADCC had no particular development programme of its 
own (Massdorp, 1992).  Under SADC too, so far, this has not 
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happened. Political integration did not even take place after 1994 
with SADC as envisaged.  Botswana and South Africa’s 
intervention in Lesotho, and the division that existed concerning 
military intervention in the DRC, bore testimony to the fact that 
mutual self-interest will not sustain political integration among the 
political elites of the region.  New approaches to the study of 
regionalism recognise that integration is an all-encompassing 
phenomenon involving various actors and takes place within a 
multi-level framework. 
 
Integration in southern Africa, according to neo-functionalist 
theory, presupposes a high degree of inter-state integration at 
different levels.  Southern Africa to them is a regional subsystem 
with a network of trade dependencies, capital flows, labour 
migration patterns and infrastructural ties (railways and roads) that 
bind the region together.  Regionalism in southern Africa does 
amount to more than this.  
A new developmental coherence presupposes that there be real 
co-operative forms of policy co-ordination and integration by 
nation-states.  In addition, and because of transnational relations, 
both state and non-state actors should be part of new 
supranational designs.  This necessitates another paradigm of 
analysis that recognises the role to be played by non-state actors 
to drive forward the process of regional integration. 
Transcationalism as a theory recognises that international 
relations conducted in a transnational context involve a complex 
process of interaction within a multi-level framework and involve 
state and non-state actors. 
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2.3 Transactionalism 
 
 
Contemporary international relations and the study of regions, 
involves more than relations between and among states.  It 
focuses on transnational relations as well116.  Transactionalism as 
a paradigm gained momentum in the late 1970s and 1980s, with 
the rise in transnational relations117.  Peter Katzenstein (et al) note 
that: “By 1970 integration theory had specified a substantial 
number of economic and social background factors that 
conditioned a series of political processes.  These, in turn, shaped 
how political actors defined their interests and thus the policy 
strategies that elites adopted in different states.” (1998:654).   
 
The theory was only concerned with the implications of 
transnational relations for state autonomy.  It, therefore, did not 
recognise that regions and the notion of regional communities are 
also defined by ‘the people’ and as such impact on transnational 
relations.  For Peterson: “The term ‘transnational relations’ was 
used variously to cover direct cross-border contacts among 
individuals and groups, the diffusion of ideas through increased 
communications and media circulation, and the effects stemming 
from continued existence of stable networks of cross-border 
transactions.” (1992:373).  At face value, it seems that the theory 
of transactionalism, which focuses on transnational non-state 
actor relations challenge the supremacy on the state in 
international relations.   
 
However, transactionalism focussed on transnational non-state 
actor relations is limited to non-state corporate actors (Katzenstein 
et al, 1998).  More specifically, transactionalism focussed on the 
                                      
116
   For Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye: “… transnational social movements and 
international organizations had created a world without borders and thus eclipsed the 
territorial state.” (1997:3). 
 
117
   For Peterson: “The basis for an escape from state-centric conceptions can be 
derived from the scholarly debates that raged in the 1970s and 1980s concerning the 
nature of the state and state-society relations within countries.” (1992:373). 
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impact of changing economic and technological forces on 
international relations, against the backdrop of a proliferation in 
the numbers of non-state corporate actors.  As such, 
transactionalism ignored the fact that “the people” who are 
conscious of their transnational past and form a transnational 
community in doing so, also define regions and the notion of 
regional communities.  Peter Vale notes that in the case of 
southern Africa: “… states, and the system they construct are the 
only- indeed, the natural- means to explain community in the 
region.” (2003:125). Both SACU and SADCC constructed 
communities around states in the 1970s and 1980s.              
 
Other authors have argued that transactionalism gained 
momentum during this period as a result of the growing concern 
by the United States foreign policy establishment on how to 
control or manage what was perceived to be an increasingly 
vulnerable economy (Neumman and Wæver, 1997).  The genesis 
of the theory of transactionalism was the result of the evolution 
among the industrialized nations of: “… a more complex pattern of 
actors and issues than claimed by realists.” (Suhr, 1997:1)118.  The 
concern of transactionalists was how to deal with impact of 
changing economic and technological forces on international 
relation, which saw a rise in non-state corporate actors.  The 
establishment of the CBI by SACU, for instance in the mid-1980s, 
was one such instance that was geared towards accommodating 
non-state corporate actors119.  Yet, these changing economic and 
technological forces, not only gave rise to a proliferation in non-
state corporate actors.  It has also given rise to the growth of 
informal cultural and economic networks as well.      
 
                                      
118
   The solution to this was a: “… process of creating new institutions, or perhaps 
some sense of shared purpose.” (Walters, 2002:83).  In the case of SACU, institutions 
established were aimed at entrenching South Africa’s economic and political 
hegemony.  SADCC on the other hand, was kept together by a shared purpose: to 
reduce economic dependence on South Africa.  
 
119
   Robert Davies opines that the CBI: “… approach was rooted in an assumption 
that what was good for business was good for the community as a whole. Its essential 
thrust was towards accommodating the demands of capital, without taking account of 
the interests of other stakeholders.” (1996:4) 
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The economic and technological changes, addressed by 
Transsactionalism,  have not only led to increased global linkages 
among non-state corporate actors.  But they have also opened-up 
avenues for civil society in general to expand and re-interpret the 
notion of region and regional communities.  The concomitant 
structural transformation, which these changes entail, allows 
people to look beyond the state and state borders, in solving 
problems of unemployment and poverty.  In this transnational 
process, which takes place within a multi-level framework, actions 
of states, markets and civil society intersect in a variety of ways, 
constituting the phenomenon of new regionalism.        
 
The implications for non-state actors of these increased social 
relations are that it has led to a proliferation in trans-border 
activity, by specifically migrant workers.  These trans-border 
activities of migrants give new meaning and value to regionalism 
and the notion of regional communities and in doing so re-scale 
inter-governmental and social relations.  This has led Jessie Hoon 
to conclude that: “The growth of transnationalism has… 
contributed to a rejection of political integration as the overarching 
goal of regionalism.” (Hoon, 2001:253). These non-state corporate 
actors were more concerned with issues of economics than with 
politics.  In southern Africa, patterns of labour migration and 
informal economic networks also reflected a concern with 
economic survival issues.  This prompted a change in inter-
governmental relations.  
 
For states, the rise of transactionalism meant that: 
“Intergovernmental relations had, in other words, become 
transgovernmental.” (ibid.).  The concern of the theory of 
transactionalism was how to deal with inter-state co-operation and 
dependence (Katzenstein, et al, 1998).  This meant that for 
transactionalists, the unit of analysis remained states.  The rise of 
economic and technological changes, however, made the 
establishment of global linkages between and among other non-
state actors, easier.  The implications for regionalism and region-
building were that states and non-state actors were compelled to 
respond to this changing global situation.   
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Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1971) examine the rise of 
transnational relations, in the form of cross-border capital, goods 
and services, information and technology, as well as people120.  
These multidimensional economic, social and ecological 
interdependencies endow international relations with a tapestry of 
diverse relationships121.  New forms of regionalism embrace 
transnational non-state actor relations as well.   
 
The above presupposes that recognition should be given to 
transnational activity among societal actors.  This presupposes 
recognition of transnational activity among societal actors, which 
requires innovative states’ responses.  States responded to this 
plethora of relations by establishing international regimes122 that 
govern: “… procedures, rules or institutions for certain kinds of 
activity…”  (Keohane and Nye, 1989:5; Young, 1994).  Moreover, 
these common procedures, rules and institutions employed by 
states were geared towards controlling and regulating both 
transnational and inter-state relations, but did not pay recognition 
to non-state organic people-to-people relations.  In southern 
Africa, the negotiated regime of SADCC and the imposed regime 
SACU did not include non-state actors (Thompson, 1991).        
                                      
120
   In southern Africa, as elsewhere, this requires a recognition that, inter alia: “The 
increased prominence of environmental issues, many of which have transboundary 
implications requiring co-operative action, provides yet another ground for 
emphasizing the importance of regional and global rather than national activity.” 
(Peterson, 1992:372). 
 
121
   For states, the critical decision was: “… whether to sacrifice domestic autonomy 
for greater international cooperation. Agreeing to abide by a set of rules or practices 
within a community of states means that members forgo some types of behaviour.” In 
a nutshell, transactionalism offered: “… states the opportunity to subscribe to a set of 
rules in exchange for reduced autonomy.” (Aspinwall, 2003: 146). 
  
122
  Oran Young (1982) distinguishes three types of regime (see also Krasner, 1983; 
Keohane, 1984:49-64).  These are spontaneous, negotiated and imposed regimes.  
More recently, Nayef Samhat observes that: “… international regime (community of 
states) is the partial consequence of efforts of the individual within these networks 
that comprise this bargaining and society… the regime mobilises, enhances, and 
legitimises the activities of this network by providing accepted norms and 
principles.” (1997:365).  For a discussion on the relevance of regimes to southern 
Africa see Lisa Thompson (1991).       
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This suggests that southern African states still viewed social 
identities as only bounded within the confines of the territorial 
state.  Yet: “…social identities and interests are not fixed but 
evolved from the diffusion and convergence of causal and 
normative understandings across national boundaries, high levels 
of communication, economic interdependence, and cooperative 
practices.” (Adler, 1997:252).  As such, states in general were 
unable through regimes to lend scope or provide guidance to: “… 
the high volume of transactions within the region over a wide 
range of economic, political and social activities which… promote 
and maintain a sense of community among the population of a 
given region.” (Hodges, 1978: 244-245).  This was because states 
were unable to control everything within their territorial confines.  
Even today, states in southern Africa are still incapable of 
measuring informal trade among the various people of the region.   
 
States established international regimes with the express purpose 
of regulating international relations.  Robert Keohance and Joseph 
Nye conceptualise the functions of regimes as: “… governing 
arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence.” 
(1977:19).  Stephen Krasner, on the other hand, defines regimes 
as: “… sets of implicit  or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.” (1983:1).  
Simply put, theoretically the intention was to create social 
institutions that would regulate the interdependence of both state 
and non-state actors123.  But this did not happen in southern 
Africa.   
 
The conception of institutions resembles that of regimes.  
Institutions are defined: “… as the formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the polity or political economy.” (Hall and Taylor, 
1996:938).  As formal entities, institutions, like formal regimes, 
                                      
123
   Jessie Hoon notes that: “Modern institutions see the renaissance in regionalism as 
an outgrowth of the expansion of transnational linkages which have increased the 
need for governance structures where international rules and cooperative behaviour 
among various actors may be encouraged thereby strengthening global 
multilateralism.” (2001:253). 
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enable states to achieve their objectives more effectively, if the 
intention is to promote co-operation.  In the case of SACU and 
SADCC, the developmental functions of institutions were limited, 
because non-state actors were not accommodates despite 
increasingly established economic ties across borders.       
 
However, generally speaking, the establishment of institutions 
took place against the background of increased economic 
interdependence and technological changes.  Linda Weiss notes 
that: “… the extent to which national economies have become 
more interconnected through trade, production, finance, and the 
growing web of international rules and institutions- are often a 
prelude to the political project.” (1999:59).  As a political project, 
new forms of regionalism are concerned not only with rules and 
institutions created among sovereign states, but accommodate 
spontaneous and informal relations among other actors as well.         
 
New forms of regionalism124 embracing transnational non-state 
actor relations presuppose that: “… the state cannot be viewed as 
a unitary actor because to do so misses the multiplicity of actors 
comprising the state.” (Ibid, p29)125.  New Regionalism, as a guide 
of action, accommodates and promotes regimes that include non-
state actors.  This is because actors in the new regionalism no 
longer include only national governments, but also private non-
governmental entities and informal cultural, economic and social 
networks.  States were, however, still used as the primary unit of 
analysis in the changing world economy of the 1980s and 
1990s126.   
                                      
124
   In southern Africa, new forms of regionalism are exemplified by the creation of 
SDIs and TFCAs (Simon, 2003). 
 
125
   For Michael Suhr: “… the transgovernmental and transsocietal focus… 
challenged the centrality of the state as the most important actor in international 
relations.” This suggests that: “Intergovernmental relations had… become 
transgovernmental.” ((1997:92). 
  
126
   This notwithstanding the advantage that: “… viewing states and civil societies as 
co-inhabitants of the public space makes us more sensitive to the possibility that 
societal actors will be able to increase their authority from the state in countries 
where that autonomy appears very limited or even non-existent.” (Peterson, 1992: 
376-77). 
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The above suggests that there were no changes of the system, 
only changes in the system (Cox, 1996).  Petersen asserts that 
transactionalism ignore… a view that sees states as sharing a 
transnational public space with other actors…” (Peterson, 
1992:378).  This: “… amidst the growth in trans-regional relations 
on the ground, especially in the wake of IMF and World Bank 
imposed SAPs, which have encouraged economic openness and 
the growth of market forces- both formal and informal- 
regionalization increasingly happens despite the singular 
preoccupation of states.” (Bischoff, 2004:4)127.  SAPs and the 
World Bank have circumvented the state and encouraged non-
state actor activity.  New forms of regionalism see states as 
sharing a transnational public space with other actors128. 
 
In the contemporary context, individuals or groups who find their 
voice through regional non-state actors- organised outside the 
institutional frameworks of regional organisations- such as San 
communities in southern Africa- contribute to regionalism and 
regionness.  This is because states only represent those who act 
within a national context, and cannot fully speak on behalf of those 
who act in a regional context.  This compels us to expand and re-
interpret our conception of region to accommodate the poor and 
marginalized.  The diminishing models of governance and the 
concomitant rise of transnational forces, affected African states in 
general, and Southern African states in this instance, adversely.  
This contributed to: “… a diminution of the role of the state as an 
economic provider.” (Blaauw and Bischoff, 2001:53).  Informal 
economic activities in southern Africa reinforced the contention 
that the state has become less of an economic provider.       
 
                                                                                                         
 
127
   In southern Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, have been implementing IMF and World Bank sanctioned SAPS, 
whereas Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland have voluntarily 
introduced elements of SAPs in their economic policies (Tsie, 1996). 
 
128
   This notwithstanding the recognition at the time: “… that state and societal actors 
share a transnational public space. Both state and societal actors have their reasons 
for existing, as well as sufficient resources and motivation for self-perpetuation to 
assure that neither is likely to disappear very soon.” (Peterson, 1992:385).  
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The state has become less of an economic provider because the: 
“The economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s eroded the 
international capacity of African states still further and structural 
adjustment programmes have required many states to recast their 
policies in new directions.” (Reed, 1995:140).  The World Bank 
(1981) stated that an over-extended state in Africa was the core 
problem on the continent.  The report reflected that the state in 
Africa rewarded political control more than it did economic 
investment and production.   
 
What was required to remedy this situation was the adjustment of 
African economies to integrate them more fully and on a more 
competitive basis with the world economy.  Yet, Balefi Tsie 
argues, persuasively too: “… that a free market approach is 
inappropriate for a developing region such as southern Africa, 
whose economies are characterised by acute disparities.” 
(2000:11).  Rather, what is needed in southern Africa, is an activist 
state.  New forms of regionalism posit a crucial role for state, 
alongside other actors, in the building of economic capacity.        
 
The imposition of SAPS and its concomitant political 
conditionalities, have opened up space for non-state actors to play 
a role in the building of economic capacity129.  These political 
conditionalities were ostensibly aimed at the promotion of new 
non-state forces.  Says Reed: “… donors, particularly the United 
States, sought to strengthen “accountability, enhance “good 
governance”, and build institutional capacity…”.  To achieve the 
afore-mentioned: “…donors began to support actors in society 
which could monitor the activities of the state.  Thus, human rights 
organizations, trade unions, fledging political parties and other 
interest groups with the capacity to analyse public policy, became 
the target of foreign assistance.” (1995:144; Sandbrook, 1993).  
                                      
129
  These liberalised political structures specifically in the southern African region: 
“…made allowance for the creation of space at the end of one-party rule, the end of 
apartheid, but we did not see the deepening of political liberalisation to the extent that 
it amounted to democratisation.” (Ozias Tungwarara, Personal Communication, 
27/09/2002.)   
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This suggests that the promotion of non-state actors in Africa were 
as much a political project as an economic one130.    
 
As a result of SAPs, state actors were by-passed by non-state 
actors as development agents: “… because of the ability which 
actors in civil society had to circumvent… state authority” (Reed, 
1995:144)131.  Fredrik Söderbaum illustrates how state actors were 
by-passed as development agents by positing that: “…SAPs and 
the reform programmes are founded on the ideology of ‘the rolling 
back of the state’, which reduces the potential not only for state-
driven regionalism but also for market and society-induced 
integration, since the two depend on each other.” (1998a:79).  
However, regional integration as a political project requires not a 
rolled back state.  To the contrary, it requires a more activist state. 
States in southern Africa should, however, recognise that they 
share a public space with other actors.  In the 1980s and early 
1990s, non-state actors have been active in establishing linkages 
with other non-state actors, which could strengthen their role in 
regional integration vis-à-vis states.     
 
Non-state actors in southern Africa, and the rest of Africa, were 
also effective in establishing international linkages with other 
global non-state actors, such as Amnesty International and 
Greenpeace.  Establishing linkages with other international actors 
were legalised by the imposition of economic and political reforms 
in southern Africa in the early 1990s (Reed, 1995).  The 
establishment of linkages with international non-state actors was 
furthermore, supported by the spread of democratisation and 
changes in technology.  Charles Petland posits that the perception 
of interdependence or mutual dependence is brought about by: “… 
modern technology of communications, industry and welfare, as 
                                      
130
   Bilateral and multilateral donors in the 1990s have devoted increasing amounts of 
their funding; especially the fraction earmarked for democracy and human rights, to 
civil society bodies. 
 
131
   Sandra McClean contends that: “Although assessment of SAPs’ contribution to 
social problems are inconclusive, it does appear that they have contributed to 
regionalist pressures by forcing people to revive old or establish new associative ties 
as counters to material shortage, unemployment etc,” (1999:946). 
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well as the growth of economic, ecological and social problems on 
the regional or global scale…” (1973:64). This interdependence 
not only affect states, but also non-governmental and 
transnational relations.   
 
States in southern Africa, as elsewhere, were not always able to 
control the flow of information, nor were they capable of solving all 
the problems they were confronted with. This called for the 
involvement of non-state actors.  The consequences of an 
increase in non-state relations results in a “… web of relations 
between non-governmental units… which in turn result in a… 
transnational society.” (Nye, 1971:33).  Transnationalism is an 
integral part of increased regionness and regionalism132.   
Increased social relations among non-state actors had major 
implications for the study of regions and regional integration.  They 
were vital in revamping existing regional integration blocks in the 
early 1990s, in southern Africa, as elsewhere in the developing 
world.   
 
For instance, MISA uses communication technology to establish 
linkages among the people of the region.  Similarly, the trade 
unions in the region have initiated the Social Charter for the 
fundamental rights of workers in southern Africa.  Various bilateral 
agreements have been established between the South African 
trade unions and their counterparts in Mozambique, Namibia and 
Lesotho.  These relations are established outside the purview of 
state influence, and contributed to the reconstitution of relations 
among non-state actors.  More importantly, this bears testimony to 
the fact that regionalism is ultimately about how regional actors 
such as state and non-state actors seek to influence and control 
issues of an economic, political and social nature133. 
                                      
132
   Regionalism, therefore, needs to cater for both state-led forms of regional 
integration and more organic forms of integration, involving non-state actors. This 
demands a re-interpretation and expanded notion of regionalism and regional 
integration.      
 
133
   Ultimately, however: “…pressure from social groups… is mediated by an 
organizational dynamic that imprints its own image on the outcome.” (Hull, 
1986:19). In southern Africa, media restrictions in countries such as Zimbabwe and 
Namibia, makes it difficult for these actors to effectively influence state policy.  
 80 
 
In the case of southern Africa, the non-involvement of non-state 
actors in their deliberations on policy formulation has contributed 
to the inability of SACU and SADCC to generate additional 
economic growth, because co-operative economic practices 
among non-state actors- as in the case of informal women traders 
in Mozambique and South Africa referred to earlier- were excluded 
from the measurement of formal economic activity (Söderbaum 
and Taylor, 2001).  The SADC document on the Free Movement 
of People and the recently established SADC Women’s and the 
Non-Governmental Council acknowledge the need to respond to 
informal traders.  However, the SADC body may also aim to 
control and regulate other transnational relations in southern 
Africa, because states predominate in regional relations and retain 
the ability to impede or promote regionalism in the sub-region.        
 
It is, however, important for states in the sub-region to involve 
non-state actors in an analysis of integration, as they are mutually 
dependent on each other to solve problems of a transnational 
nature.  Mutual dependence in this context is a consequence of 
the interdependence of states with states, as well as states and 
societies.  It also serves as a poignant reminder of the regions’ 
interdependence and common vulnerability in the global economy.  
In southern Africa, moreover, in the recent past, apartheid and the 
history of unequal economic development further reinforced the 
awareness of interdependence.  Today, South Africa’s economic 
predominance still provides the political economic glue that binds 
the region and shapes the perception of interdependence.   
By ignoring the crucial role of non-state actors in the integration 
process Transactionalism failed to recognise that: “… the new 
order… established by SAPs… in African international relations is 
firmly rooted in the re-ordered relationship which is emerging 
between civil society and the state in Africa.  While the state is 
certainly not about to be supplanted in international affairs, the 
recasting of its capacities and jurisdictions, and the expansion of 
                                                                                                         
Furthermore, there is a common feeling of unease among Southern African regional 
governments about working with civil society, as will be demonstrated elsewhere. 
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the international activities of actors in the society realm, does 
indicate that the African state will have to share political space 
with a growing number of non-state actors…” (Reed, 1995:145). 
The above suggests that the study of regionalism or the practice 
of it by those wishing to put together a region, should serve as a 
catalyst for wide ranging changes in development.  Regionalism in 
southern Africa must lend scope and provide guidance to the 
promotion of a wider regionalism that embraces both state and 
non-state actors, for the achievement of a more equitable 
economic, political and social order: in short, a developmental 
regional order.  .  In a world context of multiple actors, a sound 
understanding of world politics depends on understanding the 
different types of societal actors operating transnationally.  This is 
crucial, since societal actors co-exist and interact with states.   
Ultimately, therefore: “Any discussion of international society of 
states must take into account the transnational activities of 
individuals, firms, interest associations and social groups.  These 
societal actors have significant effects on the flow of material 
resources, know-how and ideas around the world, and cannot be 
ignored in any full account of international relations.” (Peterson, 
1992:371).  Transactionalism, as a field of study, however, only 
focussed on inter-state and corporate non-state actors only.  As 
such, it has neglected the fact that new forms of regionalism have 
constantly extended into new and diverse domains, since the mid-
1980s.  New forms of regionalism recognise that: “… regional 
initiatives- from civil society networks and NGOs… play out roles 
that have a daily impact upon peoples and states…” (Fawcett, 
2004:431)134.          
The New Regionalism as a paradigm of analysis and guide to 
political action, and one of its variants - Developmental 
Regionalism - is aimed at identifying and ascertaining where an 
alternative normative approach to regionalism exists at the level of 
                                      
134
   Louise Fawcett asserts that: “… a truly successful regionalist project today 
presupposes eventual linkages between state and non-state actors: an interlocking 
network of regional governance structures…” (2004:433). New regionalism as a 
phenomenon on the ground, recognises the linkages and mutual dependence between 
state and non-state actors. 
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civil society, and how these patterns of behaviour grow out of, and 
exist in spite of relations between and among states. 
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2.4 Transcending State-Centrism: New Regionalism  
 
 
Globalisation and the study of regionalism after the Cold War can 
be seen as a reflection of the reconfiguration of economic and 
political power in the production centres of the world (Gamble and 
Payne, 1996).  Andrew Hurrel and Louise Fawcett note that: “The 
end of the Cold War has witnessed a further expansion of the 
normative ambitions of international society.  Order is increasingly 
held to involve the creation of rules that affect very deeply the 
domestic structures and organization of states, that invest 
individuals and groups within states with rights and duties, and 
which seek to embody some notion of a common good (human 
rights, democratisation, the environment, the construction of more 
elaborate and intrusive interstate security orders).” (1995:309).   
One of the ways that is increasingly being seen as contributing to 
the creation of ‘new’ rules for international society, is regionalism, 
especially in the aftermath of the Cold War.   
After the Cold War, international society is increasingly being 
restructured along regional lines.  The rise of new forms of 
regionalism refers to a phenomenon in its infancy that had its 
genesis in the mid-1980s (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998)135.  As a 
field of study, new forms of regionalism: “… reflects the deeper 
interdependence of today’s global political economy and the 
intriguing relationship between globalism and regionalism…” (ibid, 
3; Sideri, 1997).  Simply put, new forms of regionalism are 
reflective of the proliferation of transnational activity.  This is 
because: “Even if initiatives are taken within the region, the factors 
which make these initiatives necessary are global.” (Hettne, 
1997:229)136.  New Regionalism is the study of new forms of 
regionalism.     
                                      
135
   For Marianne Marchand et al: “… there is a qualitative difference between the old 
regionalism of the Cold War and the one that emerged during the late 1980s.” 
(1999:903). 
 
136
   Morten Bäs reminds us that: “The globalisation/regionalisation nexuses have 
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In the aftermath of the Cold War a second wave or revamped 
regionalism took-off.  This second wave of regionalism is referred 
to as the study of new forms of regionalism or the ‘new 
regionalism’137, was the end of geo-political rivalry and a decline in 
US economic hegemony (Hettne, 1999b; Smith, 1997)138.  
Regionalisation, therefore, should be seen against the background 
of important transformations of the global political economy.  This 
suggests that the global economy is not only becoming globalised, 
it is also becoming regionalised.  Conceptually, the new 
regionalism refers to: “… new economic and political processes 
actually going on in many parts of the world…” (Hettne, 1999b:1).  
While different authors agree that the new regionalism refers to 
the second wave of regionalism: “… there is as yet no clear 
definition of the new regionalism which is commonly subscribed to.  
                                                                                                         
created a whole range of diversified patterns of interactions and responses at the 
local, national and regional levels.” (1999:1062). These diversified patterns of 
interactions and responses are, arguably, due to the unevenness of this process of 
global restructuring. Indeed: “The impact of global restructuring is not only uneven 
among countries, but perhaps even more so within them. This means that at the local 
as well as the national and regional levels there is a multitude of approaches and 
responses to globalisation/regionalisation.” (ibid, p1064).   
 
137
   Margaret Lee argues that the study of new regionalism can be divided into four 
theoretical constructs. The first construct is known as open regionalism, which: “… is 
based on neo-classical and/or neo-liberal economic theory, which emphasises that the 
markets should drive the integration process. The second, known as the WIDER 
approach, sees regionalism as a more multidimensional process that will result in 
greater homogeneity in areas such as culture, politics, economics, security and 
diplomacy. The third approach is termed ‘new regionalism- regionalism from below’, 
and suggests that the starting point for formal regional organisation should be 
informal cross border trade and related activity. The final theoretical approach of the 
new regionalism is the ‘external guarantors model’, which advocates that the African 
regional agenda should be supervised by an external agent in order to guarantee that 
economic reforms are not reversed and macroeconomic stability is enhanced.” 
(2003:31). 
  
138
  Margaret Lee postulates that: “The first wave… of regionalism… took place 
during the 1960s, while the second wave commenced during the mid-1980. The latter 
took off only after the Cold War came to an end in 1989.” (2003:28; Hettne and 
Söderbaum, 1998).   
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There is only some convergence of thinking in emphasizing its 
difference from the old.” (Mistry, 1999:123)139. 
New regionalism as a field of study differs from the old or first 
wave of regionalism in important respects140.  Björn Hettne posits 
that whereas old regionalism was:  
(1) “Formed in and shaped by a bipolar cold-war context, the new 
is taking shape in a multipolar world order…” 
(2) “Created ‘from above’ (by the superpowers), the new is a 
more spontaneous process from within the region and also 
‘from below’ in the sense that the constituent states 
themselves, but increasingly also other actors, are the main 
proponents for regional integration.” 
(3) “As far as economic integration is concerned, was inward-
oriented and protectionist, the new is often described as 
                                      
139
   The most cogent distinction between new regionalism and older forms of 
regionalism is that the former allows for: “… a marriage between development theory 
and international political economy. Such a merger may ultimately strengthen an 
emerging “new” or critical political economy of development.” (Söderbaum, 
2001:104). Critical Political Economy deals with historical power structures, 
emphasising contradictions in them, as well as changes and transformation expressed 
in normative terms (Cox, 1996). As such, it allows us to probe the normative 
concerns of regionalism, which deal with regionalism as a political project. 
 
140
  Marianne Marchand et al observe that: “In the past, the study of regionalisation 
has been dominated by functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to, as it was 
then called, economic and political integration.” (1999:901). James Mittelman, 
concludes that in addition to these two approaches, institutionalism and neo-
institutionalism are deficient, ostensibly because they: “… understate power relations 
and fail to offer an explanation of structural transformation.” (1999:26). Recently, 
however: “… renewed interest has been accompanied by the emergence of new 
theories and approaches to regionalisation. In particular, political economy and 
critical security studies are shedding new light on processes of regionalisation, as 
well as on the emergence of regionalism as a new world order phenomenon…” 
(Marchand, et al, 1999:901). Ultimately, new regionalism differs from older types in 
that the new regionalism approach: “… unlike the ‘old’ regional studies also 
incorporates all three major types of actors in its purview, not just states but also 
companies and communities.” (Shaw, 2000:401).    
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‘open’, and thus compatible with an interdependent world 
economy…”  
(4)  “Specific with regard to objectives, some organizations being 
security-oriented and others being economically-oriented, the 
new is a more comprehensive, multidimensional process.  
This includes trade and economic integration, but also 
environment, social policy, security and democracy, including 
the whole issue of accountability and legitimacy. 
(5) “Only concerned relations between formally sovereign states, 
the new forms part of a global structural transformation in 
which non-state actors are active and manifest themselves at 
several levels of the global system…” (1999b:7-8). 
For Andrew Hurrel (1995), the New Regionalist renaissance, or 
what he terms “The Resurgence of New Regionalism”, is a 
product of the revival of old regional organisations, the 
establishment of new ones, and the calls to deepen integration in 
some instances.  In view of the above, the new regionalism: “… is 
a package rather than a single policy and goes beyond the free 
market idea… the political ambition of establishing territorial 
control and regional coherence cum identity is the primary 
regionalist goal.” (ibid, p17; Smith, 1997:73)141.  New forms of 
regionalism are thus a pluralist phenomenon that concerns itself 
with various fields of activity and at various levels142.   
                                      
141
   This suggests that regionalism is ultimately a political and social construct. 
Indeed: “Taking the new regionalisms seriously implies that actual practices, and not 
geographical proximity alone or formal political and economic cooperation, will 
determine the delimitation of the region.” (Marchand, et al, 1999:903). 
  
142
   As a political project, new regionalism accords states the opportunity to enhance 
and protect their roles in an interdependent world because states are: “… more 
selective in its external relations, and careful to address the interests of the region as a 
whole…” (Hettne, 1996a:101). Furthermore, as a normative project, new regionalism 
allows states and non-state actors to respond to an interdependent world: “… in 
accordance with its peculiarities and problems.” Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998:7).  
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Theoretically, new forms of regionalism are also an innovative 
response to the impact of neo-liberalism on state and society.    
Robert Cox asserts that: “Neo-liberalism is transforming states 
from being buffers between external economic forces and the 
domestic economy into agencies for adapting domestic economies 
to the exigencies of the global economy.” (1995:39). Multilateral 
institutions in a regional setting facilitate this transformation of the 
state to the exigencies of the global economy.   
The new regionalism is therefore predicated on the assumption 
that engagement with the world economy is unavoidable.  For 
Balefi Tsie the process of new regionalism: “… represents an 
attempt by states to forge a form of governance different but not 
necessarily opposed to multilateralism.” (2000:12).  This latter 
contention is closely related to the fact: “… that the constituent 
states themselves are main actors.” (Hettne, 1997:229.).    Seen in 
this light, new regionalism is arguably a state-initiated political 
project, to respond to globalisation and to a plurality of actors, with 
a view to respond to the comprehensiveness and multifaceted 
nature of contemporary regionalism.   
For Björn Hettne the process of: “… new regionalism is a 
response to globalisation processes, including efforts to initiate a 
counter-process of deglobalisation.  Deglobalisation is: “… an 
attempt to bring the globalisation process and transnational 
transactions under some political-territorial control.” (1999b:6)143.  
In the face of reduced state autonomy states are the main 
protagonist initiating this process of de-globalisation144.  The 
                                      
143
   Regionalisation must thus, ultimately be viewed as: “… the political corrective to 
globalised market-driven disorder and turbulence, not only on the level of the world 
but also in local systems.” (Hettne, et al, 1999b:xxxi).  Moreover, de-globalisation 
results from a desire: “… to modify, halt or to reverse the process of globalisation in 
order to safeguard some degree of territoriality, civil norms, cultural diversity, and 
human security…” (Hettne, 1998:49). 
 
144
   Indeed, it is intimately related to the current transformation of the world economy 
into trading blocs and the process of globalisation. Yet, the new regionalism: “… is 
on the one hand seen as an integral part of the globalisation process, but on the other 
it can serve as formal (including state-led) counterforces against this process…” (Lee, 
2003:35).  In this sense, the new regionalism is an important political construct in 
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initiating role of the state in the process of de-globalisation, takes 
place against the backdrop of its reduced role as a unitary actor in 
international affairs145.     
Robert Cox concludes that: “States are, by and large, reduced to 
the role of adjusting national economies to the dynamics of an 
unregulated global economy.” (1996:528).  Thus, the state is 
reduced in its functions as a unitary and intermediary or 
gatekeeper.  In contrast, the direct participation of individuals and 
non-state actors in global and regional affairs can only grow, 
because of the uncertainty that accompanies globalisation, and 
the space that it created for non-state actor participation (Cox, 
1999a)146.   
Non-state actor participation in particularly, but not exclusively, 
economic affairs has become crucial: “… in a world context in 
which there is a rise in globalised market forces… which 
consequently contributed to: “… a diminution of the role of the 
state as an economic provider.  Arguably, therefore, International 
Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) can increasingly 
contribute to the development agenda.” (Blaauw and Bischoff, 
2001:52).  As a political initiative, the process of New Regionalism 
demands that there be mutual enablement between state and 
non-state actors in building such new economic capacity 
                                                                                                         
influencing the project of globalism. 
 
145
   Accordingly: “Within each regional project there will be more than one vision, 
and often also more than one actor pursuing regionalisation.” (Marchand, et al, 
1999:900).  This suggests that in the context of new regionalism: “The debate has 
also been widened… it is beginning to acknowledge that regional interactions and 
organisations focus not only on state but on continuing linkages among a 
heterogeneous set of actors and realms, including states, economies/companies and 
societies/civil societies.” (ibid, p897).  
 
146
   Cox (1999a) notes that civil society is increasingly being looked on as the source 
for alternative and more equitable forms of society – the motivational force for 
change. This opens up the possibility of plotting change, transformation, freedom 
from control and enlarging the possibilities for greater human emancipation. 
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(Söderbaum, 1998)147.  This creates the opportunity for both state 
and non-state actors to build new regional economic and political 
capacity.  
Building new regional economic and political capacity requires 
deliberate attempts to connect the two broad processes of formal 
and informal regionalism148.  Therefore, the study of new 
regionalism: “… concerns the ideas, identities and ideologies 
related to a regional project.” (Marchand, et al, 1999:900).  As 
such, new regionalism is a political construction, which can be 
moulded to accommodate the marginalised and begin to address 
broad-based development149.  This is necessary since: “In many 
parts of the world, what feeds people, organises them and 
constructs their worldview is not the state and its formal 
representations (at local, national or regional levels), but the 
informal sector and its multitude of networks, civil societies and 
                                      
147
   The focus of new regionalism, like critical theory, is on the exclusion of 
individuals, groups, communities and the state at the international system’s level and 
how to overcome this. To achieve this, we need to explain how the present order 
came about, and secondly, attempt to seek an alternative order to the existing one 
(Cox, 1981, 1996). This is because state-society relations are to be located in 
“…historically constituted frameworks or structures within which economic and 
political activity take place” (Cox, 1996:32). 
 
148
   For Margaret Lee: “The need to attempt to connect both the formal and informal 
processes of regionalism is at the heart of the new regionalism concept.” (2003:36). 
 
149
   Samir Amin asserts that: “The creation of such regions represents the most 
effective response to the growing polarisation as a result of the globalisation process. 
Regionalisation, therefore, will help facilitate the creation of a global system that is 
different.” (1999:54). The outcome for developing countries, Bertil Odén posits, is 
that: “… this configuration of the new regionalism is viewed as a way to increase 
regional interrelations in order to enhance interdependence and therefore arrest the 
globalisation process, which results in their economies being linked to the developed 
countries based on centre-periphery model.” (1999:157). 
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associations (again at many levels).” (ibid, p904)150.  This 
continued and increased interaction between the formal and 
informal allows state and other actors to mutually enable each 
other151.  This in turn deepens co-operation among regional 
actors, which increases the level of regionness.  New Regionalism 
studies and encourages this process.     
From the above postulate, new regionalism means regionness is 
not only a state-initiated project, but is more comprehensive and 
multidimensional.  Indeed, the usefulness of new regionalism as a 
field of study lies in its recognition of ‘informal integration’ among 
non-state actors which: “… consists of those intense patterns of 
interaction which develop without the impetus of deliberate 
political decisions following the dynamics of markets, technology, 
communication networks and social change.” (Wallace, 1992:9).  
New regionalism as a phenomenon itself makes allowance for 
transnational: “… often undirected processes of social and 
economic interactions…” (Hurrel, 1995:39)152.                
Because of its comprehensiveness and multidimensional nature, 
the New Regionalism is concerned with the broad tapestry of 
development, including security issues. (Hettne and Söderbaum, 
1998).  Development and security, it is now widely acknowledged, 
                                      
150
   In studying: “… informal regionalisms from below… our analyses should take 
into account the regional practices in the informal border politics of small trade, of 
smuggling and crime, and the networks and associations involves in these two 
processes.” (Marchand, et al, 1999:906). Studying formal and informal regionalism 
also has another advantage. For example: “…. Formal regionalisation in the form of 
trade liberalisation can also entail the regionalisation of various elements of civil 
societies into a regionalised civil society that can become a viable counterforce to the 
formal regionalisation project.” (ibid.).      
 
151
   This suggests merging top-down globalisation, driven by states and IFIs and 
bottom-up globalisation driven by social networks and social movements or 
transnational regional economy and civil society (Söderbaum, 2001). 
   
152
   This increases the level of regionness and is intimately related to the process of 
regionslisation. Löhteenmäki and Käkönen assert that regionalism refers to: “… 
subregional co-operation created from below, not by states or supra-national actors.” 
(1999:204). 
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exist in a complementary relationship with one another.  Boutros-
Boutros Ghali reminds us that: “Just as there can be no lasting 
peace without development, so development efforts cannot 
succeed without a stable, peaceful environment.” (1995:1).  The 
reality is, however, that: “… states in the southern region, as in 
much of Africa, have not been particularly responsive to the needs 
and interests of their citizens.” (Maclean, 1999:945).  This compels 
citizens to re-organise social and economic relations. 
New regionalism, as a phenomenon develops in a multipolar 
context which: “… acknowledges the importance of movements in 
civil societies for emancipation, democratisation, material 
opportunity and/or survival.” (ibid, p944).  This, by and large, is to 
explain the increased activism shown by civil societies across 
borders153.  The issues, which these non-state actors seek to 
address, include, inter alia, democracy, human rights, 
environmental degradation and migration.  These functional 
linkages established by trans-regional actors point to the impact of 
regional and international norms on the growth and the influence 
of civil societies at domestic level.  This calls for the re-
organisation of economic and social relations.   
The re-organisation of economic and social relations also finds 
resonance in southern Africa.  Sandra McClean asserts that:  “In 
the midst of growing economic uncertainty and social strains, 
people in southern Africa have established or renewed regional 
connections as protective strategies.” (ibid, p945)154.  In a situation 
of this new regionness, individuals and marginalized communities 
                                      
153
   The presence of these actors compels states to recast their roles in a changing 
global economy.  In doing so, the state has to consider a variety of factors that 
circumscribe its autonomy and influence, ranging from economic, social, political, 
cultural and historic dimensions that require much more than state participation, but 
also popular participation. These: “… social movements can also be seen as 
protective measures in an era of extreme market dominance.” (Hettne, 1995:5).    
 
154
  Reflecting on the new century, Cox maintains that the quest for a new social 
order, or what he terms ‘civilization’ can best be understood as a: “… fit between 
material conditions of life and intersubjective meanings” (2001:215-234). This 
understanding of civilisation makes the political or social economy the most 
promising arena for change and development.   
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are accorded the opportunity to interact with the wider region and 
the rest of the world as a means of advancing economic and 
political goals.  Blaauw and Bischoff (2001) contend that in the 
case of southern Africa this makes it possible for the insertion of 
regional communities155.   
The delimitation of the region will decidedly be determined by 
actual practice, and not just (physical) geography or formal 
political and economic co-operation.  As such, a new approach to 
regionalism in southern Africa must move beyond any static notion 
of region and regionness and replace it with the dynamic notion of 
the region as a social construct.  Accordingly: “… regional decision 
makers now have the opportunity to travel a different path, a path 
possibly leading to peace, sustainable development, and 
ecological sustainability.” (Swatuk and Vale,2003:31).  Such a 
path must also take cognisance of the fact that: “… in the region 
there seems to be an emerging consensus around the inherent 
value of community-based development, at state, substate and 
nonstate levels.” (ibid, p39)156.  To transcend state-centrism, we 
are compelled to expand and re-interpret the conception of 
development and security     
 
By transcending state-centrism, we will afford southern Africa and 
southern Africans the opportunity to politically correspond to 
globalisation and start a process of inward looking development 
called developmental regionalism which ‘mixes and matches’ 
inward with outward orientations with a view to lessen regional 
inequalities and to involve both state and non-state actors in the 
process of building new economic capacity. 
 
                                      
155
  The transformative potential of civil society can only be fully unleashed if there is: 
“Mutual support in promoting social equity, reversing the current trend towards 
social polarization” (ibid, p231).  
 
156
  Ultimately: “… the ways in which the market, the state and civil society interact 
and react to the challenges of globalisation are crucial in constituting sub-regional 
outcomes.” (Mittelman, 2000:160).  
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2.4.1 Developmental Regionalism 
 
 
Globalism brings into relief the issue of regionalism as a key 
development phenomenon in southern Africa.  By similar 
extension: “The new regionalism may also provide solutions to 
development problems.” (Hettne, 2001b:103).  For Björn Hettne: 
“Development is… one dimension of the new regionalism, which 
has many causes and serves many purposes…” (1996a:164).  In 
the face of marginalisation, regionalism offers southern African 
countries the opportunity to address both national developmental 
needs and to engage the international community.  Bertil Odén 
postulates that: “The marginalization of Southern Africa as well as 
the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, in the world economy over the last 
decades has increased the scope for regionally induced 
initiatives.” (2001:176)157. 
As a normative project, regionalism in southern Africa, as 
elsewhere in the developing world, accords states and non-state 
actors the opportunity to build new regional economic capacity158.  
Towards this end, Louise Fawcett notes that: “Promoting regional 
co-operation would appear then to be a rational policy choice for 
developing countries both in terms of strengthening links with the 
advanced industrialized countries but also demonstrating greater 
independence and self-sufficiency.” (1995:22).  Regionalism in 
southern Africa, however, should be not purely economic, but also 
a politically driven project, since the aim of regionalism should be 
to reduce the acute disparities in and among countries of the 
region159.   
                                      
157
   This with a view to counter-act: “… the global pattern of uneven development… 
that… more often than not was reproduced within the region…” (Odén, 1999:19). 
 
158
   This is because globalisation as a normative project: “… is driven not primarily 
by some inexorable economic process, but rather by politics: by ideology, by the 
actions, interactions and decisions of state actors, their private sector interlocutors 
and wider public.” (Cerny, 1999:159). 
  
159
   Indeed, one of the fundamental aims of the regionalisation process is the: 
“…creation of welfare (in terms of social security and regional balance).” (Hettne, 
 94 
These significant regional inequalities lend support to 
developmental regionalism that sets out explicitly to address the 
structural and spatial problems associated with integration 
amongst unequal partners, by regional economic regulation 
(Söderbaum, 1998).  In this context, developmental regionalism 
refers: “… to concerted efforts from a group of countries within a 
geographical region to increase the efficiency of the total regional 
economy and to improve its position in the world economy.” 
(Hettne, 2001b:104).  One way of increasing the efficiency of the 
total regional economy is through regional industrial development.  
Indeed one of the precepts that underpin developmental 
regionalism relates to: “… efforts to co-ordinate regional industrial 
development.” (Gibb, 2001:74).  This suggests: “… a political 
economy approach to developmental regionalism.” (Söderbaum, 
1998:86). 
A political economy approach to developmental regionalism, 
presupposes that we answer the question: “… what the driving 
forces of the regional process are.” (ibid.).  Accordingly, and to 
answer the question, we need to ascertain the role of the state, 
market forces and civil society in building new economic 
capacity160.  Historically, state-led regionalism in southern Africa 
has been a political elite project which has tended to live a life of 
its own, often separated from market demands and civil society.  
This means that up to now, the interpretation of a regional 
community in southern Africa remains the prerogative of the 
narrow interests of regional elites.  From this reading, it implies 
that states in southern Africa provide the only path to regional 
community.  Regionalism is, however, a comprehensive and 
multifaceted process taking place at various analytical levels and 
involving both state and non-state actors.  This suggests that the 
fostering of closer ties between and among governments has to 
be complemented by governments promoting grassroots co-
operation among non-state or civil society actors across 
                                                                                                         
2001b:90).  
 
160
   Writing on state, market and society relations in southern Africa, Fredrik 
Söderbaum asserts that: “The private and public economic forces have been reacting 
faster than have the state actors to the new postapartheid situation and the changes 
occurring as the result of the structural adjustment and economic liberalization 
reforms in Southern Africa.” (2001:111). 
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borders161, even outside of the institutional structures provided for 
such co-operation.  New approaches to the study of regionalism, 
which take place across a number of dimensions, accommodate 
and encourage such co-operation.     
The above suggests that individuals or groups find their voice 
through regional non-state actors, and as such also contributes to 
formal regionalism and regionness.  This creates the opportunity 
to   not only expand and re-interpret our conception of the region 
and regionalism in southern Africa, but may also contribute to 
participative regionness.  Moreover, it bears testimony to the: “… 
vast potential for a successful and mutually beneficial 
developmental regionalism in Southern Africa.” (ibid, p87).  
Indeed, evidence suggests that non-state forces driving 
regionalism in southern Africa, are already considerably 
contributing to re-constructing regional industrial development.      
Finally the importance of Developmental regionalism for an 
understanding of contemporary efforts at integration is aptly 
captured by Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, who enthuse 
that Developmental Regionalism: “… contains the traditional 
arguments for regional cooperation of various relevance for 
different actors, such as territorial size, population size, and 
economies of scale, but more significantly, also adds some which 
express new concerns and uncertainties in the current 
transformation of the world order and world economy, such as 
resource management, peace dividend, social security, 
investment and finance, stability and credibility.” (1998:19).  All of 
these inform the challenge of regional economic integration in 
Southern Africa. 
All in all, Developmental Regionalism, Björn Hettne claims, is 
discernible when attempts are geared towards: 
                                      
161
   Abie Dithlake notes that the: “SADC-CNGOs recognise and respect the role that 
such institutions play in the region. For civil society organisations to be more 
effective, we need to be focussed. Specialisation in a particular field and area of 
concern would help us a great deal and enable us to achieve much.” (Personal 
Communication, 25th January, 2006). New approaches to the study of regionalism 
recognise that non-state actors also have to address a multitude of issues.  
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(a) Achieving sufficient market size in order to attract foreign 
investment; 
(b) Forging viable economies for the purpose of enhancing 
possibilities of collective self-reliance, especially food security; 
(c) Seeking and maintaining policy credibility in the form of similar 
macro-economic policies and common political systems and 
values; 
(d) Effective articulation of common interests; 
(e) Social stability through regional redistribution; 
 (f) Joint agreement and judicious exploitation of common natural 
resources, and 
(g) Conflict management and resolution so as to collectively reap 
the ‘peace dividend’ (1996a:165-166). 
Seen in this light, developmental regionalism as an economic 
project centres on: “…the role of the region towards the rest of the 
world and the internal dynamics of a particular region.” 
(Söderbaum, 1998a:76).  To achieve the afore-mentioned, it is 
necessary to first respond to global economic demands by 
harmonising macro and micro coordination in such a way as: “… 
to cope in a rapidly globalizing world that demands ever-
increasing competitiveness.” (Mistry, 2000:554).  In addition, the 
history of lopsided economic development in the southern African 
region demands that strong emphasis be placed on measures 
intended to counter polarisation.           
For Fredrik Söderbaum therefore Developmental regionalism 
implies: “…the concerted efforts of state and non-state actors 
within a geographical area to increase the economic efficiency and 
development of the region as a whole and to improve its position 
in the world economy.” (1998a:91) (the argument of effective 
articulation)162. 
                                      
162
   Critically: “… the way in which the market, the state and civil society interact and 
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For our purpose, Developmental Regionalism may be of 
assistance to states who: “… have to cooperate to solve 
problems…” (Hettne, 1996b:100).  This would ensure that each 
member reaches a higher level of development.  Significantly, this 
would contribute to the creation of a favourable economic 
environment in the form of an expanded regional market.  This is 
in tandem with the argument of Developmental Regionalism that 
achieving sufficient market size is a sine qua non for attracting 
foreign investment (the argument of sufficient size).  A positive 
spin-off for countries which integrate with other ones, is that: “… 
As interdependence deepens so the risk of major economic or 
military conflict declines.” (Gamble and Payne, 1996:248).  
In the final analysis: “… development regionalism is a relatively 
new phenomenon. It contains the traditional arguments for 
regional cooperation of various relevance for different actors, such 
as territorial size, population size, and economies of scale, but, 
more significantly, also add some which are expressing new 
concerns and uncertainties in the current transformation of the 
world order and world economy.” (Hettne, 2001b:107). 
 
 
2.4.2 Developmental Regionalism in southern Africa  
 
 
Efforts to establish a developmental axis between the port of 
Maputo and the industrial heartland of South Africa (Gauteng) 
(Söderbaum and Taylor, 2001); can be seen as an attempt to re-
construct regional industrial development.  Yet, these efforts are 
not only state-initiated.  Indeed, in some instances, private actors’ 
enthusiasm in building a trans-regional economy even supersedes 
the role that state actors play.  Söderbaum et al (1998b) observe 
that private economic actors are included in discussions by the 
CBI, SACU/CMA, and COMESA163.  
                                                                                                         
react to the challenges of globalisation is crucial in constituting sub-regional 
outcomes.” (Mittelman, 2000:160). 
 
163
   Writing on African regions, Björn Hettne reminds us that: “Apart from the formal 
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More tangible proof of the involvement of the business community 
in economic activity in southern Africa is borne out by their 
contribution to the establishment and rehabilitation of the Beira, 
Maputo and Walvis Bay Corridors. Moreover other: “South African 
based actors, such as ESKOM, Transnet and Spoornet, mining 
companies, banks and financiers, have sophisticated regional 
strategies and push the regionalisation process forward.” (ibid.).  
Vale and Maseko allude to similar growth of South African non-
state actor based investment in the region: “South Africa’s direct 
investment in Africa was approximately R3.7 billion before the 
1994 elections, and increased to about R13 billion thereafter, 
while trade during 1994-5 has increased 52.5 per cent to R16,771 
billion.” (1998:279)164.  
However, the above-mentioned developments seek to reinforce 
the notion that: “South Africa’s physical and financial infrastructure 
is superior to the rest of the region.” (Odén, 2001:179).  
Notwithstanding South Africa’s economic dominance in the region, 
there nevertheless exists the potential for enhancing mutual 
interdependence between that country and her neighbours.  
Mining, for example, offers the opportunity to enhance mutual 
enablement or interdependence between South Africa and the rest 
of the region.   
For Bertil Odén the: “… Jwaneng in Botswana is the largest single 
diamond mine in the empire of De Beers, with ownership divided 
equally between De Beers and the Botswana government. Such 
interdependence… may in fact facilitate a balanced regional 
development through investments and technology transfer.  
Transport and communications is another sector… where 
interdependencies may be mutually beneficial.  For instance, it is 
possible that the Maputo corridor and harbour can experience a 
renaissance as an outlet for production in Mpumalanga.  It is also 
possible that South African agencies such as Portnet and 
Spoornet could be involved in the management of transport 
corridors in Mozambique.” (ibid, p179-180).  The interactions 
                                                                                                         
regions, there are more important informal networks transcending state borders and 
these networks can be seen as embryonic regional civil societies.” (2001b:92).  
 
164
   These developments point to: “… observable changes in terms of changing 
regionness, and how such changes can be brought about by concerted political action 
coming from within the region.” (Hettne, 2001b:97). 
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suggest that state-society relations are limited to government-
business relations.         
Implicit in the afore-mentioned, is the suggestion that 
developmental regionalism by encouraging state-non-state actor 
partnership, offers state and non-state actors the political 
opportunity to build new economic capacity.  Developmental 
regionalism in southern Africa should thus be: “… state-led, 
market-driven and sensitive to the concerns of civil society 
organisations.” (Tsie, 2000:13).  But to overcome disparities in the 
region also requires a degree of interventionist regionalism165.  
Indeed, as the above example of infrastructural development 
demonstrate, mutual enablement between the public and private 
sectors in the various political economies that constitute the 
southern African region, are already contributing to forging an 
equitable regional economy.    
Effective articulation articulation finds expression in the way that 
SADC engages the rest of the world on trade and related issues 
by articulating a common position.  This is exemplified by the bi-
annual SADC-EU dialogue and the SADC-Nordic initiative (Balefi 
Tsie, 1999).  Such an approach to regionalism reinforces Mfundo 
Nkuhlu’s conception of Developmental Regionalism as being of 
specific value to southern Africa because: “… it places a strong 
emphasis on measures that are intended to counter polarisation in 
the integration schemes… and… stresses the need for macro and 
micro coordination in a multi-sectoral programme that embraces 
production, infrastructure and trade.” Moreover it: “… is also 
insistent on compensatory and corrective measures to guarantee 
benefits even for the least developed contracting partners.” 
(1994:34).  In a region such as southern Africa, with a history of 
social instability, collective self-reliance and social stability can 
only be achieved- to invoke Björn Hettne’s (1996b) phrase- 
through a regional distribution mechanism.  
Not surprisingly: “Recent SADC documents indicate an awareness 
of the need for political intervention to prevent deepening of 
                                      
165
   This means, Rok Aluju argues, that: “Developmental regionalism is thus an 
attempt to govern the market.” (2001:38; Edigheji, 2005:6). 
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regional economic disparities.” (Ibid, p101)166.  Similarly, the 
recently re-negotiated SACU provides for a development 
component that recognises the need for a regional distribution 
mechanism167.  Thus, Developmental Regionalism in southern 
Africa should amount to more than just the elimination of barriers 
to trade.  It should in fact be about the economic structural 
transformation of the region.  With reference to southern Africa, 
Balefi Tsie suggests that what is needed is: “… a gradual 
transformation of the regions’ agricultural-dependent economies.” 
(2000:14).  In this respect, the co-ordination of regional integration 
efforts should be geared towards providing less-developed and 
invariably small member states preferential access to regional 
markets and facilities168.   
More critically, regional redistribution is likely not only lead to a 
decline in economic and military conflicts, but will also result in 
social stability and a peace dividend for in southern Africa (the 
social stability and peace dividend arguments).  The SADC Free 
Trade Protocol and the Southern African Power Pool Protocol, 
coupled with the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, 
are indicators that in southern Africa, attempts are underway to 
achieve both collective self-reliance and a peace dividend in the 
region (Balefi Tsie, 1999).       
From the above therefore, it is obvious that Developmental 
Regionalism seeks to: “… reinforce societal viability by including 
social security issues and an element of redistribution and 
protection (by regional compensation and development funds or 
specialised banks) in the regionalist project.” (Ibid, p36).  This 
would require that states transcend the role that they have hitherto 
played in terms of providing infrastructure and a stable regulatory 
framework. States in southern Africa should be central in providing 
regional development institutions such as a Regional 
                                      
166
   The social reconstruction of the region should not be left to states alone.  It should 
involve states, markets and civil society actors (Söderbaum, 2001). 
 
167
  Robert Davies, Personal Communication, 16 October 2002. 
   
168
   Arguably this requires state intervention in the economy. Fredrik Söderbaum 
notes that: “The debate on the preferred type of developmental regionalism overlap 
very much [with] the classical debate on the role of the state in economic 
development.” (1998:85).   
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Development Bank, a Regional Board of Industry and Trade and a 
Regional Human Rights Commission.  A Regional Board of 
Industry and Trade are especially significant for the achievement 
of policy credibility in the form of similar macro-economic policies.  
Political intervention to establish these institutions and promote 
sustainable development would require the evolution of 
developmental states in southern Africa.   
Hettne and Söderbaum remind us that developmental regionalism 
requires: “…political intervention to reduce conflict and promote 
sustainable development.” (1998: Davies, 1994:13).  Sustainable 
development169 requires that matters such as trade liberalisation 
be accompanied by, inter alia, the co-ordination of regional 
industrial development, as is the case with the Beira, Maputo and 
Walvis Bay Corridors, where both public and private investment 
have played a pivotal role170 in changing the conventional 
investment patterns in the region.   
These Spatial Development Initiatives in southern Africa are: 
“Almost entirely driven by private capital (though in partnership 
with national and provincial administrations), these SDIs are 
currently reconfiguring whole areas of South Africa and 
neighbouring states, constructing effective micro-regions of 
economic activity.” (Taylor, 2003:317).  The creation of micro-
regions in southern Africa has also given rise to the expansion of 
non-state actor activity in the economic domain.  This suggests 
                                      
169
  The requirements for sustainable development in southern Africa are:  
• Intra-regional peace and domestic social tranquillity; 
• Effective and democratic governance; 
• Fiscal responsibility and monetary discipline; 
• Investment in human capital and improved skills training; 
• More domestic and foreign investment for the creation of jobs; 
• Infrastructural development, both physical and social infrastructure (Cleary, 
2001). 
 
170
   This suggests that in southern Africa: “… a strategy of ‘development from 
within’ may yet be a feasible development strategy at the regional level, for instance 
in the form of coordination of production, improvement of infrastructure, and 
exploitation of various economic complementarities (the viable economy argument). 
Moreover, it reminds us that we need to take into cognisance: “… bottom-up, market-
induced and society-induced processes of regionalisation.” (Söderbaum, 2001:111).   
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that people and not states alone also ultimately define regions and 
the notion of regional communities.  
 Writing on the expansion of non-state actor activity as a result of 
the creation of the Maputo Development Corridor Fredrik 
Söderbaum and Ian Taylor posit that: “This informal market 
expanded to all corners of the country as well as linking up with 
neighbouring countries, marking the beginning of the institution of 
makhero171, a movement of people, mostly women, buying and 
transporting all types of goods, vegetables, fruits, clothes and 
small home appliances, between Mozambique and South Africa 
and Swaziland, to sell on the informal market.” (2001:860).  The 
activities of these non-state actors suggest that individuals or 
groups are likely to find their voice through regional non-state 
actors, and as such also contribute to the political dimension of 
regionalism and regionness.   
The success of developmental regionalism in southern Africa is, 
arguably, dependent on the nature of states and regimes and their 
common political will.  Balefi Tsie notes that: “… systems of 
governance that express the aspirations and needs of its people, 
are profoundly shaped by the nature and form of the state.” 
(2001:104). Regional development in southern Africa would, 
therefore, require developmental states.  Thandika Mkandawire 
defines a developmental state as: “… one whose ideological 
underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts 
to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of 
economic development.” (2001:65; Ajulu, 2001; Tsie, 1996)172.  
Tom Lodge (1998) asserts that southern Africa already has hard, 
resilient and developmentally effective states.  This suggests that 
the edifice to create a regional development community- 
comprising of both state and non-state actors- concerned with the 
                                      
171
   Fredrik Söderbaum and Ian Taylor point out that: “… the makhero are modern 
forms of survival strategies, but several of the women traders have constructed viable 
business enterprises.” (2001:680). 
 
172
   Balefi Tsie asserts that: “… much of the development that has occurred in 
Botswana has been state-sponsored and directed.  It is in this sense that one can speak 
of a developmental state in Botswana.” (1996:601).   
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achievement of human dignity and the fulfilling of basic material 
needs, already exists173.      
 
The above suggests that: “A complex mix of interacting processes 
and causal mechanisms in various fields (development, 
economics, politics and culture) shapes the dynamics of 
developmental regionalism in Southern Africa at various analytical 
levels.” (Söderbaum, 2001:110).  Ultimately, therefore: “The future 
dynamics of regionalism in Southern Africa will be determined in 
the relationship between top-down and bottom-up forces and 
especially to what extent they are mutually reinforcing rather than 
competitive.” (ibid, p112).  
                                      
173
   The above postulate suggests that: “A democratic developmental state is one that 
not only embodies the principles of electoral democracy, but also ensures citizens’ 
participation in the development and governance processes.” (Edigheji, 2005:5).   
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2.5  Conclusion 
 
It was contended that the theories of neo-functionalism and 
Transactionalism, deal incompletely with outcomes appropriate to 
developing countries.  State-centric conceptions of regionalism 
inadequately deal with issues of a transnational nature, such as 
poverty and unemployment.  As a result, people remain vulnerable 
to top-down forms of regionalism driven by the forces of 
globalisation.  This calls for a new approach in the analytical study 
of regionalism in a transnational context.  The transformation of 
the world economy, in the aftermath of the Cold War, has 
contributed to renewed calls for a new approach in the analytical 
study of regionalism in a transnational context.   
Historically, however, SADCC used neo-functionalist174 precepts 
since its formation, while SACU has also been an inter-state 
regional grouping.  One of the positive spin-offs from following 
neo-functionalist logic since its formation was that the countries in 
southern Africa collectively mobilised resources for infrastructural 
development based on co-ordinated and mutually perceived 
common interests.  
Furthermore, the usefulness of state-centric Neo-Functionalism in 
southern Africa was obvious at the level of the integration and 
socialisation of regional elites.  This produced a strong sense of 
political solidarity and co-operation among these elites.  It should 
be used to deepen the integration process in southern Africa.  
However, political solidarity and co-operation alone will not lead to 
supranationality.  This would require the capacity of both state and 
non-state actors.  
The prime failure of Neo-functionalism in southern Africa, 
therefore, is that non-state actors have been excluded in regional 
integration efforts.  For regionalism in southern Africa to cater for 
broad-based development, there is a need to involve states, 
markets and civil society, since these are already expanding on 
                                      
174
  Marrianne Marchand et al observe that: “In the past, the study of regionalisation 
has been dominated by functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to, as it was 
called, economic and political integration.” (1999:901).  
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their own and creating ‘facts on the ground’.  This suggests that 
regionalism needs to capture the activities of non-state actors as 
well. 
The rise of transactionalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
presupposed that cultural, economic and political aspects of 
integration could no longer be understood within the bounds of 
states alone.  Though it takes a less rigid view, transactionalism as 
another approach to the study of integration, is similarly state-
centred in its definition of regional organisation.  Here integration 
concerns itself with processes: “… in which supranational 
institutions possessing binding decision-making power emerge 
from a convergence of self-interest on the part of various 
significant groups in society.” (Taylor, 1978:243).  While both 
SADCC and SACU made significant progress in the establishment 
of institutions possessing binding decision-making power, both 
excluded societal groups in their decision-making process.     
The exclusion of societal groups in the decision-making processes 
of both SACU and SADCC occurred despite the technological 
developments that have produced world-wide information and 
communication networks.  Furthermore, this exclusion also 
occurred despite the growth of transnational networks in the 
region. The growth of transnational relations in the region was 
exemplified by labour migration in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Transnational labour migration patterns during the 1970s and 
1980s mirrored the trends in economic interdependencies among 
the nations in the region.  The cobweb of relations that resulted 
from these technological developments has produced a deepening 
of social relations.  In southern Africa the liberation struggles 
waged by the peoples of the region resulted in a deepening of 
social relations.  Furthermore, cross-border economic exchanges 
and migration, brought about by worsening economic conditions in 
the 1980s have further reinforced these relations.  However, all 
these have as yet not been developed into regional loyalties 
(Bischoff and Blaauw, 2001).   
Whilst a nascent regional consciousness and identity, which was 
fostered, inter alia, by a common British colonial past, the 
liberation struggle and informal trade, exist in southern Africa, the 
regional inter-governmental bodies have failed to bring all sections 
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of the region’s societies into the mainstream of regional economic 
and political integration efforts.  Regional integration needs to 
touch the lives of the ordinary citizens of the region, since the 
building of new loyalties in the context of regional institutions can 
also contribute to pre-empting physical conflict.   
This presupposes that we expand the conception of security to 
accommodate the marginalised, and as such begin to address 
broad-based development. Indeed, the poor and the marginalised 
should become involved in determining the content and form of 
regionalism.  Thus, the building of a transnational community in 
the region that embrace both state and non-state actors, should 
encompass the most fundamental regional development.  The 
New Regionalism approach can considerably contribute to 
achieving this.  New regionalism, on the other hand, provides a 
framework for both state and non-state actors to set parameters 
for building new regional economic capacity. 
New Regionalism as the creation of facts on the ground, amounts 
to an uncontrolled growth in transnational forces which has 
unintended consequences, like polarization.  This makes a 
regional redistributive mechanism necessary or justifiable.  It is 
now recognised that regional development is contingent on co-
ordinated development, which implicitly necessitates a regional 
intervention mechanism. In southern Africa, this intellectual shift is 
most clearly visible in the move from a Co-ordinating Conference 
to a Development Community.  With regards to the transformation 
from SADCC to SADC, André du Pisani has this to say: “… a 
development community denotes an attempt at effecting structural 
change which favours both national and regional development and 
which activates all sectors of the population to participate in the 
development process.” (2001:207).         
This shift in thinking necessarily implies renewed thinking on how 
to address the issues of a lasting regional order, against the 
background of changing national, regional and international 
realities. Market mechanisms, it is widely acknowledged, cannot 
address the issue of the fair distribution of benefits resulting from 
regional integration. Neither can it shed light on the vexing 
question on how to ensure that industrialisation should or could 
benefit the less-developed members of the integrating community 
in southern Africa.  
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Furthermore, the role to be played by non-state actors - and the 
framework needed to clarify that role - will have to be the product 
of increased engagement between the states of southern Africa 
and non-state actors. In this regard, Hettne suggests that the 
deepening of regional integration in southern Africa is contingent 
on an: “… organisation framework… which… promotes social 
communication and convergence of values throughout the 
region…”  (1996b:97).  This would require popular participation in 
and control of national and regional decision-making by citizens 
through their representative bodies such as political parties, trade 
unions and others.  The establishment of democratic and vibrant 
civil societies throughout the region is an essential precondition for 
this.   
In this regard, state and non-state actors have a critical role to 
play in transforming regional institutions, to confront the challenge 
of integration in the next century.  Developmental Regionalism, as 
a critical element of New Regionalism, has important lessons to 
offer, and indeed aptly articulates the process of regionalism 
unfolding in southern Africa.  Historically, the political nature of 
regionalism, still make it difficult for states to make allowance for 
non-state actors in their attempts to deepen regional integration in 
southern Africa.      
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Everything but Developmental?: A History of Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa    
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Until the early 1990s, Southern Africa’s regional alliance patterns 
were characterised by a clear political divide between the 
apartheid state and independent state in southern Africa.  This 
divide that stood at the centre of the region’s turmoil, resulted in 
mutually exclusive economic and political co-operation and 
integration arrangements in the sub-region, with little concern for 
regional development or growth.  Political considerations informed 
regionalism in southern Africa, economic developmental and 
security objectives that are equally important were neglected.  
SADCC, for instance, defined itself by the exclusion of apartheid 
South Africa.  South Africa, on the other hand, remained a 
dominant regional force, because of the reliance of the BLS 
countries on it, and the various bilateral agreements she had with 
countries such as Swaziland and Mozambique.   
 
Usually, regional integration under the auspices of SACU was 
politically driven.  Roger Southall argues that: “The development of 
white settler society in South Africa was founded upon violent 
conquest and was encouraged by British imperial interests for 
commercial reasons.” (1999:4; Martin, 1990).  By the time the 
Union of South Africa was constituted in 1910, Bechuananland, 
Swaziland and Basutoland were British “High Commission 
Territories”.  The British colonial administration kept these “High 
Commission Territories” outside the colonial administrative 
structure and development processes which were applicable 
elsewhere in British Africa (Polhemus, 1994).  The contribution of 
British colonial rule to the underdevelopment of the “High 
Commission Territories” is exemplified in the absence of common 
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structures it had created for its territories elsewhere.  James 
Polhemus points out that due to British colonial rule of the “High 
Commission Territories”: “There was no common High 
Commission Territory currency, airline, post and 
telecommunications authority or literature bureau… this was left to 
South Africa.” (1994:236).     The Customs Union was formally 
established between South Africa and the then High Commission 
Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, in 1910. 
 
The establishment of SACU was aimed at eventually absorbing 
the BLS countries and entrenching South Africa’s economic and 
political dominance in the region175.  The 1910 agreement was 
influenced by both economic and political events in the region.  
The regional economy, within the Customs Union changed 
considerably in 1920 with the introduction of tariff protection by 
South Africa.  This pattern of tariff protection only changed after 
the re-negotiation talks of SACU, which started in 1994.  What the 
tariff protection meant was that a range of products from 
neighbouring territories was excluded from trade by South Africa in 
the course of its interaction with them.  A partial consequence of 
this was that South Africa’s exports to the region greatly exceeded 
its imports from the region (Catteneo, 1990).   
 
This pattern of regional economic interaction established an 
effective South African hegemony, and created relations of acute 
dependency in the territories.  This pattern of tariff discrimination, it 
will be illustrated elsewhere, enabled South Africa to make political 
use of its economic dominance, in the SACU region.  This tariff 
protection was significant in shaping trade patterns in SACU in 
particular176.  In the economic sphere, SACU in essence 
                                      
175
  Peter Vale reminds us that: “The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), for 
instance, the region’s longest-surviving interstate institution, buttressed South 
African power (and its wealth) in the region for close to a century. By providing 
states with a secure source of income, participation in SACU also opened the door to 
the statehood that would come to its three minor partners, Bechuanaland, Basutoland 
and Swaziland.  The theory and practice of regional security in southern Africa have 
been profoundly one-sided: they have sought to legitimise the access of privilege to 
power and sanctioned the power of the powerful to set the terms of interstate 
relations.” (2003:36).  
 
176
  To further enhance its hegemony in Southern Africa, apartheid South Africa even 
had: “… politically motivated trade agreements negotiated to provide support to the 
Smith regime in [Rhodesia].” (Davies, 1996:169).   
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exemplifies South Africa’s highhandedness, the power of its 
industrial lobby and the general hostage status of the BLNS 
countries.   
 
From the period 1948 to 1961 a new dimension was added to the 
relationship between South Africa and the BLS countries.  During 
this period, apartheid South Africa’s relationship with the BLS 
countries was considerably shaped by its response to African de-
colonisation.  After the National Party came into power in 1948, a 
re-alignment of its relations with Africa, in general, and southern 
Africa in particular, took place.  This was in response to Britain’s 
growing commitment to the de-colonisation of its colonies 
(Southall, 1999).  South Africa was, needless to say, strongly 
opposed to the prospects of de-colonisation.   
 
By the 1970s, the regional context in which SACU operated had 
changed considerably.  Nolutshungu (1988) posits that Verwoerd 
in an attempt to entrench South Africa’s economic and political 
dominance conceived the idea of establishing a South African 
common market based upon the former High Commission 
Territories.  The objectives of such a market were to politically tie 
the former High Commission Territories to South Africa.  Similarly, 
for Sam Nolutshungu (1988), the Cabora Bassa Dam Project and 
the Kunene River Scheme were aimed at augmenting the 
dependence of both the Territories and Mozambique on South 
Africa.  Despite South Africa’s opposition to the impending 
independence of the three territories, negotiations for a new 
agreement started in 1963 and were concluded in 1969.     
 
South Africa was also capable of exerting its economic dominance 
on non-SACU members in the region.  Robert Henderson notes 
that: “During the 1960s and early 1970s, South Africa sought to 
protect itself from the threat of guerrilla warfare by liberation 
movements (e.g. the African National Congress and the Pan-
African Congress) by creating economic dependencies out of 
surrounding countries.  These ‘relations of dependence’ were 
achieved by such institutionalised means as the SACU agreement 
(i.e.. the BLS countries) and by more informal economic 
instruments such as the control of rail transit facilities through 
South Africa, South African commercial dominance of the 
industrial and commodities markets of the surrounding countries, 
provision of wage-earning employment (i.e. South African mines 
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and factories) for foreign Africans, etc.  Even the Portuguese 
colonies of Angola and Mozambique and the then white-minority-
ruled Rhodesia were brought within South Africa’s sphere of 
economic dominance, thus affording the racist regime influence 
over a surrounding buffer of dependent, if not friendly, African 
states.” 177(1985:230).    
 
The above suggests that regionalism in southern Africa was not a 
developmental project, but rather a political one, to suit primarily 
South Africa’s needs.  Fredrik Söderbaum succinctly illustrates this 
by charging that: “… formal regionalisation schemes in Southern 
Africa, such as the Frontline States (FLS); SACU/CMA; SADC 
were used mainly as instruments in the larger power struggle.  
Regionalism in southern Africa was, however, not only driven by 
the political needs on the part of South Africa to neutralise political 
opposition.  This implied that South African-based businesses 
were penetrating the region, often with active support from the 
government, while neighbouring countries tried (but failed) to resist 
increased dependency.  The neighbouring states supported the 
liberation movement in South Africa while the apartheid regime 
tried in all possible and impossible ways to prevent them from 
doing so.” (1998:77-78).   
 
As the liberation struggle became more serious, South Africa 
increasingly made political use of its dominance.  South Africa was 
able to establish co-operative relations with willing independent 
African states, such as Malawi and Madagascar, while at the same 
time it consolidated ties with neighbouring white regimes, such as 
Rhodesia (Southall, 1999). This prompted a political response and 
led to the constitution of SADCC in the late 1970s/1980, which 
excluded South Africa and made South Africa’s political and 
economic dominance a regional issue.   The genesis of SADCC 
was intimately linked to the struggle for independence in the 
region.   
 
SADCC was motivated by a desire to secure the independence of 
all states in Southern Africa.  With regards to the origin of SADCC, 
Paul Bischoff contends that: “It did in fact (1980-992) principally 
                                      
177
   The relationship between apartheid South Africa and these countries were 
considered to be different, since this relationship was based on solidarity between 
these white states in the region (Grundy, 1973:222; Ngoma, 2004) 
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define itself by its exclusion of apartheid South Africa, the region’s 
dominant member.” (1995:109)178.  Thus from the outset, regional 
integration under the auspices of SADCC was politically driven.  
Not only did the founding fathers of SADCC provide input into the 
politics of region building:  its Western allies were equally 
concerned with achieving certain political objectives179. 
 
Samir Amin (et al.) forcefully argue that: “… SADCC was not solely 
an initiative of the Frontline states. On the contrary, there was 
strong encouragement from Western countries who wished to 
draw the region closer to the West, and, by creating a division from 
undiluted confrontation with South Africa, to prevent the Frontline 
states from giving greater support to the ANC and SWAPO.” 
(1987:8).  From the outset, thus, SADCC was an organisation 
driven partially by the agenda of international donors.  In addition, 
SADCC’s formation was also a political response to South Africa’s 
military and security threats.  Magaret Lee asserts that: “SADCC 
came into existence during the period of growing militarization of 
the apartheid regime… SADCC was designed to make a greater 
political statement than an economic one.        
 
The political nature of region building in southern Africa was 
further reinforced by apartheid South Africa’s notion of establishing 
CONSAS.  Derek Chitala postulates that South Africa’s response 
to the establishment of SADCC was to proclaim: “… the notion of 
the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) which was 
                                      
178
   Ironically, with the dismantling of the apartheid system, South Africa was viewed 
as the hope for rejuvenating Southern Africa.  Indeed: “… apartheid’s regional 
strategy of destabilization had been replaced by a South Africa that offered the region 
the seemingly endless opportunities articulated under the idea of globalization.” 
(Vale, 2003:1127). 
  
179
   Anthony Hawkins maintains that the aid given by Western donors was ostensibly: 
“… to promote a group of viable economies as a counterweight to South Africa.” 
(1992:106).   Naison Ngoma asserts that: “The Western policies were also driven by 
their own economic and security interest given the tremendous economic potential 
provided by the availability of such valuable minerals as diamonds and gold and the 
need tom maintain control over the sea route to the Indian sub-continent.” (200586).  
In addition Peter Vale postulates that: “… given the scope of South Africa’s 
destruction of the region in the 1970s and 1980s, this reinvention of South Africa’s 
past as the hope for the region’s future has been done with the connivance of 
Northern Hemisphere states that have willingly provided funding for the development 
of policy positions for the postapartheid region.” (2003:33).   
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intended to promote interregional economic cooperation with 
respect to trade, transport, energy, investment and manpower.” 
(1987:31; Ngoma, 2005:90)180.  Sam Nolutshungu (1988) views 
the political objectives of CONSAS differently.   
 
For Nolutshungu (1988) the establishment of CONSAS was aimed 
at using South Africa’s military might to force southern African 
countries out of any alternative arrangement they might devise, 
and to disrupt economic installations that may link such 
countries181.  For example, South Africa prevented the 
establishment of a pipeline between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 
and the Benguela railway line (ibid.).  The political divide between 
the Frontline states, the liberation movements and apartheid South 
Africa is demonstrated by the fact that: “CONSAS [was] 
essentially... a part of ‘Total Strategy’ thesis first used in the 1977 
White Paper.  The strategy is a relatively flexible-counter response 
by South Africa to a series of crises emanating both from the 
liberation struggle and the challenges posed by the SADCC.” 
(Chitala; 1987:31).  The policy and programme of CONSAS, 
however, faltered and failed.    
 
This chapter aims to illustrate that the formation of SACU, was 
based on achieving the political objective of tying the BLS closer to 
South Africa.  Similarly, it will also be contended that SADCC’s 
formation was prompted as a political response to South Africa’s 
military, political and security hegemony. 
                                      
180
   Naison Ngoma points out that: “Members of the prospective constellation in 1979 
included South Africa and its three Bantustans (Bophuthatswana, Transkei and 
Venda), Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi.” 
(2005:90-91). 
 
181
  This military destabilisation had both human and monetary costs.  Peter Vale 
asserts that: “…we need to note that destabilisation is estimated to have cost $62,4 
billion and, far more importantly, is said to have left more than one million people 
dead.” (1997:83) 
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3.2 Promoting Lopsided Development in the Region? The 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
 
 
SACU emerged from the colonial period in the 1890s182.  It was 
formally constituted in 1910 between the Union of South Africa and 
the High Commission Territories of Basotholand, Bechuanaland 
and Swaziland.  In 1915, the agreement was extended to South 
West Africa after South Africa defeated the German Army and took 
over the administration of the territory.  But Namibia only formally 
joined SACU after attaining independence in 1990.  Over many 
years the Customs Union members Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
South Africa and Swaziland developed close economic ties that 
still bind these countries.  
 
 
3.2.1 The 1910 Agreement   
 
 
The 1910 agreement provided for: 
 
 
(a) The free movement of goods between member countries and 
the imposition of a Common External Tariff (CET) on all goods 
imported from outside of SACU. 
 
(b) Conformity of the BLS countries to South Africa’s tariff laws; 
and 
 
(c) Payment by South Africa to BLS of a share of the total pool of 
customs and excise revenue in proportion to their level of trade 
between 1906 and 1908.  South Africa received 98.7 per cent 
of the revenue, while the   BLS countries together earned only 
1.3 per cent. (Catteneo. N. 1998:7- 8).   
                                      
182
  Nicolette Catteneo posits that: “The origins of SACU date back to the 1899 
Customs Union Convention between the Cape Colony and the Orange Free State 
Republic.  By 1906, the Convention had grown to incorporate the Transvaal, Natal, 
Southern Rhodesia, North-Western Rhodesia and the British protectorates of 
Basotholand, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.” (1990:45).  
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The essence of the 1910 agreement was that it provided for the 
free interchange of manufactured products among member 
countries, and the provision of a common external tariff, against 
the rest of the world.  Robert Henderson argues that: “In practice, 
this was interpreted as ‘free duty’, permitting South Africa to 
impose quotas on those BLS goods which could compete with its 
own large-scale, technologically advanced industries; thus few 
manufacturing industries catering primarily for the South African 
market have developed within the BLS countries.” (1985:227).  
SACU was thus to be used by South Africa to achieve its national 
foreign policy objectives and to underline the general hostage 
status of the BLS countries. 
 
In the mid-1920s South Africa, in an attempt to promote industrial 
growth, adopted an import substitution programme.  This 
programme not only resulted in high protective barriers being 
imposed around SACU, but also led to trade diversion, which 
polarised industrial growth in the SACU (Cattaneo, 1990; Gibb, 
1997; Martin, 1990).  The above illustrates that SACU was never 
established to foster economic development within the BLS 
countries.  To the contrary, it was used by South Africa to enhance 
its own parochial developmental needs and as a political tool.   
 
The political nature of protective barriers, which further reinforced 
South Africa’s unilateralism and highhandedness, is succinctly 
summarised by Joseph Hanlon (1986).  Hanlon posits that: 
“Protective tariffs raise the price of goods and sometimes lower 
the quality as well.  This has happened in particular with vehicles, 
where there are also local content requirements. Sometimes this 
is linked to military demands and the threat of sanctions.” 
(1986:83).  These restrictions imposed by South Africa were not 
limited to industrial products alone. 
 
Magaret Lee observes that: “… in order to protect the interests of 
the white South African farmers, restrictions were placed on the 
amount of cattle that could be imported from these countries.  This 
policy had a devastating impact on the HCTs.  These restrictions 
remained in place until 1941.  Then, in 1963, restrictions were 
placed on the export of Swaziland timber to South Africa because 
of the threat it posed to South African pulp mills.” (2003:75).  
These early policies implemented by South Africa laid the 
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foundation for both the underdevelopment of the HCTs and their 
dependence on South Africa. 
    
South Africa’s unilateralism and highhandedness was reinforced 
by the fact that since its inception, the Customs Union was 
administered by South Africa.  Colin McCarthy points out that: 
“South Africa’s dominant position is reflected in the institutional 
arrangements of SACU.  The customs union does not have a 
permanent secretariat but depends on South Africa as the 
principal party in the administration of SACUA: the common 
external tariff investigative body for SACU; the excise duties that 
apply in the common customs area are those that are in force in 
South Africa; rebates, refunds and drawbacks of customs duties 
are again those that apply in South Africa; and revenue is paid into 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund of South Africa at the South 
African Reserve Bank.” (1992:11-12; Page,1998:36).  This 
reinforced South Africa’s dominance within the Customs Union.    
 
Since 1910, South Africa’s unilateralism and highhandedness, 
allowed her to: “In practice… unilaterally determine all customs 
rates, and operates the system to maximise the market for its 
producers behind substantial protective barriers.” (ibid.).  These 
protective barriers not only impacted on the pattern of trade, it also 
served a political purpose183.  South Africa used the provisions 
that tariffs be granted for goods produced in the BLS countries to 
set back the manufacturing capacity in those countries184.  Jan 
Isaksen notes that: “Whether the country may be granted a 
second and higher level of protection during the specified time 
period is entirely up to South Africa.  However in several cases 
where one or another of the BLNS have made representations to 
South Africa for the application of protection in one of these ways, 
the response has been negative.” (1993:184). 
                                      
183
  Peter Vale posits that the political purpose of SACU ensured that it: “… buttressed 
South African power (and its wealth) in the region close to a century. By providing 
states with a secure source of income, participation in SACU also opened the door to 
the statehood that would come to its three minor partners, Bechuanaland, 
Basutholand and Swaziland.” (2003:36).  
  
184
   Michael Matsebula and Vakashile Simelane (1996) argue that South Africa was 
capable of setting the terms for the BLS countries, because of the dominant role it 
played on the Board of Tariffs and Trade. This dominant role it played by South 
Africa: “… worked to detriment of the BLNS in setting up any large industries that 
would compete with existing South African industries.” (1996:57).    
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Thus, at the outset, SACU as a customs union was never intended 
to bring development to all its members.  Colin McCarthy contends 
that: “Any analysis of SACU must bear in mind… that the history of 
customs unions in Southern Africa is not one in which the 
integration schemes were driven by development goals; the 
customs union was mostly a pragmatic arrangement to distribute 
revenue among members…” (1992:11).  The decision on how to 
re-distribute revenue was made entirely by South Africa.   
 
The above policies adopted by South Africa, illustrate the 
country’s unilateralism and highhandedness, the power of its 
industrial lobby groups and the general hostage status of the BLS 
countries185.  It also illustrate that economic developmental goals 
for the BLS countries, were never the aim of SACU.  Instead, 
South Africa used SACU to achieve its own developmental 
objectives.  The compensation paid by South Africa to the BLNS 
countries to redress the trade diverting costs, was also primarily 
political. 
  
The political underpinning of the agreement made provision for the 
eventual incorporation of the HCTs into the Union of South Africa.  
Colin McCarthy asserts that: “The intention to incorporate the 
territories into the Union of South Africa remained on the political 
agenda from the beginning and for a very long time.  The 
economic dependence of the HCTs on South Africa counted in 
favour of incorporation, leading to a considered view that it was 
difficult to escape the conclusion that economic logic dictated that 
absorption by South Africa should be their ultimate political 
destiny.” (2003:611)186.     
 
Provision for the incorporation of the HCTs into the Union of South 
Africa187, was buttressed by the constitution.  The Constitution of 
                                      
185
   Robert Henderson argues that the 1910 agreement provided South Africa: “… 
with several institutional levers of economic pressure upon the BLS countries while 
concentrating fiscal decision-making for SACU within the responsibility of the South 
Africa government.” (1995:246). 
   
186
   Richard Gibb states that: “… for a large part of the pre-independence era the 
Territories were governed as if they were an effectively functioning and integrated 
part of the South African space economy.” (1997:76). 
  
187
   The change in the political landscape after 1948 altered such plans. In this regard 
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the Union of South Africa provided for the incorporation of these 
territories into the Union of South Africa188.  Colin McCarthy states 
that: “The envisaged incorporation of the HCTs in the Union of 
South Africa meant that independent customs regimes and an 
own tariff made little sense for them.” (ibid.).  Because of the 
economic dependence of the HCTs on South Africa: “SACU has 
led to the integration of BLS into the South African economy.” 
(Hanlon, 1986:81).  However, following the election in South Africa 
in 1948, which the National Party came to power in that country, 
Britain no longer intended to incorporate the Territories into South 
Africa.  Roger Southall observes that: “It was politically 
impracticable for any British government to transfer… the HCTs… 
while South Africa continued to implement apartheid.” (1999:9).  In 
addition, numerous disagreements regarding the operating 
procedures affected SACU.   
 
Foremost among the contentious issues of the 1910 agreement 
was the original and subsequent revenue sharing formulae. Whilst 
it was agreed that the High Commission Territories would 
indefinitely receive: “… the annual average proportion of total 
revenue from duties in the SACU area attributable to their 
imports… their… revenue did not vary with their levels of 
imports…” (Walters, 1989:30).  Consequently their revenue 
remained static189.   
 
                                                                                                         
Colin McCarthy notes that: “… the entrenchment of South Africa’s apartheid policies 
after 1948 and South Africa leaving the Commonwealth in 1961 put an end to any 
idea of incorporation, but political independence did not put an end to economic 
dependence.” (2003:612).  
 
188
  This led Colin McCarthy to conclude that: “SACU came about through the 
political forces of the colonial era and is not the outcome of pro-active planning to 
establish a regional integration arrangement on the basis of an inherent logic and 
preconceived development objectives.” (ibid, p610). 
 
189
   This explains why until the 1969 agreement, South Africa received 98,6 per cent 
of the revenue and the HCTs only 1,3 per cent (Lee, 2003).  The 1910 agreement 
provided for a fixed share of total customs and excise revenue to the HCTs. 
Bechuanaland received 0,27 per cent; Basotoland 0,88 per cent; and Swaziland 0,15 
per cent respectively (Cattaneo, 1990).  Gavin Maasdorp (1990) argues that the above 
was due to the assumption that the HCTs would eventually be incorporated into 
South Africa. 
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This disparity in revenue received reveals that at the outset SACU 
was not concerned with the appropriate distribution of revenue in 
the first place.  The unequal distribution of revenue resulted in 
South Africa’s current account190 showing a perpetual trade 
balance, as opposed to the trade deficit experienced by the other 
members of the union.  This asymmetrical relationship between 
South Africa and the High Commission Territories with respect to 
revenue constitute an integral part of the history of unequal 
economic development in SACU.   
 
Another aspect of the 1910 agreement, which impacted heavily on 
the character and lopsidedness of interdependence and regional 
integration under SACU, pertains to the lack of industrial 
development in the BLS states.  This “gave birth” to polarised 
economic development in favour of South Africa.  Conventionally, 
the generic conviction in economic literature is that a customs 
union model is driven by developmental goals (Maasdorp, 1982).  
However, the 1910 agreement was at best concerned with 
exclusively promoting the economic development of South Africa.  
Gibb and Sidaway interpret the lack of economic development as 
a consequence of the logic that underpins SACU. They charge 
that: “... economic development beyond... the... extraction of 
resources for overseas markets was not envisaged.” (1998:172; 
Davies, 1994:5 and Hanlon, 1986:82-86).  This meant that SACU 
was supposed to promote South Africa’s development only.   
   
South Africa had begun a policy of industrial development in 
1925191.  To achieve this, South Africa imposed high protective 
tariff barriers around SACU.  The high protective barriers, which 
were imposed around SACU, had negative impacts on the BLS 
countries.  Richard Gibb identifies three negative impacts of the 
erection of high protective tariff barriers on the BLS: “… first, 
protective barriers promoted trade diversion192 as the Territories 
                                      
190
  The current account is made up of visible trade (merchandise exports and imports) 
and invisible trade such as tourism. 
 
191
   This ensured that the HTCs remained producers of primary commodities. Indeed: 
“The South African tariff served as the tariff of the customs union and since 1925 this 
tariff was used as an instrument to encourage the industrialization of South Africa.” 
(McCarthy, 2003:612). 
  
192
  Trade diversion Gavin Maasdorp points out: “… takes place when a new, high-
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were forced to purchase high-cost South African produce; second, 
the overall level of customs revenue as a portion of GDP began to 
fall; and third, industrial growth focussed on South Africa193.  In 
addition, South Africa’s unilateral decision to follow a policy of 
import substitution highlighted the fact that the Territories had little 
fiscal discretion and no influence over the direction of any of South 
Africa’s fiscal policy changes affecting them.” (1997:75).  South 
Africa developed industrially at the expense of the BLS.     
 
Gavin Maasdorp argues South Africa developed industrially at the 
expense of the BLS because: “Industries tend to cluster in the 
relative more-developed member countries, and this leads to a 
marked intra-union imbalance in trade in manufactures.” (1982:85; 
McCarthy, 1992; 1994; Walters, 1989).  As a result, the High 
Commission Territories did not attract industries.  These 
developments reinforced the relative underdevelopment of the 
Territories194.  The 1910 agreement highlights South Africa’s 
highhandedness and unilateralism, the power of its industrial lobby 
and the general hostage situation of the BLS countries.  It also 
shows that Britain was not as concerned with the development of 
common structures, such as infrastructure, among the BLS 
countries, as it was elsewhere.    
 
The 1910 agreement managed to establish interdependence that 
was lopsided and effectively entrenched South Africa’s regional 
hegemony.  For Peter Vale: “The decade of reconstruction leading 
up to union in 1910 established the essential administrative, 
ideological and economic framework in which South Africa’s 
domestic and regional authority was both confirmed and 
elaborated through the licence afforded by the idea of 
sovereignty.” (2003:41).   
                                                                                                         
cost, customs main source displaces a member country’s imports from a lower-cost, 
foreign source.  Trade is diverted from a low-cost to a high-cost source: foreign 
products are excluded by the price-raising effect of the CET and are replaced by 
duty-free imports from the partner.” (1982:83). 
 
193
    The fact that external tariffs were structured to meet South Africa’s development 
needs contributed further to the polarisation of industrial activity (Gibb, 1997). 
 
194
   For instance: “The development of a common infrastructure focused on South 
Africa and on the need to serve its inland mining and later industrial complexes.” 
(McCarthy, 2003:612). 
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The 1910 agreement was neither an effective nor functional 
arrangement, which provided for regional coherence and regional 
identity.  SACU was used by South Africa: “… as an instrument of 
national foreign policy in accordance with the traditional state-
centric view.” (Henderson, 1985:225).  Not only was the institution 
an instrument of South Africa’s national foreign policy, it also 
excluded actors other than states in the integration process.  John 
Weeks has argued that since 1910: “The role of SACU developed 
in a broader context of South African patron-client relations, in 
which provision of migrant labour by these small countries had 
been considerably more important than commodity trade.” 
(1996:106).  
 
With a view to ensure that the Customs Union became more 
developmental in orientation, re-negotiations for a new agreement 
began in 1963.  In 1965, South Africa broke off negotiations for a 
new agreement, pending the independence of the three territories.  
Talks resumed in 1968 at the instigation of the newly independent 
smaller countries195, whose main concern were the continued 
application of a customs and excise revenue-sharing formulae 
based on their trade levels sixty years previously.  In addition, the 
polarisation effect (the tendency for industry to be attracted to the 
most developed sector of the union), the price-raising effect of 
South African determined tariffs, and the loss of fiscal discretion 
due to the lack of control over customs and excise policies which 
were unilaterally determined by South Africa, further fuelled the 
need for a new arrangement.   
 
The above illustrates that the 1910 agreement was characterised 
by relations of economic domination and subordination which: “… 
enabled South Africa to derive substantial benefits from its access 
to cheap resources whilst at the same time promoting strong ties 
of economic dependence.” (Hanlon, 1987:344).  In 1969, 
therefore, a more modern form of the Customs Union Agreement 
was signed. 
   
 
 
                                      
195
 Botswana and Lesotho gained independence in 1966, whilst Swaziland obtained 
independence  in 1968.  
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 3.2.2. The 1969 Agreement 
 
 
 
The 1969 agreement recognised the developmental status of the 
BLS countries and allowed for: 
  
1. A revised method of calculating the division of revenue; 
  
2. The establishment of a Customs Union Commission among 
member states; and 
 
3. Measures enabling BLS to protect the development of 
certain industries.” (Catteneo. N; 1998:8).  
 
 
Significantly also, the 1969 agreement also made provision for 
decision-making to be vested in South Africa.  Magaret Lee 
observes that under the 1969 agreement: “… South Africa 
continued to unilaterally make all policy decisions and control 
every aspect of economic policy from determining the revenue 
allocation to its distribution.” (2003:76). This had serious 
implications for the BLNS countries who were unable to 
manipulate fiscal policy in order to promote domestic development 
(Gibb, 1997).   South Africa also controlled every aspect of the 
administration of the customs union too.   
 
The introduction of a revised revenue-sharing formula was geared 
towards or served as a compensatory mechanism to BLS 
countries that were participating in a customs union with a more 
economically developed country. For Magaret Lee: “The new 
formula was deemed to be more pro-BLS” (2003:75).  With a view 
to reduce the fluctuations in the revenue received by the BLS 
countries, an enhancement and stabilisation factors’ were 
introduced.  The compensatory mechanism was also intended to 
compensate the BLS countries for: (1) the polarisation effect of the 
SACU agreement; and (2) for the loss of fiscal discretion (ibid.). A 
Customs Union Commission was also formed to consult with 
Union members about matters affecting the operation of the 
Customs Union among member countries. 
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Michael Matsebula and Vakashile Simelane note that South Africa 
paid compensation to the BLNS countries, because: “… most of 
their imports are products which have been manufactured inside 
the SACU wall… therefore… it can be inferred that BLNS have 
been subsidising industrialisation in South Africa.  This justifies 
some form of compensation to ensure an equitable distribution of 
the gains from economic integration within SACU.” (1996:56). 
 
But the SACU situation also points to the reality that financial 
transfers do not solve the problem of the unequal distribution of 
benefits.  John Ravenhill asserts that compensation payments 
failed: “… to address the most fundamental issue in the 
distribution crisis: the location of industrial production within the 
region with its spillover effects on empowerment, technological 
transfers and learning-by-doing.” (1985:209).  South Africa 
continues to be the country of choice for industrial investment 
(Østergaard, 1993). 
 
The revenue formula became a contentious issue for both South 
Africa and the BLNS countries, as a result of the changing 
regional landscape in the 1970s.  Richard Gibb asserts that: “In 
1976, the formula was amended so as to provide a ‘stabilisation 
factor’ in the levels of revenue received by the BLNS.  Throughout 
the 1970s these revenues fluctuated markedly, partly in response 
to a successive series of crises experienced by South Africa after 
the Soweto uprising.”(1997:77).  The political objective of 
introducing the stabilisation factor, was to tie neighbouring states 
to South Africa, with the intensification of the liberation struggle in 
southern Africa. (Catteneo, 1990).  The promotion of economic 
development in other SACU member states, in particular, was 
seen as central to tying these member states to South Africa.           
  
A notable distinction between the 1910 and 1969 agreements was 
the latter set out to promote economic development regionally196.  
The 1969 agreement explicitly states that the intention is to 
promote economic development for all Customs Union members 
on the principle of equitable benefits: “… to ensure the continued 
economic development of the customs area as a whole, and to 
                                      
196
 The reality, however, differed markedly from the aim of development (Robson, 
1967:478). 
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ensure in particular that these arrangements encourage the 
development of the less advanced members of the customs union 
and the diversification of their economies, and afford all parties 
equitable benefits arising from trade among themselves and with 
other countries…” (Republic of South Africa, 1969:2)197.  Another 
pro-BLS decision was the stipulation: “…  that the objectives of 
SACU include the economic development and diversification of 
the economies of the least advanced members.” (Maasdorp, 
1990:24).   
 
In addition, the 1969 agreement recognised the economic 
inequality between South Africa and smaller member states.  
Towards this end, the Agreement sets out to: “… ensure in 
particular that… [the] arrangements encourage the development 
of less advanced members of the customs union and the 
diversification of their economies , and afford to all parties 
equitable benefits arising from trade among themselves and with 
other countries…” (1969:4).   By diversifying economies:  “… the 
intention has been the development of manufacturing industries in 
the smaller member states.” (McCarthy, 2003:613). 
 
Even though the 1969 agreement explicitly made provision for the 
development of certain industries by the BLNS countries, South 
Africa’s actions were again contrary to its stated objectives.  
Industrial development in the BLNS countries was seriously 
impeded by South African unilateralism in the 1970s and 1980s 
and even the   1990s.  Nicolette Catteneo (1990) further illustrates 
how the protectionist policies of South Africa, sabotaged the 
development of industries in Swaziland.  She charges that when: 
“A textile mill erected in Swaziland by Hong Kong investors 
planned to make use of imported cloth [from outside the customs 
union area] South Africa imposed a duty on imported fabric 
causing the project, which would have provided 300 jobs, to 
collapse.”.  South Africa applied similar measures when: “… a 
proposed chemical factory in Swaziland in 1971, which would 
have exported at least 80% of its output to South Africa.  South 
African farmers were denied existing consumer subsidy on 
                                      
197
   Colin McCarthy argues that: “Because of South Africa’s protectionism policies, 
BLNS consumers have been buying South African goods at prices higher than would 
apply if the goods were brought in the global market.” (2003:615). 
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fertilizers if they bought from Swaziland, and Pretoria increased 
the tariff on the ammonia and phosphoric acids that Swaziland 
would have to import from Iran for the project.” (ibid. p49, 58)198.  
  
South Africa sabotaged industrial development of Botswana and 
Lesotho in similar ways (ibid.).  South Africa benefited from 
sabotaging the industrial development of the BLS countries.  
Robert Davies argues that: “Although the production of 
manufactured goods was largely oriented to the domestic 
market… in the mid-1980s, exports of manufactured goods made 
a significant, albeit little noticed, contribution to South Africa’s 
post-war manufacturing growth.  A study conducted in the 1970s, 
for example, found that although the combined GDP of Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland were at the time only 3 per cent that of 
South Africa, trade with these countries was responsible for 27 per 
cent of new value added and around 67,000 new jobs in South 
Africa’s manufacturing sector.” (1993:72).  South Africa continued 
to sabotage industrial development in the BLNS countries in the 
1990s. 
 
Thus, South Africa unilaterally decided to cancel provision 311 of 
the 1969 agreement in 1995 (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng, 
1998).  Such action by South Africa not only points to its 
unilateralism, but also to the power of its industrial lobby and the 
general hostage status of the BLNS countries.  McGowan and 
Ahwireng-Obeng note that provision 311 of the 1969 agreement: 
“… had previously permitted the BLNS states to import from 
outside SACU raw materials for textile production destined for the 
South African markets.” (1998:182).  Other industries also suffered 
as a result of South Africa’s highhandedness and unilateralism 
and the power of its industrial lobby.  These industries were the 
Hyundai car assembly plant in Botswana, the intended Citroen car 
assembly plant in Namibia, a fertilizer factory in Swaziland and a 
television assembly plant in Lesotho.  The beneficiaries of such 
unilateral action by South Africa were its raw material producers 
                                      
198
   To be sure: “From 1937 to about 1990 the policy in South Africa was to protect 
agricultural production against import competition and to encourage self-sufficiency 
through qualitative import control.” (ibid, p614). The above points to South Africa’s 
unilateralism and highhandedness and the power of its industrial lobby. 
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(ibid.).  The above illustrates that the 1969 SACU agreement 
superseded South Africa’s structural power199.         
      
To Paul Rich, the general hostage status of the BLS countries is 
illustrated by the fact that:  “… at independence the BLS states 
were all in the Rand Zone, possessing no national currency… 
Furthermore: “For communication and trade with the rest of the 
world they were, with the exception of Swaziland, which had 
closer access to the sea through Mozambique and the port of 
Maputo, almost totally reliant on telecommunications channels and 
road and rail routes to the sea which passed through South 
Africa.” (1994:239).  It is this hostage status and lopsided 
development of the BLS countries, which was a defining feature of 
the 1969 SACU agreement.     
 
SACU failed to develop the BLNS countries, because as Gavin 
Maasdorp posits, that as regards SACU: “The basic requirements 
of orthodox customs union theory are not satisfied.  The 
participating countries are not at similar levels of development; 
they do not have competitive industrial sectors; they do not have 
the potential to develop complementary industrial sectors.” 
(1992:139).  The differences in the level of development ensured 
that fortune favoured the strong: in this instance South Africa.  
This has led Carol Thompson to assert that: “SACU has survived 
mainly by force, not economic rationality, and has costs its poorer 
members dearly in long-term development… (1992:132). 
 
This contradicts the conclusions reached by the African 
Development Bank, which has asserted that: “… SACU, which is 
built around the pivotal economy of South Africa, is clearly Africa’s 
closest existing model to the growth-pole-based regional 
integration arrangement.  In spite of the continuing debate 
regarding the formula for sharing tariff revenue between its 
member states, it seems clear that Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia 
and Swaziland derive significant benefits in terms of investment 
flows generated by the opportunities offered by the South African 
                                      
199
   South Africa’s structural power has ensured that it became the major trade partner 
of most countries in the region.  Pierre Beaudet notes that: “By 1988, South Africa 
supplied between 80 and 90 per cent of all imports to the BLNS countries. The main 
products sold to the region were chemicals, plastics, footwear and millinery, 
machinery and vehicles.” (1994:156-157). 
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market and the ‘agency of restraint’ function performed by SACU 
to enhance the credibility of their trade policies.” (2000:134).      
 
In essence, therefore, SACU did not discourage polarised 
development, which benefited South Africa in many respects.  
Under the 1969 SACU Agreement: “… the SACU tariff … was… 
the South African tariff, managed by South African authorities in 
the interest of the South African economy.  BLNS have little say in 
their trade policy and in the levying of duties that contribute a 
major part of their revenue… SACU’s governance… was… not 
democratic and… was characterized by an absence of 
supranational customs union institutions.” (McCarthy, 2003:618).  
Finally: “In spite of the developmentalism embodied in the 1969 
SACUA, the Agreement essentially remained an agreement that 
until 1994 had to deal pragmatically with the situation of small but 
politically independent African states being locked into an 
integrated economy with apartheid South Africa.” (ibid, pp618-
619).    
 
Colin McCarthy notes that: “Many observers regarded [the 1969 
agreement] as a marriage forced by relationships of dependence 
and an embarrassment for a continent that found itself in its first 
post-colonial decade.” (2003:606).  The above has led Harry 
Zarenda to conclude that: “SACU has not at any stage in its 
existence claimed to be a development-focused institution rather 
than a convenient political arrangement.” (1997:60).  What it 
illustrates is that South Africa was able to use the BLS hinterland 
for its own developmental purposes.  
 
Gavin Maasdorp points out that the 1969 agreement: “… contains 
no machinery for distributing industry among the four member 
countries.”200  He concludes that: “Such programmes are regarded 
as particularly important when, as in the case of SACU, one 
member country is more industrialized than the other.” (1982:94).  
The 1969 agreement failed to forge interdependent economies, 
and instead promoted lopsided regional integration and 
                                      
200
   This notwithstanding the fact that the 1969 agreement made allowance: “… to 
protect industries designated as infant industries or as of special interests to smaller 
economies.” (ibid, p613). 
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development.  This begs the question: What economic and/or 
political glue kept the Customs Union together?.   
 
The revised revenue-sharing formulae, which was the most 
contentious source of dissatisfaction (Thomas, 1995), represents 
the most logical explanation as to why the BLS countries remained 
party to the 1969 agreement201.  SACU receipts from the common 
revenue pool represent not only an important or significant 
percentage of revenue for these countries, but also a secure 
source of income (see table1).  In fact, according to the 1969 
agreement, the BLS countries: “… would receive 42% more from 
the common pool of customs, excise and sales duties than they 
individually paid into it.” (Catteneo, 1990:46)202.  Ultimately: “The 
justification for enhanced revenue payments is to compensate 
BLNS for the disadvantage of being in a customs union with a 
much larger and more developed economy and for the way in 
which the customs union is organized.” (McCarthy, 2003:615).  
This reinforces the notion that SACU promoted lopsided regional 
integration, in favour of South Africa.   
 
Table 1: BLNS SACU Receipts 
Share of National Income Revenue/Grants  
   Country  % of Revenue 
 1975 1990/1 1994/5 2001/2 
Botswana 31.6% 13.2% 16.2% 13% 
Lesotho 57.1% 43.5 53.2 51.6% 
Namibia 203 22.3 26.4 28.4% 
Swaziland 25.9% 44.7 47.2 51% 
                                      
201
   For the smaller SACU members, the revenue they derived from the organisation 
served as a crucial fiscal resource. For instance: “In 2001/2 SACU revenue 
contribution as a share of total revenue were 51,6 percent for Lesotho, 51 percent for 
Swaziland, 28,4 percent for Namibia and 13 percent for Botswana.” (WTO, 2003:7). 
Botswana derived less revenue from the pool because of its larger share of revenue 
from the diamond sector.      
 
202
   Colin McCarthy postulates that: “A formula is used to calculate revenue shared 
for the BLNS countries, with South Africa’s share of the revenue determined as the 
residual after payments to the smaller member states have been determined.” 
(1992:12-13). 
 
203
   Namibia was administered by South Africa during this period. 
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Source: McCarthy, C. 2003. “The Southern African Customs 
Union in Transition" African Affairs. 102:605-630. 
 
The BLS countries were, however, not only dependent on South 
Africa for the subsidisation of their budgets via the common 
revenue pool.  Geographically, all three are landlocked.  As such, 
they were also inextricably linked to the apartheid Republic by 
virtue of its export and transport networks, and its control of the 
service sector.  Most of these countries were also dependent on 
South Africa for labour, since most of these migrant labourers that 
worked in South African mines made a valuable contribution to 
sustaining households in their countries of origin (their 
contributions to the GDP in their countries of origin are invaluable- 
see table 3)204. 
 
James Sidaway and Richard Gibb note that: “Other benefits 
include relief from the burden of having to operate an independent 
customs service and associated administrations, free access to 
supplies from South Africa and access to foreign exchange and 
semi-convertible currency… offered by the relatively sophisticated 
South African financial infrastructure…” (1998:174-175).  This 
resulted in the economic dependence of both BLS countries and 
non-SACU members on South Africa.   
 
The above illustrates power of South Africa’s industrial lobby and 
the general hostage situation of the BLNS countries.  This 
prompted a response and led to the constitution of SADCC, which 
excluded South Africa and made South Africa’s political and 
economic dominance a regional issue. 
      
 
 
 
                                      
204
   For Roger Southall: “… the maintenance of foreign supplies of workers from 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland became an 
important policy objective.” (1999:13). Politically this allowed the apartheid 
Republic to shape the politics of region building.   
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3.3 The Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference 
(SADCC): A Vehicle for Limited Integration? 
 
 
 
SADCC was established in 1980205, from the political alliance of 
the Frontline States.  At the time of its formation: Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, constituted the Conference. 
 
  
3.3.1 Objectives of SADCC 
 
 
SADCC’s mandate was: 
 
 
• To reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa.  
  
• To forge links with a view to create equitable and genuine 
regional integration. 
 
• To mobilise its resources which will enable it to promote the 
implementation of national, interstate and regional policies. 
 
• To secure international cooperation within the framework of its 
strategy for economic liberation.” (Mandaza and Tostenten, 
1994:4). 
 
                                      
205
   SADC dates back to a call by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in 1974 for the 
establishment of a “transcontinental belt of independent and economically powerful 
states.” The formation of SADCC is also widely regarded as a response to South 
Africa’s plans for a “Constellation of Southern African States” in the late 1970’s.” 
(Leistner, 1995:272). 
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The above objectives were to be achieved through sectoral and 
project co-operation206 in the fields of agriculture and food 
security, transport, energy, mining and tourism (see appendix 2).   
This meant severing ties that pre-date colonialism and the 
discovery of minerals in South Africa. 
  
The implications of the discovery of minerals for the rest of the 
southern Africa, is that it bound the region to South Africa.  André 
du Pisani asserts that historically: “Political and economic 
interaction between South Africa and the states presently within 
SADCC pre-dates formal colonisation, and accelerated with the 
colonial expansion of Europe into Southern Africa.  Rich mineral 
discoveries, notably diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) in South 
Africa, copper in Zambia, and coal, chrome and other base metals 
in Zimbabwe and Namibia, deepened the patterns of interaction” 
(1992:178).  The discovery of these minerals not only provided for 
economic linkages between apartheid South Africa and the rest of 
the region, but also constituted the edifice upon which the 
dependence of these states on South Africa was to be built207.   
 
Reducing dependence on the apartheid state meant severing 
economic ties that pre-dated the colonial period.  Layi Abegunrin 
notes that at formation: “SADCC member states… did… not have 
an integrated transport and communication system distinct from 
that of South Africa…” (1985:193).  The dependence of southern 
African countries on the South African transport system, set the 
parameters of the region’s and ultimately SADCC’s dependence 
on South Africa.   
 
For the founding fathers of SADCC the: “Reduction of dependence 
on South Africa… was… central to the achievement of economic 
development, and to the advancement of the dignity and the basic 
human needs of the people of Southern Africa” (Abegurin, 
1985:193).  From the formation of SADCC South African economic 
                                      
206
 Project Integration: “... involves co-operation in the planning and implementation 
of joint projects. ... These projects are aimed at the improvement of infrastructure and 
production structures, so as to advance trade in the region.” (C. Van Rooyen, 
1998:129) 
207
  The discovery of these minerals also produced social relations among the ordinary 
people in the region. It is these relations, which point to the existence of a region that 
pre-date the state system and defies national boundaries.   
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hegemony was, thus, by far the most imposing structural 
characteristic determining southern African relations. South Africa 
was capable, it will be argued, to use its economic hegemony, to 
consciously manipulate the rest of the region.  The inability to 
break the relationship of dependence of SADCC countries on 
South Africa, characterise the existence of the organisation.  The 
ultimate objective of SADCC was, political and not developmental 
in nature: to exclude South Africa and make its economic and 
political dominance a regional issue.     
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3.3.2 The Parameters of SADCC Dependence on South 
Africa 
 
 
 3.3.2.1 Transportation Networks 
 
 
 
Transport constituted a vital artery of dependence for SADCC’s 
land-locked states, such as Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  The regional dependence of 
specifically those land-locked SADCC states on South Africa is 
highlighted by the fact that: “… Botswana depends on South 
Africa’s railways for access to the sea.  Similarly, 90 per cent of 
Zimbabwe’s railways depend heavily on South African railways for 
coaches, maintenance and expertise.  Zimbabwe was, therefore, 
highly susceptible to rail sanctions by Pretoria, as was seen in 
October 1981 when South Africa suddenly withdrew twenty 
locomotives on loan to the country.  Like Zimbabwe, Zambia also 
utilises the South African Railways for the transportation of her 
copper to the ports of Durban, East London and Port Elizabeth 
along the coast of the Indian Ocean” (Abegunrin, 1985:196-197). 
 
Nancy Thede asserts that: “Malawi, until 1982, shipped 95 per 
cent of its traffic through Mozambique; after 1982, 95 per cent has 
been routed through South Africa” (1993:44)208.  These transport 
dependencies illustrates that the South African railway system 
remains vital for these land-locked SADCC countries.  An 
important decision for SADCC, in moving away from South Africa, 
therefore, was to give priority to the transport and communication 
sector.  To achieve this, it was decided to establish SATCC in 
Maputo, Mozambique.  Fadzai Gwaradzimba views the 
importance that SADCC has attached to these sectors as 
                                      
208
  Paul Goodison observes that: “During the colonial period the littoral countries of 
Mozambique and Angola provided important transport services to neighbouring land 
locked southern African states.  The transport routes through Mozambique carried  
of Rhodesia’s trade ½ of Swazilands and all of Malawi’s, as well as 1/5 of South 
Africa’s, whilst the route through Angola carried fully 46% of the imports and 
exports to Zambia and Zaire’s southern province of Shaba.  In 1973 Maputo was the 
largest port in Southern Africa handling more cargo than any other regional port, 
including those in South Africa” (1992:3).       
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stemming from the fact that: “infrastructure projects coincided with 
donors’ traditional sector of interests.” (1993:52; Mistry, 2000:557).  
Donor aid was meant to be critical in reducing SADCC’s 
dependence on South African transport routes209. 
      
But donor aid had a political element, and as such manipulated 
priorities and strategies.  Christopher Hill (1983) charges that the 
amount of aid given to Southern Africa served a particular 
purpose: not to disturb the precarious balance between the 
interests of South Africa and the need to ensure that the aid given 
to Southern African countries did not antagonise the South African 
government.  He concludes that in some cases, such as 
Zimbabwe, the aid given to that country had a particular overt 
political overture: to prevent that country from shifting too far to the 
left.   
 
This seems to affirm Thandika Mkandawire (1987) postulate that 
the formation of SADCC was an attempt by Western governments 
to restructure the regional economy to suit Western investment- 
particularly in the field of railway networks- with a view to reinforce 
the region’s continued accessibility to foreign trade and 
investment.  Donors and South Africa were together able to “divide 
and rule” the region because of the economic and politically 
diverse nature of SADCC. 
 
South Africa, in fact, took political advantage of its dominance of 
transport routes.  The military attacks on transport infrastructure in 
the late 1970s and 1980s were to see the political manipulation of 
SADCC by South Africa.  This political manipulation was 
underpinned by an economic thrust.  The intention was to tighten 
economic links and to frustrate the mounting efforts by regional 
states to reduce their dependence on South Africa.  For the 
transport sector in SADCC, this meant that because of South 
                                      
209
   Ironically, South Africa also provided aid to improve infrastructural projects.  
This aid had a particular political logic to it.  This was done by providing: “… for the 
direct channelling of low-interest loans to African countries in forms which could be 
clearly identified as South African.  In 1972, for instance, the total extent of financial 
assistance of R171m was dispensed to Malawi, Madagascar, Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Mozambique for the creation of infrastructural projects which would integrate 
regional economies into the South African network.” (Southall, 1999:15). 
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Africa’s military aggression, traffic was deliberately diverted to 
South African ports. 
 
Paul Goodison maintains that: “By the mid 1980s  of the 
international cargo of the 9 SADCC States was being carried on 
South African Railways, including fully 50% of the cargo of the 6 
landlocked SADCC states.  In 1980/81 this increased traffic 
earned no less than US$ 240 million for South African Transport 
Services…” (1992:4).  South Africa also used the ‘reward’ and 
‘compliance’ system to reinforce the dependence of SADCC land-
locked states on it. 
 
Swaziland, for instance: “… received assistance to build a railway 
line through its territory linking the Eastern Transvaal with 
Richards Bay, and a supplementary R50M payment via SACU” 
(Southall, 2003:32).  Swaziland was ‘rewarded’ for signing a Non-
Aggression Pact with the apartheid state in 1982 (ibid.).  Other 
countries in SADCC who opposed the apartheid states overtures 
were forced into compliance as the cases of Zimbabwe and Zaire 
illustrate.  
 
In the case of Zimbabwe: “… the South African Transport Services 
made determined efforts to wean traffic away from Maputo by 
offering highly competitive rates and facilities to Zimbabwean 
importers and exporters.  South African companies proved 
increasingly unwilling to ship goods via Mozambique; and 
following the sabotage of the Beira-Mutare oil pipeline in early 
1983, Pretoria blocked oil imports to Zimbabwe (ibid, p33).  These 
were overtly political moves by South Africa. 
 
South Africa also politically manipulated transport links by forcing 
compliance from Zaire.  Paul Goodison postulates that: “In one 
case the availability of wagons for the export of Zairean copper 
was tied not only to the use of South African ports and railways but 
also the existence of a return cargo from South Africa to Zaire.  In 
this manner Zaire was encouraged to import grain from South 
Africa… in 1983 when the USA sent food aid to Zimbabwe through 
South Africa, South African railways used the otherwise empty 
returning wagons to offer a cheap contract price for the export of 
asbestos from Zimbabwe, thereby undercutting the rates offered 
via Maputo” (1992:4). 
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To increase SADCC dependence on South Africa, a wave of 
escalating aggression and destabilisation was unleashed in the 
late 1970s and 1980s.  A campaign of destabilisation was: 
“Launched in response to setbacks to its proposals to draw 
neighbouring states into a new hegemonic alliance CONSAS210 
and directed most particularly at those states and projects seen as 
most challenging to its designs, destabilization did have the effect 
of impeding efforts by other countries of the region to reduce 
dependence on South Africa and diversify their economies.  The 
deepening transport dependence, which resulted from the 
sabotage of alternative facilities in Angola and Mozambique, for 
example, not only boosted the earnings of South Africa’s ports and 
railways, but also tended to increase the non-price advantages of 
South African goods and thus tie landlocked countries into an 
enhanced trade dependence on South Africa.” (Davies, 1996:171-
172)211. 
 
The above cases illustrate how South Africa was capable of using 
its economic and military strength to achieve political objectives.  It 
also bears testimony to the apartheid Republic’s highhandedness 
and unilateralism, the power of its industrial lobby and the acute 
levels of dependence between that country and SADCC.  The 
result of the above was that autonomous development in the 
different national economies, as well as the SADCC region, was 
stifled.  Labour was another sector, which reinforced South 
Africa’s regional hegemony.   
  
         
 
                                      
210
 Roger Southall (1999) cogently elucidates the political objective that underpinned 
CONSAS. He contends that by establishing CONSAS: “Pretoria reckoned that if 
Zimbabwe could gain its independence under Muzorewa, then Malawi and 
Swaziland, both extremely conservative states which already had strong economic 
links with South Africa, could be drawn into formal regional cooperation.  This 
would leave little option for Botswana and Lesotho, the other two members of the 
Customs Union, to join- with the possibility that Zaire and Zambia could then be 
induced to affiliate. Namibia, which apartheid strategists were by now hoping would 
bring to a Muzorewa-type internal settlement, would also join the club, leaving the 
other FLS- Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania- weak and isolated.” (1999:30).   
    
211
   Interestingly, these: “… economic and transport links between the countries of 
Southern Africa… predated and co-existed with apartheid.” (Southall, 1999:3). 
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3.3.2.2 Labour Relations 
 
 
 
Migrant labour is another regional link, which underpins the 
dependence of SADCC countries on South Africa.  This history of 
labour migration in southern Africa dates back to the discovery of 
minerals in the region, specifically, diamonds and gold in South 
Africa.  For Paul Goodison: “… initially migrant labour grew up 
around skills shortages on the South African mines…” (1992:13).   
While initially these labourers were only employed as 
mineworkers, they were also employed in the manufacturing 
sector and in households in general in the Republic.   
 
Roger Leys and Arne Tostensen show that by the early 1980s 
when SADCC was established: “The largest number of some 
155,000 came from Lesotho.  About 50,000 originated in 
Mozambique, some 35,000 and 38,000 from Botswana and 
Malawi respectively (1982:63).  The income of these migrant 
workers constituted a significant portion of the foreign exchange 
of the SADCC states.  The examples of Lesotho and Mozambique 
illustrate the dependence of SADCC states on the foreign 
exchange earnings of migrant labourers (See table 2). 
 
Layi Abegunrin notes that: “… for Lesotho in 1975, remittances 
from migrant workers totalled $250 million, a figure more than 
double the gross domestic product of the country” (1985:196).  
Richard Weisfelder (1983) put Lesotho’s level of dependence into 
perspective by asserting that the repatriation of goods and cash by 
migrant workers plays a major role in offsetting Lesotho’s 
enormous trade deficit, where imports are eight times greater than 
exports.  In the case of Mozambique, foreign exchange 
remittances from migrant workers in South Africa totalled $175 
million, during the same period (Abegunrin, 1985).   
 
South Africa was capable of using SADCC’s dependence on 
foreign exchange earned by migrant workers for political 
purposes.  Roger Southall asserts that: “By deliberately 
maintaining a reserve army of employable labour, South African-
based capital was enabled to minimise labour shortages and 
undercut wage demands by the black workforce”  Thus: “… the 
maintenance of foreign supplies of workers from Angola, 
 138
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland became 
an important policy objective”212 (1999:13).  Where compliance 
with South Africa’s policy objectives was not adhered to, the 
Republic used migrant labourers to force such compliance. 
 
Paul Goodison succinctly illustrates how South Africa used 
migrant labourers as a political tool by stating that: “… in the case 
of Mozambique the decline was the result of direct political 
manipulation by the South African government.  Manipulation 
which would have led to an even greater reduction had not the 
Chamber of Mines pleaded for a policy reversal in order to allow 
them to continue to recruit experienced Mozambican miners” 
(1992:13-14).  The above also illustrate how the industrial lobby in 
South Africa worked with the government to, amongst others, 
undercut wage demands by the black workforce.        
 
Table 1. Migrant Labourers in South Africa  
 
Countries 1965 1970 1971 1972 1975 1977 
Angola 11 000 3400 N/A 4466 2862 N/A 
Botswana 59 000 47 360 51 000 31 960 34 020 N/A 
Lesotho 117 000 147 400 165 000 131 749 80 526 160 630 
Malawi 80 000 107 180 100 000 131 291 11 000 18 000 
Mozambique 161 000 144 900 132 000 121 708 127 000 40 000 
Swaziland 39 000 24 260 12 000 10 108 17 000 N/A 
Zambia 16 000 N/A N/A 638 N/A N/A 
Zimbabwe 27 000 11 640 N/A 6 200 16 000 30 000 
 
NA= Figures not available 
 
Source: Abegunrin, L. 1985. “The Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference: Politics of Dependence” in R. Onwuka 
and A. Sesay (eds.). The Future of Regionalism in Africa. London: 
Macmillan.
                                      
212
   Roger Southall observes that: “Whereas in 1946 some 56 per cent of the black 
workforce on the mines originated from outside South Africa, by the early 1970s the 
proportion had risen to about 75 per cent” (1999:13). 
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3.3.3 Economic Dependence: Augmenting SADCC’s Dependence 
 
 
 
The degree of economic dependence and the political diversity of 
the SADCC states on South Africa had some bearing on the 
degree of political dependence of these states on the apartheid 
state.  While SADCC defined itself ostensibly by its opposition to 
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia at 
independence, remained members of SACU213. The dependence 
of these countries on South Africa rendered impractical any total 
trade boycott of South Africa.  In addition, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe had strong bilateral ties with the apartheid 
economy (Bischoff, 1995).  These ties were strengthened by the 
promise of aid214. 
 
The political logic, which underpinned these bilateral ties, was 
premised on an attempt by apartheid South Africa to divide the 
continent’s opponents of apartheid.  The cases of Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia, bears testimony to the fact that, 
depending on the levels of dependence, southern African 
countries, were unable to conduct diplomatic relations with 
apartheid South Africa on their own terms. 
 
For instance, while fierce opposition to apartheid found resonance 
in the documents of SADCC, each member state of the 
organisation were unable to conduct its diplomatic relations with 
apartheid South Africa on its own merits. This allowed Malawi, for 
example, to open an embassy in South Africa, and allowed the 
apartheid state to open an embassy in that country.   
 
                                      
213
  The Highlands Water Scheme in Lesotho and the Sua Pan Project in Botswana 
funded partially by South Africa, bind these SADCC countries even further to the 
South African economy.  
 
214
   Roger Southall (1999) asserts that these amounts were not large, but were 
earmarked to be identified as from the apartheid Republic.  He states that: “In 1972, 
for instance, the total extent of financial assistance of R171m was dispensed to 
Malawi, Madagascar, Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique for the creation of 
infrastructural projects which would integrate regional economies into the South 
African network” (1999:15).      
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Other SADCC members were equally economic dependent on the 
apartheid state.  For instance, South Africa invested heavily in the 
mining industries of Angola, Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe215.  Furthermore, the mostly land-locked states of 
SADCC were dependent on South Africa’s transport networks for 
some of their exports.  It is therefore not surprising that 
dependence on South Africa created a paradox:  “… the greater 
the degree of economic dependence on the RSA, the milder the 
criticism of apartheid.” (Leys and Tostensen, 1982:66).   
 
But whilst it seemed that economic factors underpinned South 
Africa’s regional policy: “… these were to play second fiddle to 
military and strategic imperatives as apartheid became subject to 
mounting pressure during the final years of its existence.” 
(Southall, 1999:4).  This contributed to perpetuate regional 
economic dependence on South Africa and donor aid, and led to 
the augmentation of such dependence, and as such lopsided 
economic development.  South Africa’s relations with 
Mozambique, was characterised by the latter being one the main 
suppliers of mine labourers to South Africa216.  But unlike Malawi, 
Mozambique was economically important to South Africa.  In fact: 
“Maputo was the largest port in Southern Africa, handling more 
cargo than any other port in Southern Africa.217” (ibid. p131).  
 
What made the relationship between South Africa and Malawi 
peculiar for Joseph Hanlon is the fact that: “For South Africa, 
Malawi has never been economically important; there is little 
South African investment there; although the trade is useful.  
                                      
215
   Roger Southall notes that: “The South African mining houses and transnational 
firms became increasingly engaged in the extraction of mineral wealth from 
neighbouring states.  For instance, the Anglo-American Corporation partnered the 
Zambian government in the production of copper and, in the late 1970s, the Botswana 
government in the extraction of nickel and copper from its Selebi-Pikwe mine. But 
the major cause of South African involvement in mineral extraction beyond its 
borders was in Namibia” (1999:13). 
 
216
   This was part of an agreement to send Transvaal cargo through Lourenco 
Marques (Hanlon, 1986:132). 
  
217
   Joseph Hanlon points out that: “In 1973 Mozambique handled a large proportion 
of regional imports and exports: one-fifth of South African, two-thirds of Rhodesian, 
half of Swazi, and all of Malawian.” (1986:131). 
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But… it is important diplomatically, particularly as a sign that 
Pretoria is still not totally a pariah… Moreover… Malawi has 
proved a useful outpost from which to support the MNR in 
Mozambique.  For Malawi, the benefits of these links with South 
Africa are less easy to see.  There has been some aid, especially 
at key times when it was not available from other donors.” 
(1986:235).  The above illustrates that the closer the relations 
through SACU integration be it through services or bilateral trade, 
the less critical of  apartheid. 
 
After Zimbabwe obtained independence in 1980, most of the 
agreements were revisited, with a view to try and bludgeon 
Zimbabwe into diplomatic and political concessions (Hanlon, 
1986).  The political divide between and among SADCC countries 
created internal friction and enabled South Africa to exacerbate 
inter-SADCC rivalries.  These structural problems are mainly 
responsible for the flaws and faults of SADCC.  
 
 
3.3.4 SADCC: Flaws and Faults 
 
 
 
The first failure of SADCC to achieve its set-out objectives was the 
development strategy it pursued.  The failure of SADCC’s sectoral 
or project co-operation strategy is to be located in the nature of the 
organisation and the financing of projects.  SADCC’s loose 
organisational structure and nationally based development 
strategies deterred co-operation and development at the regional 
level218.  Sectoral co-operation by each member country, which 
had been envisaged as a means to achieve the economic 
objectives of SADCC, have at best, achieved modest success.  
Gregg Mills concludes that sectoral co-ordination: “... has been 
extremely unwieldy...” which consequently “... hampered attempts 
at self-sufficiency.” (1995:5).  Sectoral co-ordination was not only 
unwieldy, but also impractical.  For instance, Tanzania, which had 
no dynamic or real manufacturing sector, was allocated the 
industry and trade portfolio.  
                                      
218
   Mr. Andrew Ndishishi points out that the ‘scramble for aid has much do with this 
failure.  At one stage, SADCC had 490 projects that invariably overlapped at times.”  
Personal Communication, Mr. Andrew Ndishishi, 6th June 2001.    
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The division of labour in SADCC also ensured that development 
programmes were not regionally executed.  Arne Tostensen 
asserts that: “The very name of the organisation as a “Conference” 
attests to the looseness of its structure… consequently… no 
supra-national powers were conferred on any organ [institution].” 
(1993:155).  In the absence of a legally binding treaty SADCC was 
thus unable to compel member states to adjust their national 
economic policies to accommodate regional priorities.  In this 
regard, Richard Weisfelder alludes to: “… the existence of severe 
deficiencies in the willingness of member states to adjust their 
national economic policies to accommodate regional priorities.” 
(1991:6; Thede, 1993:40; Mistry, 2000:558).  Furthermore, 
projects were donor driven and these donors were reluctant to 
finance regional industrialisation projects.  This situation ensured 
that concerns for national development overrode regional ones.  
 
What compounded the choice of preference of national over 
regional was the fact that SADCC had a small permanent 
secretariat, located in Botswana that was responsible for 
overseeing the execution of the functions of the SCUs.  The 
preference of national over regional meant that SADCC managed 
to produce only some integration. The failure of the strategy of 
sectoral co-ordination prompted SADCC to adopt a strategy that 
was predicated upon the lowering and removal of barriers to trade 
among and between states219.    SADCC also attempted to 
develop and diversify regional economies- through 
industrialisation- independent of South Africa.   
 
SADCC’s industrial plans did not succeed because there was no 
donor support.  Donors in general were unwilling to commit funds 
towards replicating South Africa’s manufacturing capacity in the 
region.  Donor support for regional industrial development was 
also not forthcoming because Western governments and the 
South African government saw how they could further extract 
exports and resources from SADCC by promoting infrastructure 
instead.  André du Pisani notes that: “… the regional economy 
supplies Western industrial economies with raw materials and 
                                      
219
   SADC’s founding treaty (1992) made it clear that it would move-away from 
merely co-ordinating national development projects on a regional basis towards more 
far-reaching regional integration, involving, inter alia, greater political co-operation. 
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agricultural products” (1992:176).  In addition, most SADCC states 
were also APEC states part of the Lomé agreements.  One of its 
functions was to have them continue to supply raw materials and 
commodities.  This made regional autonomous development 
difficult. 
 
SADCC’s stated objective of greater financial self-sufficiency and 
independence from donors, were also not reached.  To the 
contrary, it relied heavily on international donors220.  Gregg Mills 
charges that SADCC in its entire existence acted: “… as a conduit 
and coordinating centre for international aid and investment, … 
(1995:3).  Erich Leistner notes that  “... 80% to 90% of SADCC 
projects are funded by outside donors.” (1995:272).  The 
magnitude of SADCC’s dependence on donor funds is further 
demonstrated by the annual inflow of aid to the regional body.  
Says Erich Leistner: “During the 1980s, net aid inflows averaged 
well over US$ 2billion annually.” (1991:1; Hawkins, 1992:106).  
Therefore, SADCC did not manage to reduce its dependence on 
South Africa.  SADCC dependence on South Africa and the rest of 
the world was perpetuated because it paid little attention in 
involving the private sector in its integration efforts Blumenfeld 
(1991).   
    
 
3.3.5 SADCC’s Achievements 
 
 
 
Such structural forms of dependence, however, did not 
automatically imply that SADCC was entirely at the mercy of 
apartheid South Africa.  SADCC on its part did manage to: 
(1) “Provide a conduit for foreign aid: SADCC was well-regarded 
by aid organisations, which were particularly interested in 
sponsoring regional transport and communications projects; 
furthermore; 
                                      
220
   Ibbo Mandaza maintains that in providing aid to SADCC there was: “… the 
tendency by donor countries to resort to bilateral rather than multilateral approach to 
aid.” (1987:221). 
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(2) The annual consultative meetings focussed the attention of 
donor countries on South and Southern Africa’s role in the region; 
and 
 (3) Significant progress was made in the reconstruction and 
development of SADCC’s transport and communication network.” 
(Davies. R. et al. 1993:29)221. 
 
 SADCC’s acknowledged successes are in some of the domains 
of sectoral co-operation (notably food security and transport), in 
mobilising aid, and- no least- in holding together within the context 
of a history of uneven regional development, political fracture and 
ideological diversity.  SADCC engaged in a rigorous campaign to 
upgrade and rehabilitate its transport network222.  Communication 
links were also improved, with the aim of broadening the 
international communication traffic between and among SADCC 
countries and the rest of the world223.  Balefi Tsie notes that: “The 
project coordination approach… was… useful in sustaining the 
active participation of all SADCC states…” (1996:84), although it 
did not address lopsided regional development.   
 
What attempts at regional integration did achieve, Carol 
Thompson (2000) asserts was that SADCC was a cognitive 
organisation, managed to, for example, cognitively linked the 
citizens of Tanzania with those in South Africa beyond the 
liberation struggle.  This suggests that societal relations beyond 
the state also inform the conception of regions and the notion of 
                                      
221
   The politics of region building around improved transport and communication 
served another purpose.  Ibbo Mandaza rightfully argues that: “It should not be 
forgotten that there is often a close relationship between ‘good infrastructure’ and the 
high rate of investment.” (1987:221). 
 
222
 Anthony Hawkins asserts that: “Much is made of SADCC’s achievements in 
transport integration, food security and agricultural research… Most of the regional 
infrastructure attributed to SADCC pre-dates it and would have been developed and 
rehabilitated even without SADCC.” (1992:105). 
  
223
  The establishment of the Southern African Transport and Communication 
Commission, it was hoped, would play a decisive role in the rehabilitation of these 
two sectors.  The only other Commission SADCC has, is the Southern African Centre 
for Cooperation in Agricultural Research. 
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regional communities.  Yet, at the beginning of the 1990s, states in 
the region were still seen as the locus point in regional analysis.        
 
The argument here is that regional analysis should also recognise 
that states share the international space with other actors.  The 
implications for SADCC were that in our regional analysis we 
should: “…no longer see interstate cooperation as the most 
appropriate response to development in the region.” (Bischoff, 
1995:110).  Ultimately, as: “SADCC itself admits, its hopes of 
regional integration have largely remained a dream… ostensibly 
because… the organisation has failed to bring all sections of the 
regions’ societies into the mainstream of regional co-operation 
efforts.  It has not touched the lives of the ordinary citizen of the 
region.” (Beaudet, 1994:139).    
 
For André du Pisani the transformation from SADCC to SADC in 
1992: “…denotes an attempt at effecting structural change which 
favours both national and regional development and which 
activates all sectors of the population to participate in the 
development process.” (2001:207).  The intentions of SADC were 
thus to began a multifaceted, more developmental, approach to 
regionalism, embracing both economic and political processes, 
and involving both state and non-state actors.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
 
It has been illustrated that the history of regionalism in southern 
Africa, up to 1994, was premised on political considerations, not 
developmental ones.  In the case of SACU, for instance, South 
Africa promoted regional development centred on its own 
parochial national economy.  This is illustrated by South Africa’s 
development of its manufacturing capacity since the mid-1920s. 
Furthermore, the trade balance that weighs heavily in favour of 
South Africa in the Customs Union bears testimony to lopsided 
economic development in SACU.  
The goal of overall economic development was never part of the 
logic that underscored SACU.  To the contrary, South Africa was 
more concerned with counter-acting the trade diversion suffered 
by smaller member countries, as a result of it pursuing its own 
economic goals.  This prompted the introduction of a 
compensatory mechanism and distribution of additional revenue.  
The reliance of these smaller countries on this revenue, which 
constitutes a major portion of their public revenue, further 
entrenched their dependence on South Africa (See table 1).  
Furthermore, not only does South Africa dwarf these countries in 
terms of population (see table 3), they also rely heavily on South 
Africa’s telecommunication channels, its road and rail routes, 
especially to the sea.  Moreover, one of the essential dimensions 
of the dependent relation between South Africa and smaller 
Customs Union members remains labour migration. 
Moreover, both SACU Non-SACU member states were reliant on 
the apartheid Republic for transport and export routes (rail and 
port traffic).  South Africa also had control over the service sector 
and (the marketing of regional agricultural produce.  In the 1970s 
and 80s apartheid South Africa made political use of its economic 
dominance by establishing CONSAS.  Historically thus, SACU can 
be viewed as a political arrangement used by South Africa to 
advance its own development through the creation of its own 
market and economic hinterland.  
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SACU, in the final analysis, emerged as a pragmatic trade and 
payment arrangement.  It was never a development or growth 
oriented integration programme.  What held SACU together was 
largely due to the revenue that it provided the BLS countries.  The 
distribution of these customs and excise revenue in favour of BLS 
countries was intended to compensate them for the loss of 
sovereignty in setting their own tariffs, for the polarisation effect of 
the Customs Union and for higher prices resulting from 
protectionist policies of South Africa.  Both the 1910 and 1969 
agreements illustrate South Africa’s highhandedness and 
unilateralism, the power of its industrial lobby and the general 
hostage situation of the BLS countries.  The SACU agreements of 
1910 and 1969 were, thus, political not developmental projects.  
The formation of SADCC was, similarly, politically-oriented and not 
developmentally focussed. 
SADCC succeeded in bringing together widely different economic 
and political systems.  Significantly and particularly due to its 
opposition to apartheid, the region alongside the Frontline states 
developed political cohesiveness and forged a regional identity.  
Notwithstanding its reliance on international donor support, it 
achieved limited success in the regional rehabilitation of 
infrastructure.  Lastly, its reliance on donor support produced a 
paradox: SADCC became aid dependent, but managed to retain 
the attention of the international community on southern Africa.  
As such it contributed to ensuring that southern Africa in the 
struggle against apartheid and in responding to regional 
destabilisation does not become marginalised internationally.  
However, SADCC has achieved only limited regional integration 
for a number of reasons. 
The logic that underpins the existence of SADCC was premised 
on a political goal: to counter South Africa’s economic and military 
hegemony.  As such, governments and political considerations 
drove its instruments of co-operation.  Moreover, the promotion of 
regional development was not clearly encapsulated in the SADCC 
framework for regional co-operation.  Not surprisingly therefore, 
the levels of economic development and industrialisation, were 
low.  Moreover, development priorities, production structures, 
resource allocation and resource endowments, inter alia, were 
diverse.  The lack of higher levels of integration and 
industrialisation, were also influenced by SADCC’s institutional 
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structure, which does not compel compliance with regional 
objectives. 
SADCC failed to promote equitable economic integration in the 
region, because it was ostensibly driven by political 
considerations.  Also it was a statist project that did not involve 
non-state actors.  SADCC, thus, failed to co-ordinate national with 
regional development, largely because it was so loosely 
organised, politically diverse, and donor driven, which meant that it 
could never put forward a comprehensive plan for redeveloping 
the region. 
 
Regionalism in the 1990s and beyond needs to account for 
changing realities, which recognise that regional organisation is no 
longer a process driven by states alone.  The organisations   have, 
however, a history of integration that must be revamp and 
transformed to reflect this need for deeper integration.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
The Reform of Regional Organisations in Southern 
Africa 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
The end of the Cold War and the democratisation of South Africa 
in 1994 had important implications for region-building in southern 
Africa.  The end of the Cold War and the liberalisation of global 
politics had, as illustrated elsewhere, increased the scope for 
regionally-induced initiatives.  Similarly, the end of apartheid had 
offered states in southern Africa new hope for building democratic, 
inclusive and sustainable regional institutions.  Unlike before, 
regionalism in the 1990s was not only state-centric.  It takes place 
in a multi-level framework, is comprehensive and involves many 
actors and issues.      
 
Following the above, the construction of regions: “… may comprise 
sub-state as well as supra-state and trans-state units, offering 
different modalities of organization and collaboration.” (Fawcett, 
2004:432).  Both state and non-state actors ultimately define 
regions and the notion of regional communities.  The above 
suggests that the establishment of institutions, which 
accommodates these multiple meanings of regionalism for 
developmental purposes requires: “… an inclusive typology that 
includes state-based as well as non-state based regions, and 
regions of varying size and compositions” (ibid.)224.  Regionalism, 
therefore, should be a multifaceted task, which recognises that 
transnational networks also participate in the regional domain.     
                                      
224
   Louise Fawcett asserts that: “… a truly successful regionalist project today 
presupposes eventual linkages between state and non-state actors: an inter-locking 
network of regional governance structures.” (2004:433). New approaches to the study 
of regionalism acknowledge the mutually reinforcing role to be played by state and 
non-state actors in building new regional capacity.   
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Andrew Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum argue that in Africa in 
general, and in southern Africa in this instance: “… state-society 
nexus is based on multiple actors that are linked together in hybrid 
networks and coalitions, together creating a wide range of complex 
regionalisation patterns…” (2003:1).  Region-building in southern 
Africa should, therefore, recognise the interface of state-centred 
co-operation dovetailing with non-state actor participation in the 
inter-state regional project.  Institutional reform must, therefore, 
ensure citizens’ participation in the development and governance 
process.  
 
Historically, however, regionalism in southern Africa was state-
centric and driven by political considerations, not developmental 
ones.  While developmental regionalism recognises the role of the 
state in building regional capacity, it also argues that broad-based 
development is state-led, market-driven and accommodates the 
concerns of civil society.  The building of durable regional 
institutions needs to account for this.       
 
In the aftermath of apartheid and in an attempt to build durable 
regional institutions, the changing economic and political 
dynamics, had elicited critical investigations about the prospects of 
regional integration in the region (Odén, 1993; Gibb, 1997; 
Sidaway and Gibb; 1998; Mistry, 2000).  A common thread 
discernable in this literature review focuses on the need for 
regional institutions to become more developmentally-oriented.  In 
principle, thus, the intention was to develop institutions, which 
signified a break-away from past practises, which was state-led.  
Issues of economic integration were to be addressed in tandem 
with broader concerns, which embrace political objectives. 
 
For SACU, a broadened scope meant reversing uneven 
development and the economic dominance of South Africa.  Both 
highhandedness and unilateralism, the power of its industrial lobby 
and the general hostage situation of the BLNS countries.  The 
SACU agreements of 1910 and 1969 were, thus, political not 
developmental projects. The re-negotiation of SACU was 
necessitated by the need to adapt to developments within a 
democratic South Africa, and to address the concerns of the BLNS 
countries with regards to the 1969 Agreement.  The SACU 
Agreement of 2002 states that the different levels of economic 
development of Member States, demands mechanisms to deal 
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with such inequality.  The desire to overcome regional inequalities 
lends support to the appropriateness of developmental regionalism 
that sets out explicitly to address the structural and spatial 
problems associated with integration amongst unequal partners.  
The 2002 SACU Agreement also sought to establish common 
policies and to ensure that the organisation becomes more 
democratic in orientation225.  The transformation of SADCC into 
SADC in 1992 was also aimed at moving beyond limited 
infrastructural development and securing donor aid to the 
achievement of broader economic and political objectives.  In other 
words, to ensure that the organisation becomes a vehicle for wide-
ranging changes in development.                 
     
The intention was to ensure that the body becomes a catalyst to, 
inter alia, eradicate poverty and reduce unemployment in the 
region. It was also hoped that the organisation could assist states 
in the region to develop their industrial capacity.  This was to be 
achieved through a strategy of development integration, which, it 
was hoped would heighten levels of integration.  The 
transformation of SADC was also geared to the strengthening of 
regional institutions, the attraction of FDI and the accommodation 
of regional integration amongst non-state actors.  At the end of the 
1990s, SADC reviewed its objectives, with a view to even deeper 
regional co-operation and integration.  In short, regional integration 
in southern Africa was to be seen as a developmental tool to 
harness the potential of both state and non-state actors to achieve 
multifaceted objectives.   
 
The question that this chapter seeks to answer is: In view of the 
changing economic and political dynamics in the region after the 
downfall of apartheid, have the institutions of SACU and SADC 
been sufficiently transformed to match the ambitions of regional 
multilateralism in the 1990s and beyond226, which politically and 
                                      
225
   Michael McDonald points out that while the BLNS countries complained about 
South Africa’s unilateral decision-making, they never showed significant interest to 
make the process of decision-making more democratic and transparent (Personal 
Communication, 11 October, 2002).  
  
226
   In this context: “The term ‘multilateral’ presumes cooperation… all multilateral 
activities include cooperation… the institutions of multilateralism may manifest itself 
in concrete organisations, but its significance cuts more deeply.  The institutions of 
multilateralism is grounded in appeals to the less formal, less codified habits, 
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institutionally accommodate both state and non-state actors, and 
cover a range of issues?  More critically, this chapter will examine 
whether the precepts of developmental regionalism outlined 
elsewhere, provide a lead about the direction that SACU and 
SADC is pursuing.      
 
 
                                                                                                         
practices, ideas and norms of international society” (Caporso, 1993:54-55). 
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4.2 The Reform of Regional Organisations in Southern 
Africa: The Case of a Re-negotiated SACU 
 
 
4.2.1 Re-negotiating SACU: Background and Issues 
 
 
 
Following the independence of Namibia in 1990, and the advent of 
democracy in South Africa in April 1994, SACU members agreed 
that the 1969 agreement should be re-negotiated in order to 
democratise SACU and to address the current needs of SACU 
members more effectively.  The disagreement between the BLNS 
countries and South Africa over the shortcomings of the 1969 
agreement has led Richard Gibb to conclude that: “… the ending 
of apartheid has promoted a period of intense instability in the 
established regional trading arrangements.” (1997:67).  This 
necessitated the re-negotiation of the SACU agreement with a 
view to address the concerns of all SACU members more 
effectively. 
 
For the democratic government in South Africa, the re-negotiation 
of the SACU agreement was an attempt to deepen its relations 
with the BLNS countries.  Chris Alden and Mills Soko maintain 
that: “South Africa was also keen to introduce changes to the 
existing agreement: the incoming African National Congress 
(ANC) government was determined to underline its credentials in 
the region by supporting SACU’s democratization, and dispensing 
with the ‘colonial’ image associated with erstwhile SACU 
agreements.” (2005:370-371).    
 
The BLNS countries, on the other hand, have argued that under 
the 1969 agreement they were still not adequately compensated 
for the disadvantages of belonging to SACU (Lee, 2003)227.    
                                      
227
   The disagreement over the 1969 agreement again highlights the political nature of 
the 1969 agreement.  The political nature of the 1969 agreement is borne out by the 
fact that for South Africa specifically: “… the BLNS countries had been invaluable to 
the apartheid state.  These countries had given the South African government some 
semblance of much needed legitimacy in that it was able to maintain relationships 
with legitimate African countries.  They were also essential to South Africa’s 
sanction-busting strategy in that South African companies were able to relocate to 
these countries and export their products to the rest of the world.  Alternatively, they 
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Developmental regionalism views regional distribution- in this 
context through a compensatory mechanism, as essential for 
achieving social stability in the region.  But the revenue-sharing 
formula was not the only point of contention for the BLNS 
countries.   
  
Ngida Mwase and Gavin Maasdorp identify the complaints of the 
BLNS as the following: 
 
 
 “Inadequate compensation for payment delays from the 
common pool, the loss of fiscal discretion, the price-raising 
effect228; 
 
 The effects of the RSA’s protective tariffs and industrial 
concentration; 
 
 Greater protection for the BLNS agriculture and infant 
industries and measures to encourage industrial 
development;  
 
 Arbitrary and unilateral decision-making by the RSA; and 
 
 The conversion of the Board of Trade229 and Industries into a 
multilateral institution, and the establishment of multilateral 
dispute arbitration procedures” (1999:221).     
 
All in all, the re-negotiation of the SACU agreement, after the 
downfall of apartheid, was prompted by the undemocratic nature 
of decision-making embedded in the agreement.  The intention 
was: “… to design institutional arrangements that will democratize 
                                                                                                         
were able to send their products to the BLNS countries for the final production phase 
before being exported to the world” (Lee, 2003:79).  This promoted lopsided 
economic development in favour of South Africa.    
   
228
  The price-raising effect results from the BLNS countries paying higher prices for 
internationally uncompetitive goods that they import from South Africa. 
 
229
  The Board acts as a tariff investigative body for SACU. It determines, amongst 
others, excise duties, rebates and refunds. Under the 1969 agreement, the Board 
unilaterally adopted tariffs and duties to promote South Africa’s own development 
needs (Gibb, 1997). In essence, the Board of Trade and Tariffs made all SACU 
decisions, primarily to protect South Africa’s domestic market.  
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decision-making in the management of SACU.” (McCarthy, 
2003:621).  Despite the disagreement between South Africa and 
the BLNS countries, both parties viewed SACU as an important 
entity for regional integration.   
 
In view of the above, both parties agreed to address the concerns 
of SACU members more effectively.  Mwase and Maasdorp point 
out, the importance of SACU as an entity for regional integration 
was prompted by the realisation that:  
 
 
 “Economic relations between the various countries should 
foster mutually beneficial links (a positive-sum game for all); 
promote economic development in all countries; minimize the 
economic dominance of any country or countries; promote 
interdependence; facilitate intra-regional trade and investment 
flows; and strengthen the competitiveness of individual 
countries and SACU as a whole in the global economy; 
 
 Not all countries benefit equally from membership, but all 
should be better off inside that outside SACU; 
 
 All countries should commit themselves to a policy of good 
neighbourliness and eschew a position of regional hegemony.  
South Africa in particular should commit itself to a policy of full 
co-operation as an equal partner” (1999:224).  
 
 
The above suggests that SACU committed itself to a 
developmental approach as the basic architectural principle upon 
which regional integration should best be built (Bertelsmann, 1998).  
But to achieve these developmental goals required overcoming the 
shortcomings of the 1969 agreement. 
  
In a nutshell, SACU members agreed that the 1969 agreement 
contained the following shortcomings:  
 
• Weak institutions; 
 
• Undemocratic decision-making; 
 
• No dispute settlement mechanism; and a  
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• Revenue sharing formula that was not sustainable230.  
 
While the 1969 agreement contained the above shortcomings, it 
remained indispensable to both South Africa and the BLNS 
countries.  For South Africa, it was necessary to preserve the 
SACU agreement for economic and political reasons.  Magaret 
Lee asserts that: “Without SACU revenue, the BLNS countries, 
especially Lesotho and Swaziland, would be economically 
destabilized.  This in turn would likely result in increased illegal 
immigration to South Africa, thus exacerbating the already 
overwhelming problem that exists in South Africa due to the huge 
number of legal and illegal job-seekers.  With an increase in both 
foreign job-seekers and poverty along its borders, political and 
economic stability in South Africa would be seriously 
compromised.” (2003:80). 
 
The SACU agreement remained important for the BLNS countries 
because: “… the revenue-sharing formula offers a trade-off 
between the relative fiscal autonomy and an income to state 
coffers.  In this respect it represents the ascendancy of a rentier 
class in the BLNS states and cements their (sometimes uneasy) 
relationship to the dominant strata in South Africa.” (Gibb and 
Sidaway, 1998:174).  The re-negotiation of SACU would have to 
be much broader than catering for elite interests only.     
 
 
4.2.2 Re-negotiating SACU: Processes and Outcomes 
 
 
 
While the negotiations for a re-constituted SACU were launched 
on the 11 November 1994 in Pretoria, South Africa, it was rooted 
in continued complaints from the BLNS countries and South 
Africa. In 1990, the BLNS countries argued that the 1969 SACU 
Agreement was not fair to them. In turn, South Africa responded in 
1991, that it could no longer afford to subsidise the BLNS 
countries via the revenue-sharing formula.  It also complained that 
its share of the revenue continue to fall (Lee, 2003). To resolve 
                                      
230
  Robert Davies, Personal Communication, 18 October 2002. 
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these issues and start negotiations for a new agreement, CUTT 
was constituted. 
 
CUTT comprised of officials from all five member states. They 
were task and mandated to negotiate on behalf of the ministers of 
SACU. The SACU renegotiations were aimed at addressing such 
critical issues as the creation of new structures and mechanisms 
for joint decision-making in tariff bodies, and the possibility of 
achieving a greater degree of co-ordination in such areas as 
competition and industrial policy, as well as the revenue sharing 
formula (Davies, 1996). In essence, the re-negotiations were 
aimed at addressing four critical issues: 
 
1. The revenue sharing formula; 
 
2. Institutional arrangements; and 
 
3. Policy231.  
 
 
Another issue of concern for the negotiation partners is whether to 
enlarge SACU to allow SADC members that are not currently of 
the organisation to become members.  Fundamentally, the issue 
at stake was whether to restructure SACU as a sub-set 
arrangement that needs to be harmonised with the broader 
SADC232, since: “… the nature and evolution of SADC is very 
much dependent on the outcome of those negotiations.” (Gibb, 
1997:67).  The latter issue have not been resolved at the 
conclusion of the re-negotiations on 21st October 2002233. 
 
From December 1994 to October 1996 eight meetings were held. 
The negotiations then reached a stalemate and only resumed in 
                                      
231
  Robert Davies, Personal Communication, 18 October 2002. 
  
  
232
    The enlargement of SACU was a primary policy objective of the former South 
African regime, which saw this as a means of extending South African hegemony and 
undercutting organizations such as SADC/C.  Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
are frequently mentioned as countries that may seek membership of SACU.  
 
233
   Prior to the dismantling of apartheid in 1994, South Africa viewed the BLNS as 
politically dispensable (Lee, 2003). 
 
 158
October 1998. The most contentious issue during the negotiations 
was over the revenue-sharing agreement. The disagreement over 
the latter agreement was exacerbated by the negotiation for an 
FTA between South Africa and the EU. The implications of the 
FTA agreement for the BLNS were that they stood to lose revenue 
as a result of reduced customs duties (Barber, 2004; Bertelsmann, 
2002). Another reason why the negotiations took so long was due 
the attitude of South Africa towards the BLNS countries. Margaret 
Lee asserts that: “Throughout the re-negotiations, South Africa 
allegedly acted as a hegemon, and resisted attempts to make the 
organisation more democratic.” (2003:82). Despite of the above 
difficulties, the SACU Agreement was concluded in 2002234. 
 
 
Article 2 of the 2002 SACU agreement states that the new 
objectives of the customs union are: 
 
 
 To facilitate the cross-border movement of goods between the 
territories of the Member States; 
 
 To create effective, transparent and democratic institutions, 
which will ensure equitable trade benefits to Member States; 
 
 To promote conditions of fair competition in the Common 
Customs Area; 
 
 To substantially increase investment opportunities in the 
Common Customs Area; 
 
 To enhance the economic development, diversification, 
industrialisation and competitiveness of Member States;  
 
 To promote the integration of Member States into the global 
economy through enhanced trade and investment; 
 
 To facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue arising from 
customs, excise and additional duties levied by Member 
States; and 
                                      
234
  The new SACU Agreement was signed in Gaborone, Botswana, on the 21st 
October 2002.  
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 To facilitate the development of common policies and 
strategies  
 
All the above objectives are partially in line with the new 
regionalism approach, and its variant, developmental regionalism, 
which seek to promote and maintain policy credibility through the 
adoption of common policies and strategies.  Furthermore, the 
realisation that the interface between the national and the global is 
critical suggests that new regionalism offers southern African 
countries the opportunity to address both national developmental 
needs and to engage the international community more effectively.  
 
 However, with its focus on inter-state agreements and 
arrangements only, these objectives, however, fall short of the 
practice of new regionalism, which look at processes of 
regionalisation in various fields of activity and at various levels, 
practise by states and non-state actors.    
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4.2.1 New Institutional Arrangements  
 
 
With regards to the institutional arrangements the SACU 
agreement of 2002 sets itself apart from the 1969 agreement in 
that it was geared towards: 
 
• “The creation of effective democratic institutions, including 
provision for dispute settlement; 
 
• The provision of common institutions to be accompanied by 
the adoption of common policies and strategies; and 
 
• The recognition of the importance of tariffs as instruments for 
the implementation of industrial development policy” 
(Southern African Customs Union Agreement, 2002: 
Preamble).  
 
To achieve the above-outlined objectives, the new SACU 
agreement provides for the following representative institutional 
structures:  
 
• A Council of Ministers- Supreme decision-making body; 
 
• Secretariat which has an administrative function235; 
 
• A SACU Tariff Board which deals with tariff changes; and a  
 
• Customs Union Commission, which deals with policy and 
implementation issues236. 
 
According to Article 8 of the re-negotiated agreement, the Council 
of Ministers, consisting of at least one minister from each member 
state, shall be the supreme governing body that guides the policy 
direction and functioning of SACU, including strategic staff 
appointments and the approval of the budgets of the Secretariat, 
                                      
235
  The Secretariat will be responsible for the day to day running of the revenue pool, 
and will also be funded from the revenue pool 
(http://www.dfa/gov.za/docs/sacu2310a.htm). 
  
236
  Robert Davies, Personal Communication, 18 October 2002.  
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the Tariff Board and the Tribunal.  Member states will take turns in 
holding the chair of the Council for 12 months, in a sequence 
decided by the Council.  Trudie Hartzenburg asserts that: “The 
establishment of the Council of Ministers represents a 
fundamental shift in SACU administration, with a clear 
commitment to democratisation of administration, management, 
and implementation.” (2003:181).  The inter-governmental nature 
of the new Agreement is exemplified by the decision-making 
procedure adopted by SACU. Decision-making of all SACU 
institutions under the new Agreement shall be based on 
consensus states Article 17 of this Agreement.  It thus addresses 
a fundamental flaw of the 1969 Agreement: that of a democratic 
deficit embedded in that Agreement.  The drawback of decision-
making by consensus, however, is that national interests as 
opposed to regional interests will dominate the decision-making 
process.   
 
The Tribunal is, however, exempted from this consensus decision-
making approach.  The decisions of the Tribunal, which is 
composed of three members, shall be decided by majority vote. 
This body is essence serves the function of resolving disputes 
between and among member states.  The establishment of the 
Tribunal (Article 13,1) also signifies a break-away from decision-
making based on the parochial needs of South Africa.  Because of 
the supranational character of this newly-established body, it is 
able to make decisions that are final and binding on all SACU 
members. In that sense, the Tribunal differs from the consensus 
model of decision-making adopted by the Council of Ministers.  It 
is the final and binding nature of decisions of the Tribunal, which 
allows it to intensify the democratisation of SACU.  This in line with 
new approaches to regionalism, which is comprehensive and 
multi-dimensional, and concerns itself with the whole issue of 
accountability and legitimacy. 
Article 10 of the re-negotiated agreement states that the 
Secretariat shall be responsible for the day-to-day administration 
of SACU, co-ordinate and monitor the implementation of Council 
and Commission decisions, arrange and keep minutes of SACU 
bodies and assist in the harmonisation of national policies that 
relate to SACU.  The existence of a permanent Secretariat drawn 
from all member states of the Customs Union, not only 
strengthens inter-governmentalism supranationalism, but will also 
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contributes to transparency and the deepening of democracy.  In 
addition, the co-ordination of policies is in line with a political 
economy approach to developmental regionalism, which finds 
expression in efforts to co-ordinate, amongst others, regional 
industrial development.        
 
The functions of the third institutional body of SACU, the Tariff 
Board are dealt with by Article 11 of the-negotiated agreement.  
The Tariff Board, the Article states, is to be an independent 
institution consisting of experts drawn from all member states who 
operate as full-time or part-time members of the Board.  The 
ostensible function of the Board is to make recommendations to 
Council on the level and changes of customs, anti-dumping, 
countervailing and safeguard duties on goods imported into the 
common customs area, as well as on tariff rebates, refunds and 
duty drawbacks.  This ensures that the Board has broader 
legitimacy and also increases the economic efficiency of SACU 
countries. 
 
The final institutional body that the re-negotiated agreement 
provides for is the Customs Union Commission.  Article 9 states 
that this Commission shall consist of senior officials at the level of 
heads of government departments from each member state.  The 
Commission shall report and be responsible to the Council and will 
have an important operational role, since it has to accept 
responsibility for the implementation of the Agreement and the 
decisions of the Council, oversee the management of the customs 
union revenue pool according to Council guidelines, and supervise 
the work of the Secretariat. 
 
In addition to these institutions, Article 14 of the Agreement also 
requires member states to establish specialised, independent and 
dedicated national bodies, or to designate institutions to receive 
request for tariff changes and other related SACU issues.  SACU 
as a body deviates from conventional customs unions in that it 
seeks to address regional inequalities through a compensatory 
mechanism.  While the broadening of the institutional capacity of 
SACU is commendable, it nowhere makes provision for the 
involvement of non-state actors.  This suggests that the edifice of 
SACU, which was historically state-centred, remains intact.     
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The institutional set-up of SACU seeks to deepen co-operation 
among state actors only by, inter alia, the establishment of 
common policies and institutions.  Anton Fowler recognises that 
the diversity of SACU economies: “… makes any initiative towards 
the development of common policies and even harmonisation of 
policies and strategies a challenge.  One must realise that 
common policies, such as a common industrial policy, do not 
necessary imply that the same ‘ingredients’ must be available in 
every Member State.  Sector development and sectoral strategies 
will form a key component of any initiative to develop common 
policies.  As a Customs Union, SACU already have a common 
tariff policy in the form of a CET.  This is already an important step 
in the direction of common policy development.”237.   
 
Anton Fowler further charges that: “As a Customs Union, SACU 
already has a common tariff policy in the form of a CET.  This is 
already an important step in the direction of common policy 
development.”238 This again points to the fact that the 2002 SACU 
Agreement is both inter-governmental in nature and seek to 
enhance the democratic credibility of the new SACU institutional 
framework.  In the face of diverse economies, developmental 
regionalism could play a decisive role, by allowing SACU states to 
cooperate to solve problems.  This would ensure that each 
member reaches a higher level of development.  The existence of 
the CET also suggests that institutionally SACU conforms to one 
of the precepts of developmental regionalism: the effective 
articulation of common interests.               
 
SACU also seeks to democratise the organisation’s institutional 
structure.  These developments are in line with the practices and 
processes of new approaches to regionalism, which posits that for 
the state to fulfil its developmental function, its institutions needs 
to foster greater interdependence among states involve in the 
regional integration efforts (Heintz, 2003).  The democratisation 
process ought also be aimed at fostering common values among 
Member States, a requirement for the success of developmental 
regionalism in SACU.    
                                      
237
   Personal Communication, 6th February, 2006. 
  
238
   Personal Communication, 6th February 2006.  
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The new institutions of SACU, however, fail to recognise that 
cross-community interactions and interdependencies, which are 
as old as SACU itself, could deepen regionalisation and the sense 
of regionness.  The new institutional agreement of SACU also fails 
to acknowledge that historically, a single unified informal economy 
held up by mining labour, illegal migrants, cultural transactors and 
informal traders, contributed to the configuration of the SACU 
region239.   
 
The above implies that the new institutional agreement of SACU 
does not lend scope to the fact that people in SACU are conscious 
of their past and still interact in the informal economy.  These 
trans-border activities from below lend new meaning and value to 
the region and the notion of regional communities.  New 
regionalism as a field of study, however, not only recognises 
states and formal organisations, but acknowledges that informal 
regionalism is integral to regions and regionalism.  Thus, the 
building of new regional economic and political capacity in SACU 
requires deliberate attempts to connect the two broad processes 
of formal and informal regionalism into the process of institution-
building.  The need for a new revenue-sharing formula suggests 
that SACU as an inter-state body recognises that new regionalism 
as a normative project allows states to respond to an 
interdependent world in accordance with its peculiarities and 
problems.   
 
                                      
239
  Anton Fowler asserts that the institutions of SACU do not recognise non-state 
actors as a partner.  He points out, however, that: “Non-state actors have been part of 
the re-negotiations process and each Member State is free to accredit non-state actors 
to form part of their delegations to meetings and events of SACU. Non-state actors 
are key role-players in SACU Member States and in SACU and it is envisaged that 
collaboration, co-operation and involvement would increase in future.” (Personal 
Communication, 6th February, 2006).  The disposition of Member States remains 
critical in determining the content and scope of regionalism in SACU. Thus, non-
state actors may find it difficult to participate meaningfully inside the SACU 
institutional structures.           
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4.2.2 The new revenue-sharing formula 
 
 
 
The re-negotiation of the 1969 agreement was, arguably, 
prompted by the need to review the revenue-sharing formula.  In 
view of the changing economic and political conditions regionally 
and globally in the 1990s, the re-examination of the revenue-
sharing formula had to take into account the following: 
 
 “The changed global environment and in particular  the 
implications of the GATT/WTO agreement for the SACU and 
for future revenue flows from customs duties; 
 
 The possibility of a differentiated revenue-sharing formula 
being applied to each country, since the BLNS economies are 
not homogeneous, and SACU is of varying importance as a 
source of revenue; 
 
 An improved revenue estimation method to overcome the 
disadvantages to BLNS of two-year time-lag in cash flows; 
and 
 
 A common statistical base for the purpose of calculating intra-
SACU trade” (Mwase and Maasdorp, 1999:225). 
 
The re-negotiation of the revenue-sharing formula was only 
concluded in October, 2001.  The essence of the new revenue-
sharing formula: 
 
 
 “Allows the BLNS countries to continue to be subsidised; 
 
 Guarantee that revenue flows to the BLNS countries will be 
stable and not fall below the current level; 
 
 Ensures that South Africa will not continue to experience a 
decrease in its share of the revenue pool; 
 
 Has a developmental component for the poorer countries; and  
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 Establishes a SACU tariff board that will meet at least 
quarterly to review applications for tariffs and anti-dumping 
protection.” (Business Day 25 and 26 October 2001).   
 
 
The new revenue sharing formula will consist of three main 
components:  
 
1. A Customs component- which will be allocated according to 
each country’s share of total intra-SACU trade, including re-
exports; 
 
2. An Excise component- net of the development component, 
should be allocated on the basis of GDP; 
 
3. A development component, which will be fixed at 15% of the 
total excise pool and distributed to all SACU members 
according to the inverse of each country’s GDP/capita240. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 The Customs Component 
 
 
 
The customs component of the new agreement, according to Colin 
McCarthy is been designed to benefit the smaller Customs Union 
members.  Accordingly: “Each member’s percentage share in the 
customs pool during a specific year will be equal to the member’s 
value of goods imported from all other SACU members as a 
percentage of total intra-SACU imports during that year.  Since the 
intra-SACU trade balance is heavily in South Africa’s favour, which 
means that the BLNS import much more from South Africa that the 
other way around, the BLNS shares will be relatively high 
compared to that of South Africa.” (McCarthy, 2003:625).  This 
meant that the organisation had to put measures in place that 
would correct this historical imbalance.  
 
Accordingly: “… the architects of the new agreement have 
recognized the dependence of the smaller SACU members on 
                                      
240
  Source: http://www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/mulilateral/sacu.htm 
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customs union revenue and consequently agreed on a revenue-
sharing formula that would provide BLNS with revenue protection.  
Linking revenue distribution to intra-SACU imports, bearing in 
mind South Africa’s large trade surplus with BLNS, is also 
presented as compensating BLNS for the cost-raising and 
polarization disadvantaged of being in a customs union with South 
Africa.” (Ngwenya, 2002:28; McCarthy,2004:165).  In this sense, 
the 2002 SACU agreement conforms to the requirements of 
developmental regionalism, which posits the need for a 
redistribution mechanism to counter-act polarisation and as such 
is specific with regards to objectives.   
Colin McCarthy posits that: “The excise revenue component of the 
total revenue pool will consist of the gross amount of duties 
leviable and collected on goods produced in the common customs 
area.  In distributing this pool of funds the amount available is 
obtained by subtracting the amount that goes toward the funding 
of the SACU institutions plus a further deduction to fund the 
development component of revenue allocations.  Of the net 
amount available after the two deductions, a member state will 
receive a percentage share equal to the value of its GDP in a 
specific year as a percentage of the total SACU GDP during that 
year.  On the basis of GDP values for 1998, South Africa would be 
allocated 92 percent of the available excise component.” 
(2003:625-626).  For South Africa, excise duties is: “…. An 
appropriate instrument to raise tax revenue for much needed 
social expenditure.” (ibid.).  Developmental regionalism as a 
normative project demands that strong emphasis be placed on 
measures intended to counter polarization.  
 
Colin McCarthy argues that with the new revenue-sharing formula 
South Africa stands to gain much more than the BLNS countries 
from the new Agreement.  Indeed, estimations by the South 
African government for the period 2002/03 envisaged that the 
Republic: “… will retain about 52 percent of the R21, 358 million 
revenue pool.” (ibid, p627).  This suggests that: “… it would not be 
unrealistic to envisage a scenario that will work against BLNS and 
in favour of South Africa…”  This could come about if trade 
liberalization should lower the customs component of the revenue 
pool, while excise revenue increase and South Africa maintains its 
dominant share of the regional GDP.” (ibid.).  This suggests that 
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the level of integration is important if polarisation effects are to be 
avoided. 
 
The above seems to refute the contention that the development 
component was negotiated to benefit small member states of the 
SACU Agreement.  To be sure: “The official explanation for the 
development component is to give Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland, the member states most dependent on SACU revenue, 
some protection against decline in the real value of the revenue 
pool brought about by bilateral and multilateral trade 
liberalization…” (ibid.).  Implicitly, therefore, the 2002 SACU 
Agreement recognises that historically SACU promoted lopsided 
economic development and integration, but as yet does not seem 
to have measures in place to address this. 
 
The fact that the new agreement attempts to protect small 
members from a declining revenue base, and move towards 
reducing regional inequalities are in line with new approaches to 
regionalism, which posit that development of all members of 
regional groupings is a sine qua non for successful regional 
integration.  In this regard, James Hentz postulates that: 
“Developmental regional economic integration promotes greater 
regional interdependence and argues that for regional economic 
integration to work, it must first and foremost focus on equitable 
regional development.”241 (2003:24).  This could not only lead to 
deeper regionalism, but also to increase regionness242.                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
241
   The drawback of this, however, is that: “… developmental regional economic 
integration is very much a state led process.” (Hentz, 2003:24).  
 
242
   Björn Hettne asserts that: “Changes in terms of regionness thus imply changes of 
the structural position in the centre-periphery order.” (2001b:91). 
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4.2.3 The Economic Developmental Component 
 
 
The concern for a development component243 for SACU, is 
premised on the long-held view by the South African Department 
of Finance that there is a need for: “… a ‘clean formula’, with any 
additional payments destined for the BLNS countries coming from 
the South African budget as regional aid.” (Gibb, 1997:83).  This 
reinforces the goal of developmental regionalism, which is to 
establish a regional fund to redistribute state income for welfare 
purposes.  The creation of welfare in terms of social security and 
regional balance is one of the precepts, which underpin 
developmental regionalism.  In such a way, the goal of 
developmental regional regionalism- to forge viable economies- 
would be considerably enhanced.   
Moreover, South Africa’s contention that: “… an industrial 
development strategy should replace the revenue contributed 
under the enhancement/stabilisation agreements.” (ibid.) is in 
tandem with the logic of developmental regionalism, which posits- 
an industrial plan at regional level in order to ‘space’ 
industrialisation.  More critically, it would strengthen the 
hypothesis that developmental regionalism implies: an economic 
plan to promote sustainable development.      
The 2002 SACU agreement is particularly sensitive to need to 
develop the BLNS countries economically.  To assist in the 
economic development of the BLNS countries, the development of 
common policies is critical.  The development of common policies 
is critical to address, inter alia, the structural and spatial problems 
associated with integration amongst unequal partners, and to 
reduce the acute disparities in and among countries of the region.  
                                      
243
   Anton Fowler notes that: “The development component is more flexible as it 
provides for budgetary support to Member States instead of specific project support 
(limited in scope and coverage). Member States can now utilize their respective share 
of the development component as they deem fit and not have to provide justification 
for every project they embark upon.” (Personal Communication, 6th February, 2006). 
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Article 38 to 41 provide for the development of common policies 
by SACU countries.  The development of especially a common 
industrial policy for SACU was of particular significance in view of 
the fact that: “South Africa’s regional industrial policy has for at 
least the past four decades had a significant influence on the 
industrial development of the BLNS” (Hartzenburg, 2003:183)244.   
 
Development also implies that SACU must aim to eradicate 
economic disparities among Member States.  Anton Fowler points 
out that: “The SACU Agreement does not direct industry relocation 
to specific Member States, nor does it specify that industrial 
activity must be equally spread throughout the Custom Union.” 
What is noteworthy about SACU’s attempts to eradicate economic 
disparities among Member States is that: “The new SACU 
Agreement allows or collective decision-making with respect to the 
setting of tariffs and this will be an important step in the balanced 
development of industrial and other policies and the 
location/establishment of industries in the region.”245  Collective 
decision-making is a critical requirement for the success of 
developmental regionalism in SACU.  Collective decision-making 
find expression in public-private partnerships, which have so far 
contributed to the establishment of various SDIs, will arguably, 
contributed to development of regional infrastructure246.  This in 
                                      
244
   Trudie Hartzenberg argues that: “The development of a common industrial policy 
by SACU countries, may thus avoid some of the initiatives that are overtly biased in 
favour of, for example South Africa’s industrial development. The outcome is 
potentially, more balanced regional industrial development.” (2003:183).   
 
245
  Personal Communication, 6th February, 2006. 
 
246
   Paul Jourdan notes that the SDI programme was launched in South Africa in 1995 
by the government with a view: “… to unlock economic potential and facilitate 
global competitiveness, new investment, access to global capital, infrastructural 
development, and job creation in areas that have unrealized potential due to a range 
of historical and political reasons, primarily apartheid.” (1998:718). The South 
African government, therefore, realised that these initiatives accords it the 
opportunity to address national development needs. This thinking is in line with the 
precepts, which underpin developmental regionalism. Fredrik Söderbaum points out 
that: “To date there exist 11 SDIs in South Africa (of which four involve 
neighbouring countries): The MDC (which also includes Mozambique and ultimately 
Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe); the Lubumbo SDI (Swaziland and 
Mozambique); the coast-to-coast SDI (Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique); the 
Platinum SDI (Botswana); the Phalaborwa SDI; the West Coast Investment Initiative; 
the Fish River SDI; the Wild Coast SDI; the Richard Bay SDI; the Kwazulu-Natal 
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turn, will contribute to the redistribution of economic activity to the 
BLNS countries.  
 
The redistribution of economic activity to the BLNS countries, 
through, say, the improvement of regional infrastructure, is critical 
for the success of new regional initiatives.  Poor infrastructure may 
inhibit intra-regional trade integration.  The development 
component of the new SACU agreement, which favours the 
poorest member states, recognises that regionalism in southern 
Africa, should not only be purely economic, but also a politically 
driven project.  As a politically driven project, regional 
infrastructural development should contribute to the reduction of 
acute disparities in and among countries of the region.  In the 
SACU region, reducing transport dependence through regional 
infrastructural development lend support to the policies of new 
regionalism and its variant developmental regionalism that sets 
out to explicitly address the structural and spatial problems 
associated with integration among unequal partners.       
  
Table 2. The Southern African Customs Union: Population, GDP 
and GDP per capita (2000). 
 
  
Population (million) 
2000 
 
 
GDP (US$ billion) 
 
GDP per capita 
(US$ per 
annum) 
 
Botswana 
 
 
1,6 
 
6,0 
 
3,749 
 
Lesotho 
 
 
2,2 
 
0,7 
 
405 
 
Namibia 
 
 
1,8 
 
3,1 
 
1,706 
 
South Africa 
 
 
43,1 
 
126,2 
 
2,929 
 
Swaziland 
 
 
1,0 
 
1,4 
 
1,515 
                                                                                                         
SDI; and the Gauteng SDI.” (2001:115). These regional initiatives offer southern 
African countries the opportunity to address both national developmental needs and 
respond to an interdependent world in accordance with its peculiarities and problems.         
 172
 
Source: Esterhuysen. P. 1994. South Africa in Sub-Equatorial 
Africa: Economic Interaction. Pretoria: Institute of South Africa. 
 
Financial Mail (London). 21 May 1999. 
 
Indicator South Africa, (2001)18,2:70 
 
 
The process of dismantling apartheid in South Africa in the early 
1990s challenged the edifice of SADC: which was to unify the 
region politically and reduce dependence on the apartheid state.  
The transformation of SADCC into SADC saw the establishment 
of objectives that were to include, amongst others, trade 
integration, human resource development and the social and 
economic improvement of the standards of living for the region’s 
people.  In other words, SADC was to become a vehicle for 
economic development and political co-operation: a multi-purpose 
organisation.     
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4.3 The Southern African Development Community 
(SADC): Breaking with the Past? 
 
 
 
The imperatives for meaningful and deeper regionalism in 
Southern Africa, acquired a new significance after 1990.  Namibia 
acceded to independence in 1990, and moves were underway to 
dismantle apartheid in the dominant regional economy of the 
region, South Africa247.  In tandem with these developments, the 
changes in the global political economy and the perception of 
marginalisation of African countries in global affairs, made the goal 
of closer regional co-operation among countries more urgent.  
Moreover, economic and political liberalisation in the southern 
Africa, brought about by the adoption of SAPs by most states in 
the region, further fuelled the need for regional co-operation at a 
higher level of integration. 
   
To respond to these developments, a policy document submitted 
to a Southern African Development Coordinating Conference 
meeting in January 1992, spelt out proposals for a move-away 
from project co-ordination towards trade integration, proposing: “... 
a reduction of barriers to intra SADCC trade, greater co-ordination 
of external tariffs, freer movement of capital and labour, the 
creation of regional infrastructural authorities and a development 
bank, as well as the rationalisation of efforts to promote integration 
in Southern Africa.” (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1993:35).  Implicitly 
thus, the Development Community was to be a vehicle for more 
than limited economic or political co-ordination or integration, in 
fact, it was to serve as a catalysts for deeper and wide-ranging 
changes in development and economic reforms248.  The ambitious 
treaty that ‘gave birth’ to SADC, encapsulated these objectives.  
These objectives bears testimony to the fact that incrementally 
                                      
247
   For Peter Vale: “The ending of apartheid confirmed the region’s geopolitical 
structure- a structure that relied on a hierarchical framing to give it form and, indeed, 
purpose.” (2003:115). 
 
248
  Despite the ambitions that underpin SADC, Peter Vale maintains that: “…SADC 
is the formalization of the region’s hierarchical structure, a form of multilateralism 
constructed around South Africa’s power, which is underwritten by the United States 
and the European Union…” (ibid, p132).   
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heightened levels of integration was aimed at.  This signified a 
break from past attempts at integration. 
 
SADC achieved notable successes, specifically in the fields of 
infrastructural development and forging a sense of regional 
belonging, albeit primarily among regional elites.   By the late 
1990s, however, SADC acknowledged that it was hampered by 
severe constraints and difficulties.  These constraints and 
difficulties were identified as the following: 
 
1) The SADC Secretariat in Gabarone lacked the power, 
authority and resources required to facilitate regional 
integration; 
 
2) The sector co-ordinating units in the member states were 
highly uneven in their ability to pursue and implement policies; 
 
3) SADC’c Programme of Action lacked a clear regional focus, it 
covered too many areas, and the majority of projects were 
mainly national; 
 
4) Limited capacity to mobilize the region’s own resources, 
including the private sector, for the implementation of the 
Programme of Action and an over-dependence on external 
financial resources; and 
 
5) Growing political divisions within SADC and a failure to 
address governance, peace and security issues.” (SADC, 
2000:7). 
 
    
However, the transformation of SADC in 1992 into a development 
community was incomplete since the institutional structure of the 
organisation was not revamp to accommodate the organisation’s 
new agenda (Lee, 2003)249.  The development community of 1992 
experienced the following institutional difficulties: 
 
                                      
249
   At formation SADC had only two regional development institutions- the Southern 
African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) and the Southern 
African Centre for Co-operation in Agricultural Research.  
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o “Lack of appropriate and effective regional institutions and 
management systems to spearhead the integration agenda; 
 
o The need for mechanisms capable of achieving the high level 
of political commitment necessary to shape the scope and 
scale of the process of integration.  That implied strengthening 
the powers and capacity of regional-decision-making, co-
ordinating and executing bodies; 
 
o Lack of synergy between the objectives and strategies of the 
Treaty on the one hand and the existing SADC Programme of 
Action (SPA) and the institutional framework on the other; 
 
o Limited capacity to mobilize significant levels of the region’s 
own resources for the implementation of its Programme; 
 
o The relevance, management limitations and external financial 
overdependence of the SPA.” (SADC, 2000:3). 
 
 
In addition to the institutional deficiencies, SADC also relied to 
heavily on donor funding.  A Review and Rationalisation of the 
SADC Programme of Action revealed that SADC remained 
dependent on donor funding.  Elling Tjønneland illustrates this by 
pointing out that: “SADC itself estimates that approximately 80% of 
SADC’s project portfolio in the year 2000 came from foreign 
sources.” (2004:15).  The review concluded that SADC’s 
dependence on donor funding meant that the implementation of 
the organisations objectives were largely determined by donors, 
rather than SADC’s own priorities.  This phenomenon reinforces 
the dependency syndrome, and often means that national 
priorities take preference over regional ones.  What was needed 
was to reduce such funding and replace it with regional resources 
(SADC, 1997).  What the review also revealed was that SADC 
needed to overcome both the above institutional deficiencies and 
its dependence of aid. 
 
To achieve the above, SADC as an institution at the end of the 
1990s needed to: heightened the levels of integration; strengthen 
its institutional capacity; attract more foreign direct investment; and 
involve non-state actors in the integration process.  In other words, 
what was needed was a new and multidimensional approach to 
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regionalism involving, states, markets and societal actors.  Such a 
multidimensional approach to regionalism would necessarily 
cover; inter alia, cultural, economic, political and security aspects.  
In simple terms what was needed was a new and normative 
approach to regionalism, which allows southern African states the 
opportunity to respond to an interdependent world in accordance 
with its own peculiarities and problems.  
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4.3.1 Heighten levels of integration 
 
 
 
The Southern African Development Conference was founded in 
August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia.  Article 5 of the SADC Treaty 
enshrined the following objectives.  These objectives shall be to:  
a. ”Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, 
enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of 
Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through 
regional integration; 
b. Evolve common political values, systems and institutions; 
c. Promote and defend peace and security; 
d. Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective 
self- reliance, and the interdependence of member states; 
e. Achieve complementarity between national and regional 
strategies and programmes; 
f.  Promote and maximise productive employment and the 
utilisation of resources of the region; 
g. Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective 
protection of the environment; 
h. Strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social 
and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the 
region.“ (SADC, 1992a). 
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The above objectives posit that regionalism and regionalisation250 
are comprehensive and multidimensional processes: “… which 
implies increased regional cooperation, integration and 
complementarity with respect to a number of dimensions such as 
culture, politics, security, economics and diplomacy.” (Schulz et al, 
2001:14).  Thus at the outset, the objectives of SADC indicate that 
is were to be a vehicle for achieving wide-ranging economic, 
political and developmental objectives.  The fact that these 
objectives seek to move beyond a concern with trade integration 
and were geared towards building co-operation that fosters equal 
partners involving non-state actors- a political objective- reinforces 
that that: “… new regionalism validates political interaction as 
coequal with economic exchange relations in building regional 
cooperation.” (Thompson, 2000: 44).   New regionalism as a 
process demands that the search for economic solutions proceed 
in tandem with the goal of achieving political objectives.        
The central objective of SADC is said to aim at intensifying 
co-operation among Southern Africa countries251. With the view to 
integration, the following objectives were formulated: 
• “Deeper economic co-operation and integration, on the basis 
of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross 
border investment and trade, and freer movement of factors of 
production, goods and services across national borders; 
• Common economic, political, social values and systems, 
enhancing enterprise competitiveness, democracy and good 
governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of 
human rights, popular participation and the alleviation of 
poverty; 
                                      
250
   Helge Hveem points out that: “Regionalisation implies a dynamic element, the 
pursuit of regionalisation, creating a regional system or network in a specific 
geographical area or regional social space, either issue-specific or more general in 
scope.” (2000:73). 
   
251
   The retention of sectoral responsibilities at SADC’s formation- despite its limited 
impact on promoting deeper co-operation and integration- made the goal of 
intensifying co-operation among Southern African countries, untenable. 
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• Strengthen regional solidarity peace and security in order for 
the people of the region to live and work together in peace 
and harmony.” (Mandaza and Tostensen; 1994: viii)252. 
These objectives are developmental in nature, since it promotes 
self-reliance by postulating that: “… a strategy of ‘development 
from within’ may yet be a feasible development strategy at 
regional level, for instance in the form of coordination of 
production, improvement of infrastructure, and exploitation of 
various economic complementarities.” (Hettne, 2001:104).  This is 
in line with a political economy approach to regionalism posited by 
developmental regionalism, which seeks to increase the efficiency 
of the total regional economy, through, amongst others, regional 
industrial development.  To achieve the above meant using criteria 
such as common political values as opposed to political solidarity.   
Unlike with SADCC, the criteria for admission as a new member 
are no longer based political solidarity.  Indeed, SADC now insists 
that for admission as a new member, the applicant must, inter alia, 
fulfil the following criteria: 
(1) Geographical proximity to the SADC region; 
(2) Commonality of political, economic, social and cultural 
systems with the systems of the SADC region; 
(3) Feasibility of cost-effective and efficient co-ordination of 
economic, social and cultural activities under the SADC 
framework of co-operation; 
                                      
252
  These above set-out objectives were to be achieved through a strategy of 
development integration.  Østergaard (1993) posits that two features of development 
integration are conspicuous.  Firstly, the integration community needs to consciously 
intervene in the process, with a view to promote co-operation and interdependence.  
Secondly, there needs to be an equal distribution of the benefits among the members.    
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(4) Absence of a record of engagement in subversive and 
destabilisation activities, and territorial ambitions against any 
SADC, or any of its member states [sic]; 
(5) Must be a democracy, observing the principles of human 
rights and the rule of law; 
(6) Must share SADC’s ideals and aspirations. (Gibb and 
Sidaway; 1998:170). 
The most notable difference between SADCC and SADC, relates 
to the development strategy that the latter pursues.  The former 
body viewed the market integration253 approach as best for the 
region.  The development integration254 approach that SADC 
pursues is geared towards compensating for the shortcomings of 
the market integration approach (Østergaard, 1993)255.  Indeed, 
“Development integration stresses the need for both macro and 
micro co-ordination in a multi-sectoral programme embracing 
production, infrastructure and trade.  Close political co-operation at 
an early stage of the integration process… and… the need for an 
equitable balance of the benefits of integration… are also 
important for this approach.” (Davies, 1996a:29).  More revealing, 
SADC will provide tax and other incentives to businesses that 
invest in poorer member countries.  Poorer member countries 
stand to benefit from investments in infrastructure, production and 
trade.  More critically, such investments will considerably 
contribute to the structural transformation of these countries.   This 
                                      
253
  This approach is based on the integration experience of industrialised states. It 
involves the lowering and removal of barriers to trade between states in a region in 
order to increase trade between them. This increased trade is seen as the engine of 
development and growth.  
 
254
  This approach suggests that industrialisation must be advanced before market 
integration can be considered.  In other words, the goods must first be produced 
before they can be traded.  The developmental integration approach therefore 
involves a multi-sector programme in production, infrastructure and trade (Davies, 
1994; ADB, 1993).     
  
255
    André du Pisani notes is that: “In adopting a development integration approach 
each member is allowed, at least in theory, to define the pace, scope and sectors of 
integration.” (2001:207).    
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suggests that in SADC, there is the realisation that regional 
integration encompasses more than trade integration: it is a 
comprehensive and multifaceted process involving many actors 
and issues.  To address concerns other than trade, SADC 
embarked on a development integration strategy.  
 
4.3.1.1 SADC and Development Integration 
 
 
 
The genesis of regional integration pursued by SADC/C in the 
1980s and 1990s was still premised on development integration, 
which as Corina van Rooyen reminds us required: “… a higher 
degree of state intervention…” (1998:129).  For Jens Haarlov, the 
development integration approach: “… is born out of the problems 
and dysfunction of the pure market integration approach… the 
market approach’s static character, its sole focus on how trade 
creation and trade diversion will influence welfare, and its 
tendency to widen economic differences between lesser and more 
developed areas, when market forces are left to function on their 
own.  The development integration approach’s answer to this is to 
change the agenda in three areas: 1. The objectives of the 
integration process; 2. The timing and level of interstate binding 
commitments; and 3. The distribution of costs and benefits of 
cooperation.” (1997:30).       
 
André du Pisani charges that by: “… adopting a development 
integration approach each member is allowed, at least in theory, to 
define the pace, scope and sectors of integration.” (2001:207).  
The drawback of this approach was that: “There was no follow-
through in translating regional commitments into national actions.” 
(Mistry, 2000:558).  By allowing member states to determine their 
‘own schedule’, the issue of sovereignty is simultaneously 
addressed256.  Reflecting on the issue of sovereignty in the African 
                                      
256
   Paul Bischoff notes that: “The desire and enthusiasm for regional integration as a 
way to deal with Africa’s many development problems is tempered by the fear that 
national leaders have about the possible loss of sovereignty by their respective states. 
Sovereignty, of course, is the one precious strategic and political asset political elites 
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context, Christopher Clapham postulates that: “… the defence of 
statehood normally provides an essential element in personal 
survival strategies…” (1996:5).  The development integration 
approach pursued by southern African countries in the 1980s and 
1990s, offered the best possibility to address both pressing 
economic issues, such as a compensatory mechanism, and 
issues of a political nature such as sovereignty (Østergaard, 
1993).         
 
Development integration257, by focussing: “… on how to stimulate 
the creation of productive capacity… was geared towards … 
fostering structural transformation of the economies.” (Østergaard, 
1993:34).  The objective of integration becomes economic and 
social development (Haarlov, 1997).  The strategy of development 
integration adopted by SADC in 1992 saw southern Africa began 
with a multifaceted to regionalism, both economic and political.  
Successful economic structural transformation and social 
development in southern Africa requires state intervention in the 
economy.  
 
Carol Thompson posits that: “… for a region like Southern Africa, 
with its persistent and profound poverty, the state can put back on 
the agenda questions of income disparity and redistribution.”258 
(2000:45).  The success of economic structural transformation and 
social development also requires active participation from private 
                                                                                                         
have to hold on to.” (2004:2).   
 
257
   James Mittelman links development integration with new regionalism through his 
concept of transformative regionalism. To him, transformative regionalism connects 
development integration with regionalism from below. The essence of transformative 
regionalism, Mittelman, contends, rests with: “… calls for political cooperation at the 
beginning; equity and balance among member states (e.g. redistribution and regional 
industrial planning as a conduit for regional trade) an active state (e.g. promoting 
exchange, building infrastructure); and regionalism that begins from bottom and 
flows upwards. Such regionalism is linked to cultural identities that are new (e.g. 
environmentalists, women’s movements, pro-democracy forces. The strength of 
transformative regionalism will rest on strong links with civil society.” (1999:48).    
  
258
   Carol Thompson asserts that: “Theories of new regionalism conceptualise the 
state as an actor in shaping regional relations and in responding to global exigencies. 
New regionalism theories are also ‘bringing the state back in’ by reminding us of 
aspects of the historical role of the state, such as reconciling market dysfunctions.” 
(2000:45). This suggests that the developmental function of the state remains crucial 
to the success of regional integration efforts.    
 183
economic actors of civil society.  This approach to regionalism is in 
tandem with practice of new regionalism, which posits a multi-
faceted approach to regionalism.  New approaches to the study of 
regionalism recognises that deeper regional integration and an 
increase sense of regionness, only comes about through the 
practice of regionalism on a variety of levels. 
 
Development integration, Corina van Rooyen postulates, demands 
that: “Economic structural transformation must thus take place, 
with diversification away from only commodity exports.”  More 
significantly, this strategy recognised that: “If trade liberalization is 
to take place, it should be complemented by the coordination of 
regional industrial development, the establishment of a regional 
fund or bank, a degree of coordination of macro-economic policies 
and giving preference to less-developed members in terms of 
access to regional markets and facilities.” (1998:129).  This 
multifaceted approach to integration is in line with new approaches 
to regionalism, which posits that integration should take place at 
various analytical levels.  As yet, these issues have not been 
sufficiently addressed by the organisation.     
 
James Mittelman notes that in the case of southern Africa: “The 
development integration model was introduced as an alternative to 
a one-sided emphasis on efficiency maximization of existing 
capacity, not surprisingly, in the context of a low level of 
productive capacity.  This approach stresses the need for close 
political cooperation at the outset of the integration process.  Not 
only does it assign priority to coordinating production and 
improving infrastructure, but also calls for a higher degree of state 
intervention than does the market model and for redistributive 
measures such as transfer taxes or compensatory schemes 
administered by regional funds or specialised banks259 (1996:195).  
                                      
259
  Robert Davies argues that development integration as a regionalist project 
promotes:  
 
1. “efforts to co-ordinate regional industrial development; 
2. the establishment of regional funds or banks giving special priority to the least 
developed members; 
3. measures to give less developed members greater preferences in access to 
regional markets; and 
4. some co-ordination of macro-economic policies at a relatively early stage.” 
(1996:3-4).  
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This suggests in theory at least, a new and multifaceted approach 
to regionalism. 
 
Trade integration is to be accompanied by attempts to promote 
coordinated regional industrial development.  A counterweight to 
economic liberalism, it seeks to redress external dependence, 
especially through the regulation of foreign investment.  Hence, 
development integration is a multilevel approach engulfing 
production, infrastructure, finance, and trade.” (1996:195).  By 
adopting a developmental approach to regionalism, SADC 
rejected integration by stages- advocated by theories of 
integration such as neo-functionalism and transactionalism- and 
set priorities important to the region.  New regionalism as a theory 
is a product of a spontaneous process from within the region 
driven by constituent states that are the main proponents for 
regional integration. 
 
The strategy of development integration is so far failing in SADC, 
because the organisation did not provide for effective and efficient 
regional development institutions.  To the contrary, SADC has 
argued that: “… market forces should be allowed to play a greater 
role in regulating investment flows with minimum government 
controls.” (1992:26).  This presupposes that private economic 
actors were to play a central role in regional integration, at the 
expense of the state.  The comprehensive objectives that SADC 
adopted in 1992 and the development integration strategy it chose 
in pursuance of these objectives, required strong state intervention 
(Tsie, 1996)260.  To achieve the objectives of co-ordinated 
development and integration of infrastructure, investment and 
production, requires, arguably, strong state intervention in regional 
affairs.   The fact that a number of regional states adopted SAPs 
meant that they played a minimal role in economic restructuring.  
New regionalism as a process sees the state and market forces as 
mutually enabling each other in the process of building regional 
capacity.  The formation of public-private partnerships, which saw 
                                      
260
   Balefi Tsie succinctly argues that: “The most promising route towards achieving 
these objectives is not to ‘roll back’ the state by to re-design it so that it becomes part 
of the solution of the problems of underdevelopment and uneven development in the 
region.” (1996:95).  What was needed at the formation of SADC was to nurture 
developmental states in the region, which would have been able to intervene 
effectively in the regional integration process for purpose of promoting balanced and 
equitably regional development.   
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the development of various spatial development initiatives in 
southern Africa, are examples of state-market complementarity.      
 
The development integration model in the context of SADC was 
not very successful in Southern Africa.  James Mittleman notes 
that: “In practice, the development integration model has fallen 
short of the professed aims of its architects in Southern Africa.  In 
SADCC’s first decade, its professional staff and representatives of 
member states infrequently consulted the private sector and failed 
to involve capital in planning regional industrial development.” 
(1999:33). The continuity between SADCC and SADC is evident in 
that SADC, like its progenitor, embraced trade integration, but was 
not promote co-ordinated regional industrial development at its 
initial phases, ostensibly because of donor priorities and project 
priorities which focussed on infrastructural development.   
 
Furthermore, development integration in the SADC context also 
failed because it has been: “…weakly embraced by social forces 
in the subcontinent, and the institutionalisation of the neoliberal 
concept, ascendant in the post-Cold War world. (ibid, p196).  New 
regionalism as both a field of study and a process ignores the 
distinction between state and non-state actors associated with 
conventional regional integration theories, and recognise that 
formal and informal aspects of regionalisation are often 
intertwined.                
         
For new approaches to regionalism to succeed, there is a need to 
realise that trade integration should be accompanied by the 
building of local economic capacity amongst the citizens of the 
region.  A new theoretical approach to regionalism should 
recognise that the multidimensionality of contemporary 
regionalism warrants a new type of analysis, which transcends the 
development integration approach to regionalism.  Heightened 
levels of integration presuppose that the processes of formal and 
informal regionalism, collectively contribute to increase regionness 
and deeper regionalisation.               
 
The above suggests that there needs to be a realisation that the 
removal of barriers to trade (trade liberalisation) is not the 
panacea to deeper regional economic integration.  The increased 
involvement of South African business activities in the region, 
which resulted from trade liberalisation, seems only to augment 
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and intensify economic imbalances in SADC.  By exacerbating 
existing inequalities, these activities undermine efforts directed at 
the goal of developmental regionalism, premised on the principles 
of balance, equity, and mutual benefit in regional relations 
enshrined in the SADC Treaty.  What is needed is a 
transformative process, which embraces both states and markets 
that will aid the process of industrialisation, which in turn will 
reflect the urge by SADC for heightened levels of integration.   
 
In 1997 A Review and Rationalisation Study was carried out by 
consultants on behalf of SADC.  This study proposed that SADC 
began a process of restructuring, which were aimed at promoting 
deeper regional co-operation and integration.  Gina van 
Schalkwyk asserts that SADC: “… embarked on an ambitious 
internal restructuring exercise to improve its efficiency and tackle 
difficult questions of how to accelerate socioeconomic 
development and achieve meaningful, equitable regional 
integration.” (2003:187).  This restructuring of the organisation is 
also in conformity with new approaches to regionalism, which 
posits that approaches to regionalism should emerge as a result of 
a region’s own peculiarities and problems. 
 
The study proposed that the sectoral co-ordinating units be 
phased out and replaced by the following directorates: 
 
1. Social and Human Development and Special Programmes 
(SHD&SP)261; 
 
2. Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR)262; 
 
3. Infrastructure and Services (I&S)263; 
 
4. Trade, industry, investment and finance264; and 
                                      
261
  This Directorate was launched in December, 2002. (Personal Communication, 
Willem Goeiemann, 9th February, 2006). 
 
262
 This Directorate was launched in December, 2002. (Personal Communication, 
Willem Goeiemann, 9th February, 2006). 
 
263
  This Directorate was launched in December, 2002. (Personal Communication, 
Willem Goeiemann, 9th February, 2006). 
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5. Politics, Defence and Security Directorate265. 
 
The process of restructuring SADC conforms to the new 
regionalist approach, which focus on processes of regionalisation 
in various fields of activity and at various levels. The institutional 
restructuring of SADC was also geared towards moving the 
organisation from and inter-state entity to a supranational 
institution. 
 
SADC’s restructuring also involved the operationalisation and 
harmonisation of policies.  This is to be done through the Regional 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP).  Jan Isaksen 
points out that the RISDP will focus on three kinds of objectives: 
“… the social goals; the economic objectives which would focus 
on the development of measures to alleviate poverty, including 
industrial development, trade, macroeconomic policies, investment 
and infrastructure, and the political priorities which would include 
democratic governance and mechanisms for conflict prevention, 
management and resolution.” (2003:205).  These objectives point 
to the multi-faceted approach that the restructuring of SADC will 
encompass, which is in line with the precepts that underpin new 
approaches to regionalism, which calls for deeper integration.               
   
 
                                                                                                         
264
  This Directorate was launched in August, 2001. (Personal Communication, 
Willem Goeiemann, 9th February, 2006). 
 
265
  This Directorate was launched in August, 2005. (Personal Communication, 
Willem Goeiemann, 9th February, 2006). 
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4.3.2 Potential to strengthen its structure (reform 
proposal) 
 
 
 
Arguably one of the primary reasons why SADCC had limited 
success in promoting deeper co-operation and integration relates 
to its institutional capacity.  Ibbo Mandaza and Arne Tostensen 
point out that because SADCC was primarily established to co-
ordinate inter-state projects in a decentralised manner, it 
experienced a serious problem: “… the decentralised structure 
had no clear line of authority and accountability in the 
implementation of regional programmes.” (1994:109).  What 
needed for SADC in 1992, was to strengthen the institutional 
capacity of the organisation.     
SADC’s founding Treaty recognised the need for adequate 
institutional capacity in the form of effective and efficient regional 
development institutions.  This position was reinforced by the 1994 
Annual Consultative Conference document.  The 1994 Conference 
posited that a prerequisite for building a community was: “… to 
promote the establishment of strong and viable regional and self-
sustaining institutions, with greater capacity to take decisions on 
behalf of the Community and remain immune from influence of any 
one member State.” (SADC, 1994:17).  Towards this end, Article 9 
of the Treaty lists the SADC institutions as the following: 
(a) The Summit of Heads of State or Government; 
(b) The Council of Ministers; 
(c) The Commissions; 
(d) The Standing Committee of Officials; 
(e) The Secretariat; 
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(f) Sectoral Coordination Units (SCUs); 
(g) The Tribunal.  
SADC thus, unlike its predecessor, has legal personality at the 
time of its formation, and can therefore enforce sanctions against 
member states, which fail to fulfil their obligations266.  Because of 
its legal personality, SADC’s institutions could potentially have had 
greater political significance.  The formal establishment of SADC 
and its embodiment in a treaty are represented in the text of the 
Treaty itself symbolises its commitment to heightened levels of 
integration.  However, it is disturbing that: “The legal structure of 
SADC does not compel members to enact the necessary 
legislation at a national level to enable SADC to implement 
interstate projects.” (Tsie, 1996:85).   
As such, the implementation of decisions made by the body 
cannot be guaranteed.  The recent reforms adopted by the 
organisation seek to reverse this situation.  Andrew Ndishishi 
points out that national laws would have to conform to regional 
expectation.  He cited the rules of origin requirement.  SADC as a 
body agreed that the rules of origin should reflect a 35 per cent 
local content requirement.  All SADC governments have agreed to 
this and therefore it is reflected in all national laws267.  However, 
not all has changed for the better in SADC.    
SADC’s decision-making structure retained the continuity with the 
past.  Decisions, as in the case of SADCC, are based on 
consensus, and shall be the preserve of the Summit, states article 
10 of the SADC Treaty.  Whilst developmental regionalism 
demands the joint management and judicious exploitation of 
common natural resource, that implies consensus in the realm of 
decision-making, the ratification of the SADC Free Trade Area, 
serves as a negative reminder of SADC’s past.  Hitherto, only 10 
                                      
266
   Balefi Tsie notes that: “The legal structure of SADC does not compel members to 
enact the necessary legislation at a national level to enable SADC to implement 
interstate projects… consequently the… implementation of SADC decisions may not 
be guaranteed.” (1996:85). 
     
267
   Personal Communication, Mr. Ndishishi, 6th June 2001. 6/06/2001. 
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members have ratified the treaty.  This obviously stifles the 
progress of the Development Community.   
SADCC in contrast, had no treaty, no central authority and not 
even a mechanism that ensured that decisions were implemented.  
By and large, this limitation of SADCC ensured that its strategy of 
co-ordinating inter-state projects in a decentralised manner had no 
clear line of authority, or accountability in the implementation of 
regional programmes (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994).  
Surprisingly this failed strategy remained part of SADC at its 
formation.  This meant that the SADC remained primarily an inter-
state body.  The consequences were that this undermined the 
Secretariat and moves towards supranationalism. 
In March 2001, an extraordinary SADC Summit approved far-
reaching changes to the SADC institutional framework.  Most of 
the institutional reforms revolve around the changing role and 
functions of the Secretariat.  Jan Isaksen and Elling Tjønneland 
assert that with regards to the Secretariat: “… the reforms intend 
to give it the power and authority to shape the form and content of 
the regional programme and be more effective in implementing it.  
The institutional reforms are also intended to ensure a more cost 
efficient and cheaper regional organisation.” (2001:10).     SADC 
also seek to strengthen the Secretariat (see figure 1) that the level 
of competence throughout the region is harmonised.   
 
To achieve the above objectives, The SADC Secretariat shall, 
inter alia: 
 
 “Be responsible for strategic planning and management; 
 
 implement decisions of the governing structures, including the 
Organ; 
 
 co-ordinate and harmonise policies and strategies of member 
states; 
 
 monitor and evaluate the implantation of regional policies and 
programmes; 
 
 ensure gender mainstreaming in all programmes and projects; 
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 mobilise resources and co-ordinate programmes and projects 
with donors and co-operating partners; and  
 
 do research on community building and the integration 
process.” (Isaksen and Tjønneland, 2001:10). 
 
 
Figure 1: The structure of the new SADC Secretariat 
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The above reforms reflect the need to strengthen the capacity of 
the Secretariat, which will assist it in performing its regional 
developmental function268.  The reform of the Secretariat will also 
assist the organisation in moving from an inter-state organisation, 
to a body embracing supranationalism.  This would entail, for 
instance, that at a national level directors are chosen throughout 
the region to run the projects of the organisation.  This is contrary 
to past experiences when even junior officials ran the programs of 
the organisation.  This proposed strengthening of the SADC 
structures bears testimony that the decentralisation system was 
not effective.  Consequently, SADC/C was poorly co-ordinated, 
had poor communication structures and subsequently poor 
performance.   
 
SADC, like its predecessor, allocated sectoral co-ordinating units 
according to countries’ national interests and competencies269.  
This continuity, Jan Isaksen argues, was prompted by the 
contention that: “… the SCUs created a SADC presence in 
member countries.”270 (2003:202). In 1997, the sectoral co-
ordinating units were revised271.  The revision of these sectoral co-
ordinating units stemmed from the fact that the: “… the SCU-
model was based on the perceived need to focus energies and to 
                                      
268
 Willem Goeiemann points out that: “The capacity at the SADC Secretariat is being 
strengthened, both financially and with the appropriate staff. We are still in the 
process of recruiting permanent staff. The process will be completed by the end of the 
year. In the meantime we are making use of staff seconded from member states, as 
well as technical advisors funded by donors (Personal Communication, 9th February, 
2006). 
     
269
   Gina van Schalwyk, writing about the sectoral co-ordinating units notes that: “By 
1990 a moratorium was placed on the creation of new sectors… The moratorium was 
temporarily lifted when South Africa and Mauritius joined in 1994 and 1995, 
respectively.” (2003:188-89).    
 
270
  SADC at formation retained the sectoral co-ordinating units because: “… the 
political aim of strengthening commitment towards the body by creating a feeling of 
ownership of SADC and its programme of action in member states.” (van Schalkwyk, 
2003:189).   
 
271
   Magaret Lee argues that: “Although SADC documents indicate that the sectoral 
approach is being replaced by the directorates, in reality it appears that the sectoral 
approach is merely being reformed, with activities centralised under the SADC 
Secretariat.” (2003:55). 
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increase coordination across sectors.”272 (ibid.).   Attempts to co-
ordinate regional co-operation and integration, is in line with new 
approaches to development, which sees co-ordination and policy 
convergence as essential to increase regionness and 
interdependence. 
Five clusters, instead of the current 21 sectors that were spread 
throughout the 14 member states, were approved (see appendix 
4) these are trade: industry, finance and investment; infrastructure 
and services; food, agriculture and natural resources; social and 
human development and special programmes (see addendum 4) 
Directorates corresponding to the core clusters have been 
established at the SADC secretariat in Gabarone (see appendix 
4).  The directorate on Trade, Industry, Finance, Investment and 
Mining, was launched in March 2001.  By September 2002, three 
of the four Directorates have been established.   
 
The Infrastructure and Services Directorate was to be launched in 
December 2002.  It replaced the sectoral co-ordinating units on 
trade and industry (Tanzania), finance and investment (South 
Africa), and mining (Zambia).  The transformation of sectoral co-
ordinating units into directorates has had some problems.  In some 
instances, SADC experienced practical problems with the 
redeployment of SCUs to the headquarters, for instance, in marine 
fisheries. Jan Isaksen notes that: “Namibia, which has co-
ordinated this sector, has noted that wholesale closure of a Marine 
Fisheries Unit would leave out important operational aspects.” 
(2002:11).   
 
National committees in member states would provide input into the 
directorates.    Willem Goeiemann points out that: “The SADC 
National Committees were established and launched in all the 14 
member states of SADC, since 2001 and the process have now 
been completed. The purpose of the SNCs is to ensure that 
national interest and the regional institutions take on board 
concerns. They are supposed to meet before the main organs of 
SADC meet to deliberate and scrutinize the various Agendas. 
                                      
272
 Gina van Schalwyk maintains that: “… until 1995… of the 470 projects under the 
SCUs, only 22% by number and 12% by value were truly regional in character.” 
(ibid.).  
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Before the Directorates meet, the Agenda and Documents are 
sent to the SNCs for discussion and inputs.”273  A committee of 
ministers would oversee them, with powers to implement projects 
without reference to the full Council of Ministers (The Namibian, 5 
December, 2000)274.  Yet, the consensus model of deliberations is 
still followed by SADC, ensuring that it remains a traditional inter-
governmental organisation, as opposed to a supranational entity.  
In this trajectory, the SADC Secretariat has little autonomy as a 
policy body.  
  
This contradicts Andrew Ndshishi views that the reform of SADC is 
geared towards strengthening the Secretariat in the execution of 
their duties, and to use SADC: “… as a pillar towards building the 
African Union.”275.  With a view to strengthen pillar towards 
building the African Union, SADC has signed protocols with 
African regional organisation such as ECOWAS and COMESA.  
The intention of these protocols is to exchange information on 
intra-block building and co-operation (Daily News, 3 March 1998).    
SADC also engages actors beyond the continent in its strive to 
achieve the twin processes of developmental integration and the 
attraction of foreign direct investment.  A director, selected on 
merit by all member countries, will run each cluster identified 
above.  Ndshishi acknowledges that this turn of events represent a 
‘turn around’ from previous selection process that was based on 
political connections.   
 
By and large, however, there are overlaps between SADCC and 
SADC.  However, what makes SADC the ideal vehicle to drive 
forward a process of developmental regionalism relates to its 
policies, new structures and activities resulting from it.  Indeed, 
SADC is evolving into a site of trans-regional governance276. 
These include, inter alia, the 1992 Treaty, which provides both the 
                                      
273
 Personal Communication, Willem Goeiemann, 9th February, 2006. 
    
274
   Indeed, as Andrew Ndshishi points out, these programmes will run for 5 years and 
will only be reviewed every third year. Personal Communication, Mr. Andrew 
Ndshishi, 6th June 2001.  
   
275
  Personal Communication, Mr. Andrew Ndshishi, 6th June 2001. 
 
276
   Trans-regional is here defined as interaction across national boundaries, by 
ostensibly state-actors. 
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legal and normative framework of the institution.  Hitherto, SADC 
has institutionalised mechanisms for disaster management and 
preparedness such as the Early Warning Systems on agriculture, 
drought and food security277.  In addition, several Protocols 
including those on shared watercourse systems, education and 
training, and mining, several Draft Protocols including those in the 
area of trade278 and combating illicit cross-border drug trafficking; 
and inter-governmental Memorandum of Understanding 
establishing SAPP, which is to guide the development and 
operation of a region-wide energy grid, has been institutionalised. 
 
Furthermore, SADC has established a Charter for the Regional 
Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa; and a Declaration by the 
Heads of State and Government on Gender and Development.  
Other Protocols, notably on the contentious issue of ‘the free 
movement of persons’ in SADC, are planned279.  The latter 
protocol will be of special importance to the programme of 
developmental regionalism we are investigating here, for it will 
impact more deeply on state sovereignty and the human rights of 
migrants.  It will also provide for a normative framework in respect 
of the rights of citizens and migrants and the obligations of 
member states in respect of those rights. 
 
The July 1996 establishment of the SADC Parliamentary Forum in 
Windhoek provides yet another important indicator why SADC is a 
potential vehicle for developmental regionalism.  This forum, which 
comprises three parliamentarians from each of the thirteen SADC 
members, has both normative and developmental objectives.  The 
former include the promotion and consolidation of parliamentary 
democracy, through electoral observation, as well as safeguarding 
human and people’s rights.  The latter include, inter alia, 
                                      
277
   Significant about the establishment of these institutions is that: “In the midst of 
natural disasters, institutional arrangements have emerged that leave the divisive 
nature of state sovereignty at the margin, demanding instead its shared form in the 
hands of sub-regional structures.” (Ngoma, 2003:20). 
 
278
   SADC member states are meant to establish a free trade area by 2008. SADC’s 
Amendment Protocol on Trade, which came into force on 7 August 2000, seeks to 
create a customs union by 2012.   
 
279
  This protocol, which sought “… to enable citizens to seek to cooperate across 
national boundaries…” (SADC, 1996b), is yet to be signed.  
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promoting linkages between democracy and human development 
in SADC, working in support of regional co-operation and 
integration and harmonizing legislation in crucial areas such as 
cross-border movement, passport and border control, trade, crime 
prevention, import/export regulations and investment (SADC, 
1996a)280.   
 
The SADC Electoral Commission Forum, established in 1997, 
involves itself in norm and policy setting with a view towards 
making elections more transparent and free.  The Commission 
observes, rather than ‘monitors’, elections in SADC countries.  The 
expressed purpose of such observation is to ensure the overall 
integrity and fairness of the process.  The Forum has also been 
instrumental in adopting and refining electoral norms in SADC.  
The Forum through its work provides the impulses upon which a 
region-wide public debate about the direction of SADC should be 
based.     
 
Finally, SADC has also signed a Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation, in Blantyre, Malawi, on 14 August 2001281.  
The significance of this Protocol is that in addition to state security, 
it also covers critical elements of human security.  More 
specifically, protocols that focuses directly on human security are: 
“…illicit drug trafficking; the control on fire arms, ammunition and 
other related materials; mutual legal assistance in criminal 
matters; shared watercourse systems; tribunals; and politics, 
defence and security co-operation.” (Ngoma, 2003:22).  The 
attraction of foreign investment is of particular importance to the 
process of deepening integration in SADC.           
 
The stated objective of attracting foreign investment as opposed to 
relying on donor funding, also signified a break with the past.  
 
 
                                      
280
   For Naison Ngoma, the establishment of this Forum suggests: “… a move away 
from state sovereignty to sub-regional sovereignty; thereby showing that socio-
political and security issues are better established in a collaborative arrangement.” 
(2003:20).  This also indicates movement towards higher levels of regionness. 
  
281
   As yet, this protocol has not entered into force. 
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4.3.3 Attracting foreign direct investment rather than 
donor aid 
 
 
 
One of the principles of the 1992 treaty was the undertaking by 
SADC governments to work together more closely in order to 
mobilise investment capital.  The SADC Protocol on Trade, which 
states that the implementation of the protocol should, reinforced 
this objective: “… contribute towards the improvement of the 
climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign investment.” 
(SADC, 1996:)282.  Towards this end, most SADC countries have 
been easing barriers for investors in the SADC region.  To 
illustrate, South Africa has signed 43 bilateral investment treaties, 
Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe have signed 28, 18 and 11 
respectively (UNCTAD, 1999)283.     
 
In addition, most of the SADC countries are today members of 
international institutions and have ratified agreements that regulate 
FDI.  All SADC countries are members of MIGA, a World Bank 
institution between 1988 and 1994 (UNCTAD, 1999).  For John 
Dahl: “The ratification of multilateral agreements must be… 
understood in the context of the implementation of an economic 
policy geared to the convergence of economic integration, not only 
within Southern Africa, but more notably, into the world economy.” 
(2002:63).  To deepen developmental regionalism in southern 
African, would require the convergence of policies in the region.  
More importantly, it requires that SADC itself take steps to ensure 
that member states contribute to the financial soundness of the 
organisation.   
 
                                      
282
   This was re-affirmed by Mr. Michael McDonald who points out that for SADC to 
attract FDI, it needs to have sound financial institutions (Personal Communication, 11 
October 2002). 
 
283
   Bilateral investment treaties are normally signed to safeguard the rights of 
investors.  Ironically, South Africa who has signed the most bilateral investment 
treaties has yet to introduce a special law for FDI (UNCTAD, 1999). What is critical 
to note, is that most SADC countries have signed bilateral investment treaties with 
developed nations- 46 as opposed to the 29 with the developing world (Ibid, p48). 
South Africa has signed 10- the most- such treaties with the developed world.  
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The Council of Ministers of SADC decided in 2002 that it would 
review the financial situation of the organisation every six months.  
The council also approved a new formula for membership 
contributions, which will be applied from 2003/4 budget year.  The 
formula is based on GDP in such a way that each country 
contributes a fraction of the total SADC budget that is equal to its 
fraction of the total of the SADC countries’ GDP.  The aim with 
these developments is to achieve greater financial independence 
and greater capacity for prudent utilisation of funds.     
 
At a Mini Donors Conference 2002, SADC and its International 
Co-operating Partners attempted to forged consensus on: “… key 
issues and approaches that will facilitate and expedite the SADC 
restructuring process so as to strengthen the SADC Secretariat 
and other SADC institutions to play a more effective and catalytic 
role in promoting overall development of the region in line with the 
broader goal of creating an integrated economic community in 
Southern Africa.  Noteworthy about the conference was that it 
was: “… the first time donors have offered support to SADC as a 
group.” (Isaksen and Tjønneland, 2002:54).  This reinforces the 
notion that the regional should collectively be promoted as a viable 
investment destination.   
 
However, the SADC Declaration states that it would continue to 
rely on foreign assistance284.  In the 1990s, the majority of SADC 
states had experienced a remarkably high flow of aid as a 
percentage of the GNP- in particular Malawi, Mozambique and 
Tanzania (World Bank, 2002).  The figures below show that from 
1990 to 1998, there has been a remarkable decline in aid 
dependence in the SADC region.  The most notable contribution 
towards this state of affairs is a result of the growth of aid fatigue 
in donor countries.  While it is assumed that SADC will continue to 
rely on aid for the foreseeable future, efforts are underway to 
reduce its dependence on aid.     
     
 
                                      
284
   The consequences of relying on foreign aid are that foreign donors continue to 
influence policies.  Resultantly, regional organisations remain distant from the 
ordinary people.  In the final analysis: “Region-building is seen as the business of 
states where civil society plays no direct part: for states, the practical commitment to 
regional integration can, at will, be either turned up or down.” (Bischoff, 2000:3). 
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With a view to reduce its reliance on donor aid, and instead to 
attract foreign investment, SADC has made significant progress285.  
To illustrate, in 2000, out of the US$ 11 billion FDI that flowed into 
Africa, almost US$ 4 billion FDI flowed to SADC286.  This 
represents approximately 36% of the African total.  During the 
same period, Angola accounted for over 45% of the total SADC 
FDI inflows, whereas South Africa accounted for over 22% of the 
SADC Total (see table below) (Hartzenberg, 2002).  SADC are 
also intensifying efforts to lure FDI to the region.  Maxi Scoeman 
cautions that: “The competition for FDI could have an indirect, 
negative effect on the development of regional civil society… in 
turn inhibiting or harming the growth of a regional sense of identity 
and unity with potential spillover effects in the societal and political 
spheres.” (2001:145)287.  What is needed, therefore, is a collective 
policy framework to pre-empt this problem.       
 
Reflecting this need for a collective policy position, SADC signed 
an agreement worth US$ 18million with USAID288, in July 2000.  
This aid package is aimed at enhancing regional market 
integration, the management of agriculture and natural resources, 
and the promotion of democracy (The Namibian, July 16, 2000).  
A similar agreement was signed between SADC and the EU.  
Under this agreement the EU will provide SADC with 7,6 million 
                                      
285
   Pregay Ramsamy points out that: “Between 1996-1999 actual investments were 
about $4.3 billion.  During the same period total investment intentions were $8.9 
billion.” (in Clapham et al, 2001:37). 
  
286
 A SADC documents states that in the early 1990s, the region attracted $691 
million, but since 1995 SADC attracted an average of $3061 million (1995-1998).  
Individual SADC countries also performed well in terms of attracting FDI. In the 
second half of the 1990s, Angola, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and 
Zambia, were ranked among the top 10 recipients of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, 2003).   
 
287
   The closure of the Volvo and Hyundai plants in Gabarone, Botswana, was in no 
small measure due to the pressure from: “… motor manufacturers and trade unions in 
South Africa seeking to protect the country’s status as the hub of the motor 
industry…” (Simon, 2003:77). 
 
288
   The significance of this agreement is that an amount of US$ 360,000 will be 
spend on supporting democracy-related activities of civil society associations in the 
SADC region.  On a related issue, USAID views SADC as a major trading partner 
and a potential engine of growth for the continent. (The Namibian, April 19, 2000). 
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Euro for an expanded multi-sectoral approach to fight HIV/AIDS 
(The Namibian, November 29, 2000).  Moreover, the EU has 
committed itself to assist SADC in its efforts to invest in new forms 
of production. The 1,95 billion Euros are intended to help promote 
investment and trade partnerships and to strengthen regional co-
operation and integration in the mining sector (The Namibian, 
August 18, 2000)289.  Yet, SADC are not only attempting to secure 
FDI from beyond the region.  
 
Cross-border investment also constitutes a relative important part 
of FDI for the SADC region.  Mauritius, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe are the main sources of cross-border investment into 
other SADC countries.  Currently, intra-regional investment in the 
SADC region is concentrated in the following sectors: Agriculture 
and Fisheries, Finance, Manufacturing, Mining Retail, 
Telecommunications, Tourism, and Transport.  The main avenues 
for FDI in SADC are private-public provision of infrastructural 
services290 (Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, 
2003).  While FDI from beyond the region is critical for regional 
integration in SADC, investment among regional countries is also 
critical.  Indeed, economic and political co-operation should be 
seen as an attempt to create a favourable economic and political 
environment in the form of an expanded market.  New regionalism 
studies and encourages this process.  South African investment in 
the region could also be seen as an attempt to create a favourable 
economic and political environment in the form of an expanded 
market291.   
                                      
289
   SADC and the EU also concluded an agreement that is geared towards the 
promotion of investment in sectors such as agriculture, building, light engineering 
and tourism, over the next five years.  The significance of the agreement is that South 
Africa will contribute 1,8 million Euros to the project that will cost 18 million Euros 
(The Namibian). This investment by South Africa shows local investors of the region 
is confident about the regions future. 
 
290
  The rehabilitation of infrastructure in SADC is already “paying dividends”.  Trade 
between Malawi and Mozambique are set to increase by US$ 900 million, as a result 
of the rehabilitation of rail link between the two countries.  Investment in the Nacala 
Development Corridor will also be enhanced by the promotion of a wide range of 
businesses along the route.  The businesses that will be promoted include, inter alia, 
agriculture, mining and tourism (The Namibian, October 3, 2000).      
  
291
 However: “… questions have been raised as to how serious South African 
investors are committed to the SADC region beyond the need to have access to a 
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Table 3: FDI inflows into individual SADC economies, 1993-2000 
  
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Angola 302 170 472 181 412 1114 2471 1800 
Botswana -287 -14 70 71 100 96 37 30 
DRC 7 -2 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Lesotho 15 19 275 286 269 262 136 223 
Malawi 11 9 25 44 22 70 60 51 
Mauritius 15 20 19 37 55 12 49 277 
Mozambique 32 35 45 73 64 213 382 139 
Namibia 55 98 153 129 84 77 111 124 
Seychelles 4 15 40 30 54 55 60 56 
South Africa -17 334 1241 818 3817 561 1502 877 
Swaziland 72 63 33 -62 -48 165 90 -37 
Tanzania 20 50 150 149 158 172 183 193 
Zambia 2 40 97 117 207 198 163 200 
Zimbabwe 38 41 118 81 135 444 59 30 
Total 269 878 2739 1956 5330 3320 5304 3964 
 
Source: World Investment Report (various issues). 
 
 
Economic development spurred on by increased FDI from South 
Africa could also potentially create a more equitable distribution of 
benefits.  Not surprisingly, and in pursuance of this goal, South 
African retail chains also invest across the SADC region292.  To 
illustrate: “Since 1996 South African retail firms have gained 
significant presence in the Zambian retail sector293.  
Shoprite/Checkers, Dunns Clothing and Pep Stores, and a number 
                                                                                                         
larger market in order to enhance profits.” (Lee, 2003:171). 
 
292
   Michael McDonald notes that this type of investments may be detrimental to the 
region, since it impacts on the local producers in countries where these retail chains 
are found.  He proposed that South African retail chains should instead form co-
operatives with local producers in those countries (Personal Communication, 11 
October, 2002). 
  
293
  These retail chains are to be found in all SADC countries from Angola to 
Zimbabwe.  This suggests that: “… due account … must be… accorded to the 
proclivities of South Africa capital to seek safer havens elsewhere or to compradorise 
the entire region in its selfish short term profitability calculations.” (Tsie, 2000:13-
14). 
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of fast food chains such as Nandos, first opened branches in 
Lusaka, and followed with others in the Copperbelt region, Kabwe, 
Kitwe, Livingstone and Ndola.”  Yet: “Concern arose about the 
sourcing practices of the South African companies- some fast food 
chains even source tomatoes and potatoes from South Africa- and 
the impact of local business on this sector.” (Hatzenburg, 2002:48-
49).  This asymmetry can be counter-acted by better access to 
South African markets for other SADC countries through lowered 
South African protection.    
 
To counter the negative impact this may have on regional 
integration, there is a need to have pro-active states, which serve 
as an agent of economic restructuring in the region.  Balefi Tsie 
asserts that: “Without selective coordinated state intervention at a 
regional level to guide (not necessarily control) investment flows, 
the possibilities of unbalanced and inequitable regional integration 
are very real.” (1996:86).  SADC recognises this danger which has 
the potential to exacerbate regional tensions that may exist as a 
result of the active penetration of regional markets by South 
African firms294.  Towards this end, SADC is currently drawing up a 
protocol on trade and investment (SADC, 2001).  As regards 
investment, the protocol aims to streamline investment regulation 
within the region.  NIPAs are seen as critical in promoting the 
attraction of more FDI into the region.  Another issue that held 
back the organisation previously, that the reform of the 
organisation had addressed, relates to funding.   
 
To further enhance its ability to generate funds for the SADC 
programme of action, member states will be compelled to make 
annual contributions to the organisation.  The contributions of each 
member state will in future be determined by a formula that uses 
development indicators, such as population size, GDP per capita, 
and related indicators295.  This, it is hoped, will enable the region 
                                      
294
  Another potential problem for deepening integration in southern Africa, relates to 
South Africa being the locus for FDI in the region. In this regard, Maxi Schoeman 
concludes that: “South Africa’s high level of industrialization and highly developed 
infrastructure (e.g. transport, communication, and financial services) may attract 
investment, reinforcing the historical underdevelopment of the region and thereby 
undermining regionalization attempts.” (2001:147).  
      
295
  Ndshishi, however, acknowledged that this process would need some ‘fine-tuning’ 
since such measurements will be detrimental to countries with small populations such 
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body to provide for the bulk of money needed to finance its 
operations.  Moreover, to unlock the investment potential in the 
region, SADC has engaged in the development of SDIs. 
 
These initiatives are partnerships between the private and public 
sectors in the region296.  The ostensible aim is to rehabilitate 
transport and other infrastructure in the region. The most notable 
example in this regard is the Maputo Development Corridor.  The 
Presidents of Mozambique and South Africa launched the MDC in 
May 1996297.  To date the MDC has an investment portfolio with a 
total estimated value of US$ 661million.  What is instructive about 
the MDC and similar other initiatives298, is that these initiatives are 
driven by private capital.  It suggests that non-state actors 
operating at multiple sites- both public and private- in setting the 
regional agenda, have joined states.  This suggests that a 
dynamic synergy between states and non-state actors can be 
struck in southern Africa, which would allow them to mutually 
enable each other.  SADC, unlike its predecessor, acknowledge 
that an inclusive regional order demands that state actors play a 
role in the process of regional integration.   
 
Policy suggestions by SADC implies that states in the region 
recognise that sub-national and transnational non-state actors are 
proliferating and that they are re-shaping and re-defining the 
parameters and content of regionalism.    
 
                                                                                                         
as Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia (Personal Communication, 6th June, 
2001).   
  
296
   A SADC document argues that: “… market forces should be allowed to play a 
greater role in regulating investment flows with minimum government controls.” 
(1992c:26). A SADC document argues that: “… market forces should be allowed to 
play a greater role in regulating investment flows with minimum government 
controls.” (1992c:26). 
 
297
  The process to launch the MDC began in August 1995, when the ministers of 
transport of Mozambique and South Africa met to set in motion a plan to establish a 
developmental axis between the port of Maputo and the industrial centre of South 
Africa (Gauteng) (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2001).  
 
298
  There are about 11 proposed SDIs in the SADC region.  These spans from Angola 
to Zimbabwe, and from Namibia to Mozambique (Ramsamy, 2001).  
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4.3.4 Accommodation of non-state actors 
 
 
One of the pillars that anchor SADC is premised on the 
assumption that the social welfare of the people of the region can 
only be promoted by the popular participation of ordinary citizens 
in region-building.  Paul Bischoff postulates that to uplift the social 
welfare of the regions’ people, SADC has to: “… accommodate 
civil society in putting on the regional agenda issues such as 
respect for human rights, the redress of gender inequality, the 
promotion of people-centred development and the fight against 
poverty and inequality in the region.” (2002:286).  The 
achievement of the afore-mentioned presupposed that inter-state 
integration be complemented by a people-centred approach to 
development. This prompted SADC leaders to formulate a more 
inclusive regional order that accommodates non-state actors. 
The 1992 Treaty states that: “In pursuance of the objectives of this 
Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully, the peoples of the region 
and Non-governmental Organisations in the process of regional 
integration… SADC shall cooperate with, and support the 
initiatives of the peoples of the region and Non-governmental 
Organisations, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the 
areas of cooperation in order to foster closer relations among the 
communities, associations and peoples of the Region.” (1992: 54).  
The above illustrates that SADC recognised that non-state actors 
have a role to play in the integration process.  This approach, like 
new approaches to regionalism, suggests that regionalism is more 
comprehensive and dynamic and should be more than inter-state 
action. 
  
Towards this end, significant progress has been made to involve 
non-state actors in the integration process.  For Kato Lambrecht: 
“The most visible steps forward, albeit still insufficient, has been 
the involvement of civil society groupings and communities in 
shaping the environmental and gender agenda of the SADC.”  
Moreover: “SADC institutions have made significant, though 
insufficient, efforts to consult workers’ associations, NGOs, 
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businesses, and other interest groups on designing and 
implementing regional processes and projects.” (2001:31)299.  
Businesses have been viewed as particularly important in driving 
the process of regional integration forward300.         
The need to enhance the involvement of the private sector in 
decision-making processes has been identified by the SADC 
member states’ political leadership.  The Summit of Heads of 
Government of SADC in Blantyre, Malawi, 1997, endorsed 
recommendations calling for: “…fundamental reforms and 
meaningful involvement of the private sector in economic policy 
making and implementation.” (SADC, 2000:77).  Indeed, business 
in the region is already playing a critical role in, amongst others, 
the building and rehabilitation of infrastructure, the promotion of 
the SADC region as an investment centre301, and consequently job 
creation.  These public-private partnerships are critical for the 
enhancement of developmental regionalism in the region. 
  
Hansohm and Peterson (2001) note some regular consultations on 
economic issues between government and private sector in 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  The drawback of this is that civil society 
involvement in regional economic capacity building is limited to 
business only.  An inclusive and developmental regional order 
demands, however, the involvement of economic actors outside 
the purview of SADC’s institutional structures. The government of 
Botswana has notable and regular consultative meeting with the 
private sector in the form of the High Level Consultative Council 
(HLCC).  The HLCC, an advisory body chaired by the President, is 
                                      
299
   Most notable about the lack of civil society involvement in the design of policies, 
was the recent restructuring of SADC, where not even the SADC-Council of NGOs 
were involve in that process (Personal Communication, Abie Dithlake, 25th January, 
2006). 
  
300
  This suggests that a ‘new awareness’ recognised that: “…harnessing market forces 
for the attainment of SADC’s stated development objectives is the most appropriate.” 
(Tsie, 2000:11).  This stance also breaks with the past in that it recognised- unlike the 
Lagos Plan of Action in 1980- the private sector as the driving force behind 
development.  SADC documents, however, fail to recognise that actors outside 
SADC structures play a crucial role in promoting regional integration.     
 
301
  A similar role is played by business in APEC.   
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a forum that allows private sector representation and participation 
in decision-making processes.  To increase the sense of 
regionness, these consultations should be extended to include 
informal economic actors as well.     
 
More recently, in March 2001, SADC governments and business, 
through the SADC Chamber of Commerce, met in Windhoek, 
Namibia, to discuss how these two bodies can mutually enable 
each- to exploit their respective comparative advantages- other to 
deepen the process of regional integration302.  More importantly, 
there seems to be a realisation in SADC, by both business and 
governments that regional disparities will only be eliminated 
through conscious intervention by governments, hence the 
introduction of a regional development fund303.  There is also a 
nascent civil society interest in matters of regional integration at 
national levels as evidenced by transfrontier parks, transport 
corridors and negotiations on the Trade Protocol (Hansohm and 
Peterson; 2001).   
 
SADC, because of its focus on business only, however, failed to 
recognise that regionalism takes place in several sectors and 
involves a variety of non-state actors.  The trans-border activities 
from below lend new meaning and value to the region and the 
notion of regional communities.  These trans-border activities 
bears testimony to the fact that regional organisations and 
regionalism are political constructs, defined by ordinary people, 
and as such lend new meaning to region and the notion of regional 
communities.  As such, regions can be moulded to accommodate 
the marginalised and begin to address broad-based development.  
What is needed, therefore, is to recognise that regions are also re-
defined by the people who are conscious of their transnational 
                                      
302
   This line of thinking, Ndshishi explained, is underpinned by an acute awareness 
that: “social economic development and trade and investment…” are flipsides of the 
same coin.  Governments gain by providing the regulatory framework that will allow 
business in the region to prosper, whereas business gain by helping to create jobs, in 
that ordinary people in the region will buy their products.  It is towards this end that 
business in SADC is actively promoting the concept of a more geographically 
balanced pattern of investment.  The different investment sectors in the region meet 
on a regular basis to work towards achieving the afore-mentioned goal. 
      
303
    Personal Communication, Mr. Andrew Ndshishi, 6th June 2001. 
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past and form a transnational community in doing so.  The 
institutional set-up of SADC also makes provision for non-state 
actors to play a role 
 
Article 23 of the Treaty states that SADC shall seek to involve 
fully, the peoples of the Region and nongovernmental 
organizations in the process of regional integration304.  William 
Lindeke has charged that: “This emphasis creates a new role for 
business and non-governmental organizations within SADC…With 
this change, SADC moves away from purely statist orientation.”  
Moreover, “This initiative, though still limited, breaks new ground 
by trying to link SADC to civil society, as it is developing in the 
region’s democratic struggles.” (1996:64).  Subsequent 
amendments to the Treaty in 2001, make reference to the role that 
non-state actors, such as civil society, the private sector, non-
governmental organisations and workers could play in regional 
integration efforts.   However, there is as yet, no formal recognition 
that actors outside the SADC structures, primarily engage in trans-
border activities from below lend new meaning and value to the 
region and the notion of regional communities.    
The inability to recognise that actors outside the SADC structures, 
are also engaged in trans-border activities from below, manifest 
itself further with developments taking place in southern Africa, 
which is consistent with the within and below perspective of new 
regionalism. Bertil Odén notes that: “… co-operation is taking 
place and organized by interests outside the government 
structure, supported by SADC. One example is the Southern 
African Power Pool, organized between public electricity 
companies and formalized in a SADC Protocol on this issue.” 
(1999:170-171). These reforms suggest that the institutional 
framework inherited from SADCC has been sufficiently changed to 
match the ambitions for heightened levels of integration and 
                                      
304
  In the case of NGOs, this co-operation is normally regulated by a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU). The MOU is normally submitted by the relevant NGO, 
discussed by SADC and the NGO and if agreement is reached ratified by the two 
bodies (Personal Communication, Dr. Stephen Kokeria, 25th January, 2006).  
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accommodating non-state actors305.  However, civil society in 
general still has problems establishing a durable relationship with 
SADC.   
The SADC Treaty provides for the establishment of a SADC NGO 
Council, which was established in 19998.  The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between SADC and the SADC NGO 
Council was signed in December 2003306.  The MOU between 
SADC and the SADC Council of NGOs entail the following:    
 
 “In pursuance of the objectives of the SADC treaty and the 
desire by NGOs to contribute to regional integration and 
development, SADC and SADC-CNGO are committed to the 
principal goal, which is to contribute significantly to the 
improvement of the standard of living for the people of the 
SADC region through the participation of NGOs in a manner 
that will contribute to building a stable socio-economic and 
political environment in the SADC region.  The following are 
the objectives of the MOU: 
 
 The partnership shall be aimed at the broad goals of 
eradicating poverty and creating employment opportunities in 
the countries of the SADC region as espoused in the SADC 
treaty.”307 
 
The current restructuring of SADC has made several attempts to 
formalise links and relationships with non-state actors, through the 
establishment of National committees in each member country, 
but also through the agreements with regional associations and 
attempts to involve non-state actors in areas such as the 
implementation of the trade protocol.  Moreover, SADC documents 
fail to recognise that actors outside SADC structures play a crucial 
role in promoting regional integration.  This has led Larry Swatuk 
                                      
305
  Yet, given the state-centric nature of SADC, one may argue, as does Cox (1981), 
that this recognition seeks to reinforce the legitimacy of prevailing power relations.  
Lesley Blaauw (2003) posits that a synergy between state and non-state actors can 
only be struck if there is recognition of the organic people-to-people transnational 
relations. 
 
306
  Personal Communication, Abie Dithlake, 25th January, 2006. 
 
307
  Personal Communication, Abie Dithlake, 25th January, 2006. 
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and Peter Vale to conclude that: “What remains problematic, 
however, are both the pace of policymaking and the ability to 
enforce those policies, once made.” (2001:41)308.  Civil society, 
thus, must create the potential economic and social space to play 
an important role in determining the content and scope of 
regionalism in SADC. 
 
The above demands recognising that: “States are not the only 
regionalisation actors, and markets, civil society- as well as 
external actors- are deeply involved in processes of 
regionalisation, including its political dimensions.” (Söderbaum and 
Taylor, 2003:11).  Actors involve in trans-border activities lend new 
meaning to the notion of regions and regional communities. 
 
In the final analysis: “… SADC can and should…make greater 
institutional space for regional, nonprofit NGOs.  The SADC 
should encourage its epistemic community or network of 
professionals and individuals to have an input in the deliberations 
and diplomacy surrounding human and state security, conflict 
prevention and conflict resolution.” (2002:302).  James Mittelman 
argues that in the case of SADC: “… the formal regional 
infrastructure to support civil society projects is weak.” (1998:860).  
This has compelled non-state actors to look  ‘beyond the geometry 
of state-sovereignty’ for solutions to such problems as 
unemployment, poverty, resource scarcity, etc.          
                                      
308
  This suggests that: “SADC is allowing- often at the urging of donors- more 
participation of non-state actors and seems to have realised that only the 
incorporation of such interests will make SADC work.” (Hansohm and Peters-
Berries, 2002:118).  
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Table 4. Regional Organisation in SADC 
 
 
Organisation Year formed Major aims 
The Southern African 
Trade Union Co-
ordinating Council 
(SATUCC) 
March 1983 The primary aims of the 
council are to co-
ordinate and strengthen 
trade unions in the 
region, in order to 
harmonise labour 
standards and promote 
workers’ rights. 
The SADC Council of 
Non-Governmental 
Organisations (SADC-
CNGO) 
1995 To, amongst others, 
promote an enabling 
environment for NGOs 
at national and regional 
levels; and to represent 
the interests of civil 
society in SADC 
institutions. 
The Association of 
SADC Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry 
(ASCCI) 
October 1999 To create, inter alia, a 
forum for dialogue, both 
with governments in the 
region via the SADC 
secretariat and with 
other regional 
institutions. 
SADC Women in 
Business 
May 2000 A network for 
disseminating 
information to business 
women in the region, 
inter alia on where to 
source cheaper 
materials, how to 
access training in 
business skills, and how 
to gain exposure to 
appropriate 
technologies. 
The SADC Banking 
Association 
July 1998 To introduce uniform 
norms and practices for 
banks across the 
region; and to co-
ordinate bank-related 
crime prevention. 
The Electoral 
Commission Forum of 
SADC Countries 
 
Aimed at fostering co-
operation among 
electoral commissions 
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in the region, with a 
view to promoting a 
culture of democracy 
and free and fair 
elections. 
The SADC Lawyers’ 
Association 
1998 
 
Aimed at promoting the 
rule of law and human 
rights in member states; 
strengthening the legal 
profession in the region; 
and promoting regional 
co-operation on legal 
issues. 
The Southern African 
Regional Police Chiefs 
Co-operation 
Organisation 
(SARPCCO) 
1995 Promotes co-operation 
in combating cross-
border crime in the 
region. 
 
Associated Organisation of SADC 
 
Source: The IGD guide to the Southern African Development 
Community. 2001. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
 
 
The downfall of apartheid and the end of the Cold War has 
resulted in the quest the promotion of deeper regional co-
operation and integration.  This has led to calls for deeper 
institutionalisation in southern Africa.  Specifically, the BLNS 
countries have argued that that SACU is undemocratic and that 
they were industrially underdeveloped.  South Africa, on the other 
hand, has pointed out that it was no longer willing to subsidise the 
BLNS countries and called for a new revenue-sharing formula.  
The democratisation of the organisation led to the establishment 
of an inclusive Secretariat, based in Windhoek, Namibia. 
The revenue formula was also reformed, to include an economic 
component which caters for the economic of smaller member 
states.  This is in line with new approaches to regionalism, which 
seek to ensure that members of a regional grouping develop 
collectively.  However, doubts have been expressed on whether 
the reformulated revenue-sharing formula will lead to equitable 
regional development.  Despite the changes to the revenue-
sharing formula and the fact that the institutions of SACU have 
been democratise, the disposition of member states remains 
central to regional integration efforts.  In other words, states 
remain the only actor in the regionalisation and regional 
integration process.  This remains a crucial institutional deficit. 
Nowhere does the institutional reform of SACU cater for the 
involvement of actors outside the institutional structure of the 
organisation.  This suggests that there is as yet no realisation on 
the part of SACU that regional organisations and regions are 
social constructs, which can be moulded to address broad-based 
development.  The non-involvement of non-state actors also 
neglects the fact that people in SACU share a common cultural 
and historical background build on migrant labour, which manifest 
itself in trans-border activities.  These trans-border activities lend 
new meaning to regions and the notion of regional communities.  
In doing so, it contributes to regionness in SACU.  What is 
needed, therefore, is to change the institutional structure of SACU 
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to make allowance for informal regionalism, which takes place 
spontaneously throughout the region.  In such a way, SACU as an 
institution can build durable and sustainable regionalism.  The 
early 1990s also saw the reform SADCC into SADC.  
The reconfiguration of SADCC into SADC fuelled the perception 
that a new enthusiasm for regional integration as an essential 
strategy for the achievement of economic development was 
discernable.  Developments in the SADC region have done much 
to heighten such expectations.  SADC constituted itself as a 
legally binding treaty with powers to enforce compliance with 
decisions taken.  It differs thus much from SADCC at the outset.  
However, it was recognised that the institutions of SADC remained 
weak, because national priorities enjoyed preference over regional 
concerns.  
What compounded this problem was the fact that, whilst SADC is 
a legally binding treaty, member states still seems to focus on 
national as opposed to regional development.  This is a direct 
consequence of the SADC/C’s reliance on consensus in the realm 
of decision-making.  The development integration approach 
adopted by SADC in 1992, posited that the organisation was 
committed to a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to 
regionalism.  This approach, arguably, contributed to the success 
the organisation had in the domains of infrastructural 
development.  SADC was also reasonably successful in securing 
donor funding for developmental projects.  However, such funding 
did not secure the development of regional initiatives, but was 
rather used for national development purposes. 
In addition to the above, the SADC Secretariat remained weak, as 
was pointed out by the review of the organisations’ programmes in 
1997.  The involvement of non-state actors in the SADC 
Programme of Action also evolved considerably since the mid-
1990s.  Recent institutional reforms, suggested that SADC did not 
achieve all its objectives.  It pointed to low levels of integration, 
weak institutional capacity, a reliance of donor aid, which was 
exacerbated by the inability to attract foreign direct investment and 
the non-involvement of sectors outside the organisations’ 
institutional structure.   
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The question to pose is: How will SADC be able to heighten its 
levels of integration? It will be able to do the latter if it take 
cognisance of the fact that new approaches to regionalism is a 
comprehensive and multifaceted process that takes place on 
various levels and involve both state and non-state actors.  
Heightening levels of integration presupposes the ‘marriage’ of 
formal and informal processes of integration.   The replacement of 
the sectoral co-ordinating units by directorates, points to previous 
institutional inefficiency. It also must be viewed as an attempt by 
SADC to address the lack of synergy between national and 
regional concerns.  Strengthen the institutional structure of the 
organisation, would ensure that regional institutions become 
durable and sustainable.  The new SADC structure is, thus, a 
major attempt to address the weaknesses, which have 
characterised SADC institutions since the establishment of the 
Community in 1992. 
To achieve the objectives of region-wide GDP growth of 7 per cent 
(Bischoff, 2004), SADC as an institution will have to attract 
considerable foreign direct investment.  The organisation also 
intends to finance some of operations of SADC itself.  This does 
not mean that the organisation will not need foreign aid.  Foreign 
aid will continue to play a significant role in, especially, the 
development of social infrastructure, such as in the transport and 
communication sectors. 
SADC had made a concerted effort to involve the private sector in 
regional development, through public-private partnerships.  This 
allows us to conclude, like Fredrik Söderbaum does that: “States-
led regionalism in Southern Africa has had some positive impact 
on economic development but the problem is that up until now it 
has largely lived a life of its own as politically elite projects 
separated from market demands and civil society.” (2001:111)309.  
There is, however, as yet, no recognition that societal actors 
outside of its institutions could play a decisive role in deepening 
                                      
309
   Fredrik Söderbaum asserts that: “During the last decade a new political economy 
of development regionalism has emerged whereby the role of political authority has 
been downplayed in favour of a strategy that seeks to integrate the market and civil 
society in the process.” (2001:111).  This is essential for the success of new 
approaches to regionalism. 
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regionalism and increasing regionness.  As yet, reconstructed 
organisations of the sub-continent have not been sufficiently 
responsive to bottom-up regionalism.  What is needed, therefore, 
is for civil society actors to deliberately enhance their capacity for 
engaging regional bodies.  At a formal level, this means 
strengthening their cross-border collaboration capacities.  To 
achieve this, civil society must also create the potential economic 
and social space to play an important role in determining the 
content and scope of regionalism in SADC. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Transcending State-Centric Regionalism in Southern 
Africa?: Reflections and Prospects310 
  
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
In the 1990s, the character and functions of regions have 
experienced a major transformation.  Similarly, the process of 
uneven globalisation, which excludes some sectors of societies 
from the global production system, has opened-up political space 
in which civil society activities could be expanded.  For Cox, the 
potentially emancipatory or transformative potential of civil society 
is to be located in the ‘bottom-up’ approach, which he defines as, 
the: “… realm in which those who are disadvantaged by 
globalization of the world economy can mount their protest and 
seek alternatives.” (1999:10).  Such alternatives should also 
involve re-conceptualising the region and the notion of regional 
community in southern Africa.  The argument here is that social 
and political forces that transcend the state, also contribute to an 
expanded conception of regions and the notion of regionalism in 
southern Africa. 
 
The implications of the above for southern Africans are that they 
are now being granted the opportunity to become agents in the 
regional integration process.  To achieve this, demands that 
national civil societies should increasingly become integrated into 
a broader regional civil society.  In this regard, Fredrik Söderbaum 
has noted that in southern Africa: “While the nongovernmental 
                                      
310
   An earlier draft of this chapter was submitted to the Centre for Civil Society 
(CCS), Natal University, as a research report.  The financial assistance of the CCS 
towards the field research for this chapter is hereby acknowledged. Aswin Desai and 
Hermien Kotze of the CCS, also deserves a word of thanks for their invaluable 
comments and suggestions.  
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community is both diverse and divisive… in the region there 
seems to be an emerging consensus around the inherent value of 
community-based development, at state, substate and nonstate 
levels.” (2001:39)311.  Peter Vale expresses pessimism about the 
ability of civil society in southern Africa to establish this type of 
regional linkages, ostensibly because: “… there is in the region, 
not a strong tradition of volunteerism…”312.  He does, however, 
see opportunities for civil society to: “… think outside of the statist 
frame… by organising around issues such as water.”313  
    
The opportunity to think outside of the statist frame in southern 
Africa is borne out of the fact that re-constructed organisations of 
the sub-continent have become more relevant and responsive to 
bottom-up regionalism.  This implies that the rise of new 
approaches to the study of regionalism in the mid-1980s, has not 
only led to increased institutional development within regional 
organisations, but regionalism: “… also developed as an outcome 
of strategies individually pursued by non-state actors.” (Bach, 
2003:21)314.  This means that multiple interpretations of 
community do exist in southern Africa.  In the case of southern 
Africa, this means that non-state actors also contribute to the 
definition and organisation of social space and political community 
taking place in the region.  As such, they contribute to the 
constitution of a social reality that gives meaning to the notion of 
region and regional community.   
 
The above implies the need to rethink the relationship between 
governmental and non-governmental actors along much more 
fundamental lines in southern Africa.  More critically it exhorts us 
                                      
311
   Larry Swatuk and Peter Vale point out that: “At first these projects were 
government-initiated, but later NGOs as well as communities themselves came to be 
involved in all stages and at all levels of the projects.” (2001:40).  New approaches to 
the study of regionalism, contends that there is a natural relationship between state-
led and non-state-led regionalisation processes (Mittelman, 1999). 
      
312
  Peter Vale, Personal Communication, 20/11/2002. 
   
313
  Peter Vale, personal Communication, 20/11/2002. 
 
314
   Robert Cox postulates that: “… the issue for the future structure of world order 
had become universal globalization from above versus alternative paths of economic, 
social and cultural development…” (2001:225). 
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to consider the agency of non-state actors and transnational 
forces.  The non-statist emphasis requires a re-interpretation and 
expanded form of regionalism in southern Africa, which embraces 
non-state actors as well.  In this regard, Martin Bøås asserts that: 
“… regions are not given units.  They are always in the making; 
they are constructed, de-constructed and re-constructed through 
social practice and discourse, not only states but also non-state 
actors participate in the process of constructing the region and 
giving it specific content.” (2003:34).  New approaches to the 
study of regionalism, acknowledge the importance of non-state 
actors in the formation and re-formation of regions.    
 
New approaches to the study of regionalism, allows us to think 
about regions and regional community and solutions to regional 
issues, beyond the territorial state.  The transformative potential of 
new approaches to regionalism lies in its links to civil society.  
James Mittelman postulates that: “…the cross-border flows that 
are truly bottom-up (ethnic group transactions that transcend 
international borders, migratory movements, trading on the parallel 
market, etc) constitute a significant bottom-up pressure for 
regionalism.” (1999:197)315.  Trans-border activities of the people 
of southern Africa, which predates colonialism, lend new meaning 
and value to the region and notions of regional communities and, 
in doing so, provide or make allowance for the conception of 
regionalism, which transcends state-centrism.  New regionalism 
incorporates and explains these empirical phenomena.   
 
For Björn Hettne: “The implication is… that not only economic, but 
also social and cultural networks are developing more quickly that 
the formal political co-operation at the regional level.” (1999a:10).    
The result was that the political and social space in which civil 
society could develop was expanded (Cox, 1999).  The shared 
history and culture of the people of southern Africa, already 
provides the impulses around which these cultural networks could 
be developed regionally.  This allows southern Africans the 
opportunity to establish a regional system that transcends state-
centric notions of regionalism.  New approaches to the study of 
                                      
315
   Andrew Hurrel posits that this will result in: “… increasing flows of people, the 
development of multiple channels and complex social networks by which ideas, 
political attitudes and ways of thinking spread from one area to another…” 
(1995:334).     
 
 219
regionalism also recognise the specific historical experience of a 
particular space.  This inherent regionness presupposes that 
regions are also re-defined by “the people” who are conscious of 
their transnational past and form a transnational community in 
doing so.    
 
Okechukwu Iheduru notes that the new regionalism approach: “… 
invites us to explore ‘societies’ as both agents and consequences 
of global transformation behind the global resurgence of 
regionalism.” (2003:47).  This suggests that in the new regionalism 
framework, non-state actors have a critical role to play in the 
building of regionness316.  Robert Cox (1994) argues that in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, opportunities have opened-up for 
democratisation and the radical transformation of the present 
power systems and structures. International norms are, therefore, 
reconstituting the relationship between state and civil society in the 
modern global economy (Cortell and Davis, 2000)317.  For civil 
society, the implications are that local struggles are increasingly 
being internationalised, specifically around issue-networks.   
 
In the context of region-building in southern Africa, this accords 
civil societies the opportunity to lend new meaning to the region 
and the concept of regional communities.  It also implies that 
individuals are accorded the opportunity to interact with the wider 
region and the rest of the world, as a means for best advancement 
of economic and political goals.  Blaauw and Bischoff (2001) 
contend that in the case of Southern Africa, this makes it possible 
for the insertion of regional communities.  The authors propose 
that what is best for Southern Africa is to develop: “A regional 
policy framework to address the consequences of these trends of 
reduced loyalty region-wide, [which] includes refocusing on a 
                                      
316
   In the case of southern Africa, it will be contended here, this has immediate 
consequences for the establishment of a region-wide democracy, regionness and 
regional politics.  In the context of southern African regional integration, it provides 
non-state actors with a ‘window of opportunity’ to play a more decisive role in 
deciding on the content and scope of regional integration and organisation. 
 
317
   Robert Cox cautions that globalisation may also have contributed to: “… the 
decomposition of civil society.  This takes the form of both a fragmentation of social 
forces and of a growing gap between the base of society and political leadership.” 
(1996:27).  New approaches to regionalism, posit that relations within civil society 
and between civil society and the state are sometimes incompatible (McClean, 1999, 
2001).    
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commitment to democracy, development, building loyalty in the 
context of regional cooperation…” (2001:56).  This is a task to be 
performed by both state and non-state actors.   
 
Historically in southern Africa, however, bottom-up, market-
induced and society induced processes of regionalisation have 
been neglected in the past.  As such, integration in the region has 
not catalogued non-state actor integration.  Due to the factors 
mentioned above, opportunities have opened-up for 
democratisation and radical transformation, which may see civil 
societies in the region playing a more positive role in regional 
relations.  This would entail re-configuring the definition of 
southern Africa, to make allowance for such insights.  In socially 
re-constructing the southern African region, regional analysis 
should focus on the role of both state and non-state actors.   
 
The opportunities which allow us to socially re-construct southern 
Africa Fredrik Söderbaum notes were prompted by: “… the post-
apartheid, post-Cold War transformations, the shift in development 
ideology, the history and culture of regional relations, the small 
size of national civil societies, and a “need” to transcend the 
structure and boundaries of individual nation-states and, not least, 
to learn and share information and knowledge and simply to 
cooperate and network.” (2001:112).   The restructuring of SADC 
in particular has also opened-up new opportunities for non-state 
actors in shaping policies of the organisation.  This creates the 
opportunity for co-operation and inclusion, which in turn could 
strengthen regionness.  What is needed is to realise that 
regionalism in southern Africa is also re-defined by ‘the people’ 
who are conscious of their transnational past and form a 
transnational community in doing so. 
 
This chapter seeks to probe whether new patterns of interaction, 
which transcends conventional state-centric notions of 
regionalism, have begun to emerge in the region.  This with a view 
to: “… facilitate new and positive understandings of, and 
possibilities for, Southern Africa’s regional relations in the 
twentyfirst century.” (Swatuk and Vale, 2001:48).  Re-
conceptualising regionalism in southern Africa means we should 
move beyond the historical definition of regionalism as a statist 
project. The conception of civil society remains a contested, 
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diverse and interesting one.  It is to the theoretical definition of civil 
society that we now turn. 
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5.2 Civil Society and New Regionalism: Theoretical 
Context 
 
The primary unit of analysis in international relations theory has 
historically been the state.  Until recently, therefore, the conceptual 
unity of the state has remained intact.  However, international 
economic relations theorists have for the last two decades 
challenged the notion of the state as the primary unit of analysis in 
international relations.  Interdependence theorists, Structuralists 
and Transactionalists, have all studied the role to be played by 
non-state actors in international relations, albeit from different 
points of departure.  For Fred Halliday, Interdependence Theorists 
and Transactionalism assert: “… the role of non-state actors… 
whereas Structuralism asserts: “… the primacy of global systems 
and structures over specific actors, state or non-state.” (1987:215).  
Structuralism, thus, asserts that actors, state or non-state, can 
only play a particular role within the confines of regulatory 
framework provided by the prevailing paradigm of the global 
system.  These non-state actors are henceforth referred to as civil 
society. 
 
State and society, it will be contended here, cannot be perceived 
as mutually exclusive entities, simply because they are part of the 
same historical process.  Maxine Reitzes reminds us that: “The 
state… is a necessary and simultaneous condition of, and for, civil 
society.” (1994:96)318.  The mutually reinforcing role of these two 
entities, is best seen as being embedded in a new developmental 
social contract.  By and large, therefore, civil society and the state 
are organically linked.  This implies the need to rethink the 
relationship between state and non-state actors along much more 
fundamental lines in southern Africa.  More critically, it exhorts us 
to consider the agency of non-state actors and transnational 
forces.    
                                      
318
   James Mittelman contends that: “The state-civil society complex varies 
dramatically from one context to another, and there are different kinds of civil 
society.  In some cases, the state monopolises resources, but there are other 
permutations.” (1998:855). New approaches to the study of regionalism also 
recognise the specific historical experience of a particular space.     
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In the context of southern Africa regionalism, this calls for 
recognition that the conception of regions and the practice 
regionalism are not only state-centric projects.  The conception of 
regions and regionalism needs to recognise that other actors also 
participate in the construction of regions.  A broader definition of 
regions and regionalism, which such a re-conceptualisation would 
entail, presupposes an inclusive typology of both state-based and 
society-based actors.  The emergence of the concept civil society 
can be traced back to the period when modern ideas of democracy 
were beginning to take root.  
Hobbes and Locke, two of the founding fathers of the concept civil 
society, contend that if the state arises from civil society, then the 
former will have to militate against the conflict between and among 
individuals: sociological function (Reitzes, 1994).  There is, 
however, a limit to state sovereignty that will ensure the 
preservation of individual freedoms derived from natural law.  
Essentially the regulation of natural rights will enable civil society 
to prosper, they argue.  Hobbes and Locke propose that the 
boundary between state and civil society be regulated by a social 
contract (ibid.).  In southern Africa, this social contract would need 
to be predicated upon the establishment of a mutually enabling 
environment for state and civil society actors, with a view to 
deepen the integration process and a sense of regionness. 
 
Hegel, on the other hand, introduces an economic dimension to 
the above sociological conception of civil society.  For Hegel civil 
society arrangements are constitutive of a plurality of economic, 
ethical and social activities, separate from the state.  Hegel views 
civil society as a product of historical processes.  Various 
institutions, corporations and estates, constitute civil society.  
Implicitly therefore Hegel also perceives civil society and the state 
to be mutually exclusive.  The perpetual conflict between and 
among various strata of civil society creates destructive conflict, 
which can only be militated against by a strong state (cited in 
Keane, 1998).  As such, the state exists to intervene in the 
activities of civil society.  New approaches to the study of 
regionalism, however, view both formal, inter-state led process 
and informal regional efforts, as collectively contributing to deeper 
integration and a sense of regionness.   
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To Antonio Gramsci319 (1971) the arena of conflict is not the state, 
but civil society.  The control of the dominant class over society 
can only be invalidated by the development of a counter-
hegemonic association with alternative norms.  Gramsci’s 
definition, one amongst many, juxtaposes civil society with the 
state, whilst at the same time civil society is seen as adjunct to the 
state.  Civil society contests state power, and similarly legitimises 
state power in society.  New approaches to regionalism, posit that 
relations within civil society and between civil society and the state 
are sometimes incompatible.  But the actions of civil society actors 
in southern Africa, also at times complement the capacity of states 
in delivering essential services to citizens, particularly in cases 
where the state has become weak due to SAPs.   
 
Noberto Bobbio (1998) charges that in Gramscian thought, the 
distinction between state and civil society should not necessarily 
be located in the distinction between economics and politics.  
Bobbio asserts that Gramsci views civil society as comprising all 
“ideological-cultural relations”.  He transcends the conventional 
conception of civil society that includes only organised interests, 
by including churches, the family, the media and schools that all 
nurture public opinion.  This is in tandem with the new approaches 
to regionalism, which posits that new regional actors can also 
constitute a trans-boundary civil society in southern Africa. 
 
Because the actions of these actors compels us to re-
conceptualise regionalism, they remind us that the region is not 
only made up of institutions which promote co-operation, but also 
                                      
319
  Gramsci introduced the notion of corporate consciousness in his discussion on 
civil society.  Corporate consciousness results in a particular group just protecting 
their own interest.  This statement is of particular significance in the case of South 
Africa. Dale McKinley argues that: “Despite shows of worker power and militant 
statements directed against the consequences of South African capitalism, a larger 
portion of the leadership of COSATU (and its affiliates) are in danger of becoming 
cheerleaders of the “capitalism with a human face” club.  More frequent arguments 
about the “hegemony of capitalism”, new global realities” and the need for social 
compact politics (witness COSATU’s recent alliance with the doyen of corporatist 
unionism- the Australian Congress of Trade Unions) indicate a trajectory in which 
unions must fundamentally alter their strategic vision in order to remain “relevant” 
(Mail and Guardian, May 26 to June 1, 2000). While it is important to establish 
linkages between trade unions of the North, this type of alliances have profound 
implications for countering the neo-liberal strategy being pursued by the South 
African government.    
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of non-state actors which contribute to the formation of a regional 
identity that lies beyond the geometry of state boundaries.  In this 
trajectory, the conception of regionalism consists of a complex set 
of inter-locking institutions, norms and values, formal and informal, 
governmental and non-governmental that serves to make the rules 
for the regional order.      
  
Theorists such as Noberto Bobbio (1988, 1989), Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), and Jessop (1990), to name but a few, have shown 
renewed interests in the concept civil society.  This interest was 
fuelled by the downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe.  Prior to 
the downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe, state action has 
caused the suppression of civic activities in those countries, and 
has resulted in the domination of society by the state.  Iris Young 
suggests that the suppression of civic activities has led to the 
conclusion that: “…social change should be made by deepening 
civil society…” (1994:73).   
 
Robert Cox echoes this postulate by asserting that: “… civil 
society has become the comprehensive term for various ways in 
which people express collective wills independently of (and often 
in opposition to) established power, both economic and political.” 
(1999:10).  Similarly, new approaches to regionalism invest 
individuals and groups beyond states with rights and duties to 
express such collective wills, by, inter alia, pursuing alternative 
solutions to problems such as unemployment and poverty 
alleviation, proposed by economic and political elites.  In southern 
Africa, therefore, states should recognise that sub-national and 
transnational non-state actors are proliferating and that they are 
re-shaping, and re-defining the parameters and content of 
regionalism.   
 
Michael Bratton, for instance, charges that civil society is a 
heterogeneous entity that reflects: “… in political form, the 
cleavages and conflicts of the wider society in which it is located.” 
(1988:58; Cheru, 1997:206).  The implications for regionalism and 
the construction of an inclusive regional community is that one 
needs to consider various economic, political and cultural forces, 
which shape and reshape regions.  Bratton further contends that: 
“… economic interests and moral values are the key poles around 
which political activity regularly clusters. These are the provinces 
of civil society.” (ibid.).  Martin Shaw on the other hand has 
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posited: “… that civil society should be seen as the networks of 
institutions through which groups in society in general represent 
themselves- both to each other and to the state.” (1994a:647; 
1994b).  The recurrent theme of both these conceptions is that the 
activities of civil society occur outside the precincts of the state.  
New regionalism as a process and field of study, view states and 
societies as mutually enabling each other to deepen the 
integration process.  This creates the opportunity for co-operation 
and inclusion, which in turn could strengthen regionness.   
 
To Iris Young: “Civil society designates an area of social activity 
other than industry, commerce and finance, as well as other 
legislative, administrative, and court activity.  As a rough and 
ready beginning, civil society corresponds to the broad range of 
organizations and institutions understood as ‘civic’: “… charity 
organizations, lobbying groups, political associations agitating for 
a particular cause or programme, neighbourhood associations, 
non-profit organizations promoting education or providing 
services…” (1994:77; McClean and Shaw, 1997:197).  This 
conception of civil society does not make allowance for 
spontaneous process of informal interaction by ordinary people.  It, 
thus, neglect the fact that such interaction lends new meaning to 
regions and the notion of regional communities.  Using such state-
centric lenses to define southern Africa, suggests a poor basis for 
understanding the region.  New approaches to the study of 
regionalism, point to the need to recognise the reflexive inter-
relations of multiple actors operating at multiple levels within the 
region.          
 
It is, however, not only European scholars who view state-civil 
society relations through the prisms of critical tension that exists 
between the two.  Africanists scholars, and those writing about 
Africa, also define civil society in relation to the state.  Writing in 
the African context, Jean-Francois Bayart has postulated that civil 
society should be seen: “… as society in relation with the state… 
in so far as it is in confrontation with the state or, more precisely, 
as the process by which society seeks to break and counteract the 
simultaneous totalisation unleashed by the state.” (1986:111; 
Chabal 1994:96; and Osaghae, 1997:15).  Civil society’s 
opposition to the state, may, as the new regionalism approach 
posits, stems from incompatible goals and objectives. 
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For Naomi Chazan: “Civil society… refers to the segment of 
society that interacts with the state, influences the state, and yet is 
distinct from the state.” (1992:48).  Chazan’s conception points to 
a very important consideration for the purpose of deepening 
regional co-operation and integration in southern Africa: that there 
is room for both civil society and the state in influencing the 
content and scope of regionalism.  To achieve this, new 
approaches to regionalism posit that state-led (formal) and non-
state-led (informal) processes of regionalism should be 
connected320.  In the context of regionalism in southern Africa, the 
influence of civil society depends on its willingness to engage and 
relate to the state and the willingness of the state to relate to civil 
society.  Nelson Kasfir (1998) points out that a peculiarity about 
civil society in Africa is its ability to either contribute to better 
governance or serve as an impediment to such a process. 
 
The cases of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, are instructive in 
this regard. In Botswana, indigenous groups321 such as the first 
people of the Kalahari, articulate their interest within the 
parameters of the state, whilst in Zimbabwe the trade union is 
challenging the government to establish a more democratic 
dispensation. In Namibia, on the other hand, attempts by and calls 
for secession by parts of civil society actors in the Caprivi serves 
to undermine the government.   Whereas, in the cases of 
Botswana and Zimbabwe, civil society actions is in tandem with 
the development of a regional civil society, voluntary ethnic 
exclusion- to invoke Björn Hettne’s term- poses certain threats to 
building a regional civil society.  In Namibia, voluntary ethnic 
exclusion, has not only led to a transfer of loyalties from civil 
society to the primary group, but may also lead to a regional 
security crisis, with ramifications for both inter-state and non-state 
actor security co-operation322.  States should recognise that sub-
                                      
320
   Mortin Bøäs et al. note that: “It is only when we make deliberate attempts to 
connect the two broad processes of formal and informal regionalisms that we can get 
a clearer picture of the connection between them…” (1999:905). 
 
321
 Ronnie Lipschutz observes that indigenous peoples are a: “… rapidly growing 
network in global civil society… compose… of groups of indigenous people, that is, 
tribes, clans, societies and cultures…” (1992:395).  
 
322
  In the case of Namibia, this voluntary exclusion is fuelled by a perception of 
uneven economic development. 
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national and transnational non-state actors are proliferating and 
that they are re-shaping, and re-defining the parameters and 
content of regionalism in southern Africa.  This suggests that 
regional states must give recognition to sub-national and 
transnational communities, such as NGOs, which exist alongside 
states in southern Africa.  
 
However, the political context in which sub-national and 
transnational communities could contribute to regionalism from 
below is being undermined by the reluctance shown by southern 
African governments to allow opposing views to flourish.  In 2001, 
newspapers with independent views have come under increasing 
attack.  In the year under discussion, a newspaper in the DRC was 
shut down after it published an article critical of the Zimbabwean 
army. Swaziland also banned two papers that were critical of the 
kingdom’s royal family, while in Botswana and Namibia 
government advertisements have been removed from newspapers 
seen as critical of government (The Star, 14 May 2001).  This 
compels citizens, using the region, to re-organise social and 
economic relations.  New regionalism encourages and studies the 
way in which civil society uses political space to built new regional 
economic and political capacity.   
 
Kößler and Melber (1994) provide the most appropriate conception 
of what civil society should entail in the context of building political 
space for civil society actors such as NGOs in southern Africa.  
Their definition provides the building block of what should be a 
mutually enabling role for state and non-state actors in southern 
Africa’s regional project.  They propose that civil society should 
constitute and indeed fill: “… the vital space and network of 
potentially independent organizations that proves instrumental in 
the authentic articulation of interests, in the airing of conflicting 
perspectives of societal projects, and in the definition of a[n] over-
all concept and perspective of development that commands a 
measure of consensus that is a prerequisite for political 
legitimacy.” (1994:9-10).  This consensus is vital not only for 
regional development and the legitimating of the regionalist 
project, in southern Africa it is also critical for ensuring a lasting 
order in the sub-region. 
 
In the final analysis what is suggested here is a new social 
contract: a reciprocal, yet conditional relationship between state 
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and civil society.  In this regard NGOs and trade unions have a 
particular significant role to play in harnessing and establishing 
parameters for regional state non-state actor relations, with a view 
to deepen the nascent process of new and developmental 
regionalism unfolding in southern Africa.  The media, for instance, 
need to provide information about the struggle for sustainable 
democracy, human rights abuses and related issues. 
 
The new approaches to regionalism also suggest that the 
interactions among non-governmental organisation contribute to 
deepening integration and a sense of regionness.  The 
interactions of these organisations lend new meaning to regions 
and the notion of regional communities. It could also potentially 
contribute to restoring the regional citizenship of the marginalised 
in the region.    
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5.3 Beyond the Geometry of Sovereignty: Regionalism 
from Below in Southern Africa 
 
 
5.3.1 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
 
 
Transnational relations across the southern African region, 
manifested in interactions among non-governmental organisation 
and more broadly informal trade and cultural networks, have been 
neglected in regional integration efforts in the sub-region.  This is 
largely due to the fact that, in southern Africa, the disposition of 
states remains critical in determining scope and content of both 
inter-state and transnational relations.   
Fredrik Söderbuam asserts that: “State-led regionalism in 
Southern Africa has had some positive impact on economic 
development but the problem is that up until now it has largely 
lived a life of its own as politically elite projects separated from 
market demands and civil society.” (2001:111).  This means that 
up to now, the interpretation of a regional community in SADC 
remains the prerogative of the narrow interests of regional elites.  
From this reading, it implies that states in southern Africa provide 
the only path to regional community.  Regionalism is, however, a 
comprehensive and multifaceted process taking place at various 
analytical levels and involving both state and non-state actors.  
This suggests that the fostering of closer ties between and among 
governments has to be complemented by governments promoting 
grassroots co-operation among non-state or civil society actors 
across borders323, even outside of the institutional structures 
                                      
323
   Abie Dithlake notes that the: “SADC-CNGOs recognise and respect the role that 
such institutions play in the region.  For civil society organisations to be more 
effective, we need to be focussed. Specialisation in a particular field and area of 
concern would help us a great deal and enable us to achieve much” (Personal 
Communication, 25th January, 2006).  New approaches to the study of regionalism 
recognise that non-state actors also have to address a multitude of issues.       
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provide for such co-operation.  New approaches to the study of 
regionalism, which take place across a number of dimensions, 
accommodate and encourage such co-operation..   
In this regard, NGOs324 have an integral role to play in enhancing 
the process of development from ‘below’.  Indeed, John Clark 
reminds us that: “Nongovernmental organizations may provide 
instruments which… emphasize the participation of the poor.” 
(1995:593).  However, unlike Europe where social forces are 
perhaps stronger and better organised, southern Africa has a 
moderate history of NGOs working within a regional framework325.  
Ansu Datta’s reminder that: “Many non-governmental regional 
organisations in Southern Africa have functioned only 
sporadically.” (1989:97), attest to that. In southern Africa, 
however, the liberation movements, churches and trade unions 
have a history of transnational collaboration.     
In the realm of national politics, non-governmental organisations 
have become increasingly assertive.  The following examples from 
the 1990s illustrate this assertiveness:  
• “The protracted popular struggle for the liberation of South 
Africa from the clutches of a racist regime, which culminated in 
the democratisation of that country’s political system in 1994 
and the dismantling of apartheid; 
• The national strike by Swaziland’s workers, operating hand in 
hand with other civic groups to demand that the political system 
in that country democratised in 1997; 
                                      
324
  Michael Bratton (1989) suggests that the concept NGO comprises a plethora of 
organisations that vary in character and scale.  These are community-based 
organizations, national NGOs and international relief and development agencies.  
   
325
  Ansu Datta (1989) asserts that even though NGO co-operation is desirable, it 
should not undermine inter-governmental ventures aimed at sustainable development 
and the provision of security. 
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• The formation of Zambia’s Movement for Multi-party Democracy 
(MMD) in 1990, and its accession to political power in 1991.  
With reference to the MMD in power David Bartlett has 
concluded that: “The MMD appeared to be a class compromise 
between businesses and labour…” (2000:444).  What this, and 
the cases of South Africa and Zimbabwe described elsewhere 
illustrate, is that class power constitutes a significant barrier to 
the realisation of an alternative, potentially transformative 
regional civil society.      
• The rejection of the one-party system by civic groups in Malawi 
in a referendum which resulted in the drafting of a new multi-
party constitution, which in turn resulted in the elections which 
culminated in the ousting of Kamuzu Banda, who had declared 
himself the life president of Malawi; 
• The overthrow of Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko by Laurent Kabila, 
with the clear support of various civic groups in that country, 
and many others from outside the country.” (Makumbe, 
1998:309); 
• “In Zimbabwe during the late 1990s a formidable opposition 
party- the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)- was built 
upon the urban poor and workers, a portion of the professional 
black petit-bourgeoisie and wealthy whites: liberals, farmers 
and business managers/owners.” (Bond, 2002:15).  
These political changes could not have occurred without the full 
participation of an active and dynamic civil society in southern 
Africa326.  What the above illustrates is that civil society has played 
a fundamental role in strengthening democracy at a national level.  
                                      
326
   While trade unions have played a leading role in the liberation struggle in 
southern Africa, Eddie Webster charges that in the 1990s: “… trade unions have not 
really been able to establish their roles as autonomous actors… because… states are 
shaping the agendas of trade unions in both national and regional settings.” (Personal 
Communication, 14th October, 2002). 
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These actions, if replicated on a regional level, could potentially 
provide the impulses upon which a regional civil society could be 
built.  The SADC Council of NGOs called on SADC governments 
to take action on civil liberties in Zimbabwe and Swaziland in 
2003, illustrates that strategic networks are already being formed 
among NGOs in the region on issues of governance.  It also 
shows that local goals can be achieved by reaching out to the 
broader region in order to realise ostensible national goals. 
This offers southern Africans the opportunity to construct a 
regional community based on shared concerns and charted by 
human-centred politics. To construct such a community, calls for a 
break with the traditional models of state-dominated and elite 
driven approaches. A new paradigm to community-building in 
SADC calls for a people-centred and participatory approach.  Non-
state actors, therefore, could also contribute to the definition and 
organisation of social space and political community taking place 
in the region. As such, they contribute the constitution of the social 
reality that give meaning to the notion of region and the regional 
communities. Regionalism as a normative project should, 
therefore, recognises the importance of regionalist processes from 
‘below’, as crucial to the definition of regions and the formation of 
regional communities.   
 
In SADC, this presupposes the building of regional networks, 
among both state and non-state actors, which are aimed at 
constructing new approaches to development and human security. 
This important consideration is acknowledged by SADC. The 
establishment of a Gender Unit at the SADC Secretariat in 1998 
bears testimony to this “new awareness”. Fundamentally, the Unit 
is charged with the responsibility of advising all SADC structures 
on gender issues and to ensure that a gender perspective 
permeates the entire SADC Programme of Action and Community 
Building Initiatives327.  Another indicator of this ‘new awareness’ is 
                                      
327
   Representation by women in various positions of power remains limited.  Only in 
Botswana, Malawi and South Africa are women adequately represented in 
parliament.  
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the SADC NGO Council, which, while independent of SADC’s 
formal structures, are recognised by the body328.  If effectively 
operationalised, the SADC-CNGOs could be a key boost for 
regional integration and for civil society’s role in the process.  
Another organisation that was envisaged to play a significant role 
that would boost civil society’s role in the regional integration 
process is (ASCCI). 
 
Mareike Mein notes that: “The aim was to link the national 
chambers in Southern Africa and create a regional network to 
combine the voices of the private sector to promote its interests 
with SADC officials. Up to now, however, ASCCI remains little 
more than the sum of its parts and reflects the weaknesses of its 
constituent members…” (2004:10).  Significant to note is the fact 
that the SADC Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the NGO 
sector were able to provide considerable input to the Trade and 
Transport Protocols. One may, however, argue that the above 
represent attempts to reinforce the legitimacy of prevailing order, 
by working within the parameters set by states of the region329. 
The above means that the disposition of member states remains 
crucial in determining and enforcing common policy parameters to 
make regional integration and the further growth of transnational 
relations possible330.  Consequently, the legitimacy of political 
authority encroaches on the political and social space in which 
NGO activity can develop and expand.  As such, efforts by SADC 
                                      
328
  Glenn Farred, Personal Communication, 16th October 2002. 
 
329
   This contention is reinforced by the reliance of the organisation on donor funding. 
The agenda of ASCCI: “… is mainly determined by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Techniseche Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS).” (Meyn, 
2004:11). This implies that ASCCI agenda is donor-driven and not by the need to 
connect formal and informal business in the region, so crucial for the twin goals of 
promoting deeper and developmental regionalism.  
 
330
  Fredrik Söderbaum and Ian Taylor note that: “… state actors create 
regionalisation in order to achieve private goals and promote particular (vested) 
interests rather than societal interests.” (2003:12). For states, therefore, regionalism 
can be seen as a political phenomenon.  
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mirror the SACU regime, which remains statist in orientation.  By 
and large, therefore, the emergence of organic transnational 
connections among national civil societies in southern Africa 
needs to occur outside the statist framework.  Thus, it is 
necessary to look beyond historically constituted frameworks or 
structures within which economic and political activity takes place 
in southern Africa.    
Facilitating and reinforcing transnational connections among 
national civil societies in southern Africa would be an essential 
element in any sustainable pattern of integration.  A recent 
demonstration in Swaziland illustrates that civil society is 
increasingly being looked at as a motivational force for change 
(Cox, 1999).  In response to the government legislation that 
banned free political activity in Swaziland, the Swaziland Solidarity 
Network, which represents trade unions and pro-democracy 
groups, called on South African businesses to restrict trade with 
that country for 3 days in December 2000.  The trade union also 
asked the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the 
Mozambique Workers Federation to support the blockade (The 
Namibian, November 30, 2000).   
The movement in Swaziland is part of a broader association, the 
Southern African Peoples Solidarity Network (SAPSN)331.  
Ostensibly this movement is concerned with issues of trade332, but 
also looks at issues such as regional peace, human security and 
                                      
331
   SAPSN has a growing membership with a broad range of civil society 
organizations and institutions, including trade unions, development NGOs, and 
church-based movements.  With the exception of Botswana, SAPSN have managed 
to secure links in Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. (Eunice Mafudikwa, 
Personal Communication, 8th November, 2002) 
  
332
   The issues that has hitherto been addressed by SAPSN ranges from privatisation, 
regional integration, the African Growth and Opportunities Act, the WTO, the Post-
Lomé negotiations, and the role of South Africa in SADC.  
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democracy333.  The Southern African Peoples Solidarity Network 
has already established various sub-networks and a debt tribunal, 
which investigates how the issues of debt should be addressed 
within a regional framework, provides the impulses on how such 
sub-networks should be established.  The establishment of such 
regional sub-networks on debt is necessary, and provide the right 
antidote to the current situation where countries such as Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia, are attempting to solve 
critical debt issue unilaterally.   
More critically, the issue should be linked to the Jubilee 2000 
campaign, which is of interest to all Southern African countries334.  
Patrick Bond has suggested that a regional ideology around the 
issue of debt can be build by, for instance, invoking the spirit of the 
national liberation335.  Indeed, this seems to be happening.  
Leading southern African social movements and church 
organizations working on debt from Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
signed the Lusaka Declaration in 1999 (Bond, 2001).  Such issue-
specific networks, which occur ostensibly outside the purview of 
state influence, are critical for fostering a developmental regional 
civil society in southern Africa.       
The significance of SAPSN is that this organisation is forging links 
that can be used as the building block for a developmental 
regional civil society, which transcends state-centricism in 
southern Africa.  SAPSN has also established relations with the 
‘TRADE’ organisation, with the aim of expounding the position of 
Southern Africa in agricultural negotiations from a non-
                                      
333
  Indeed, the formation of SAPSN was a result of various national and regional 
processes during the course of 1999 around the inter-linked issues of debt, structural 
adjustment and globalisation.  (Eunice Mafudikwa, Personal Communication, 8th 
November, 2002) 
   
334
   SAPSN is well poised to co-ordinate this activity, since it is already a core of the 
Jubilee South.  (Eunice Mafudikwa, Personal Communication, 8th November, 2002). 
   
335
  Patrick Bond, Personal Communication, 16th October, 2002.  
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governmental perspective.  Similarly, it is working with several 
ACP regional networks on the Post-Lomé negotiations.  Members 
of the Southern African Peoples Solidarity Network is also building 
linkages in the wider context of the Africa Trade Network (ATN), to 
formulate a position on AGOA, a trade pact concluded between 
the United States of America and African countries.  These 
organisations do not engage national states, or SADC, ostensibly 
because regional states exclude them from the process of 
economic policy formulation.    
The issues, which these non-state actors seek to address, include, 
inter alia, democracy, human rights, environmental degradation 
and migration.  These functional linkages established by trans-
regional actors point to the impact of regional norms on the growth 
and the influence of civil societies at domestic level.  This calls for 
the re-organisation of economic and social relations.  In a situation 
of this new regionness, individuals and marginalised communities 
are accorded the opportunity to interact with the wider region and 
the rest of the world as a means of advancing economic and 
political goals.  The delimitation of the region will have to decidedly 
be determined by actual practice, and not just (physical) 
geography or formal political and economic co-operation.  As 
such, a new approach to regionalism in southern Africa, must 
move beyond any static notion of region and regionness and 
replace it with the dynamic notion of the region as a social 
construct. 
 
The recent campaign by the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and 
Development, the Swaziland Campaign against Poverty and 
Economic Inequality, the Malawi Economic Justice Network, and 
peasants from Lesotho, at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development’ also occurs under the auspices of SAPSN336. This 
suggests that the dominant conception of a regional community in 
southern Africa driven by states alone is increasingly at odds with 
events on the ground.  Moreover, it represents a compelling 
example of both developing identity and community in formation 
                                      
336
  Patrick Bond, Personal Communication, 16th October 2002.  
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beyond national borders.  Its also suggests that the route to 
community in the region may well lie beyond the discourses of 
power which have constructed the region’s current state system.  
As such, using state-centric lenses to define southern Africa, 
suggests a poor basis for understanding the region. 
 
The Southern African Human Rights NGO Network, which 
promotes adherence to international human rights norms and 
standards, is but one example of this337.    While this organisation 
is recognised by SADC, it has few formal links and engagements 
with the organisation338. Despite this, the Network continues to 
promote transnational linkages among like-minded NGOs in the 
region, to build capacity for, inter alia, human rights education, 
campaigning against police brutality and the promotion of freedom 
of expression.  In such a way, it continues to deliberately enhance 
its capacity for engaging regional bodies like SADC.  For Ozias 
Tungwarara the strategic challenge for non-state actors 
specifically is how to harness their collective power to be able to 
influence this interface in the global context339. 
In Africa in general and southern Africa in this instance, there has 
been a proliferation of organisations that seek to address issues of 
a transnational nature. The Global Coalition for Africa, the 
Federation of African Media Women, the Africa Association for 
Literacy and Adult Education, are but few of the organisations that 
are demanding the expansion of civil space for the achievement of 
a more broad-based and participatory developmental order.   The 
African NGO Networks Caucus is challenging conventional 
wisdom on the continent as regards development issues340.   
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  Ozias Tungwarara, Personal Communication, 27th September 2002. 
 
338
   Ozias Tungwarara, Personal Communication, 27th September 2002. 
 
339
  Ozias Tungwarara, Personal Communication, 27th September 2002.  
 
340
   The vision of this network was spelled out as far back as 1996, when 25 African 
networks met in Harare, Zimbabwe to assert the concerns and priorities of African 
civil societies in African and international institutions.  
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Needless to say, the issues, which these organisations seek to 
address, are invariably informed by a search for imminent 
solutions to problems such as hunger, poverty, equitable 
development and human rights, for instance. Towards this end, 
NGOs see themselves as playing a crucial role in strengthening 
civil society to address the above-issues.  In the context of 
harnessing of new and developmental regionalism in southern 
Africa, the above postulate suggests that regional NGOs need to 
contribute to articulating more widely, and in an institutional 
context, how best to solve these problems.  Sandra McClean, 
writing on southern Africa, has concluded that: “To the extent that 
these various NGOs build horizontal and vertical networks for 
communication, advocacy, and knowledge-sharing purposes, they 
appear to contribute to emerging sense of… regional citizenship.” 
(2001:130).  These NGOs also contribute to a sense of 
regionness.     
The calls made by 13 NGOs in Windhoek, Namibia in 2000 for a 
regional discussion on land reform and land redistribution highlight 
this plight.  Primarily the NGOs argued that social development 
should be both people-centred and people-driven (The Namibian, 
August 4, 2000).  They also postulated that poverty is a regional 
issue that can only be addressed in a haphazard fashion, as is 
currently the case341.  This in essence would enable NGOs to 
contribute to decisions about the content and scope of regional 
development and growth.  The Southern African Regional Poverty 
Network (SARPN) can play a decisive role in this regard.  
Sanusha Naidu has this to say about the activities of SARPN: 
“SARPN is a regional poverty network does not have a 
membership but rather is a public policy platform for drawing on 
issues of poverty and the types of measures and responses that 
are being developed to address it. It caters for actors in the realm 
                                      
341
  A most striking feature of the meeting between these NGOs is the recognition that 
not only governments do not have a region plan for poverty alleviation, but that 
NGOs themselves need to co-ordinate their attempts at poverty alleviation on a 
region-wide basis (The Namibian, August 4, 2000).  
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of poverty to be able to exchange with each other their work in the 
field of poverty. These include policy makers, development 
practitioners, academics, civil society actors from grassroots and 
community based level as well as the private and public sector.”342   
This suggests that SARPN attempts to co-ordinate the processes 
of formal and informal regionalism so critical for the success of 
new regionalism343. 
With the resurgence of neo-liberalism that is increasingly asserting 
its dominance in national development strategies and plans in 
SADC, the ideological orientation of an organisation like SARPN, 
which is constituted of a myriad of organisations, becomes 
questionable.  Civil society needs, however, to play a particularly 
important role in poverty alleviation. Ozias Tungwarara suggests 
that with regards to issues such as poverty civil society needs to 
articulate citizens’ interests, by making themselves relevant in 
communities. This demands that civil society has an organically 
defined mandate, based on real and identifiable targets344. 
This type of interaction, featuring direct people-to-people 
engagement and co-operation builds solidarity and bridges 
between peoples of the southern African countries, and 
contributes to mobilising public opinion in support of southern 
African co-operation. Moreover, many South and southern 
Africans have made their homes in countries other than their own 
in the region. These experiences may encourage and play a 
decisive role in the development of a regional consciousness   
because this type of co-operation and interaction builds bridges 
and solidarity among and between the people of the region.  This 
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  Sanusha Naidu, Personal Communication, 1st November, 2002.  
 
343
   Sue Mbaya points out that SARPN do not work with people who are not part of 
national NGO structures.  The work of national NGOs that are part of SARPN is to 
mobilise those on the fringes of society that are most affected by poverty (Personal 
Communication, 26th January, 2006). 
   
344
  Ozias Tungwarara, Personal Communication, 27th September, 2002.   
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in turn contributes to mobilising public opinion in support of 
southern African co-operation and integration.   
Similarly, special attention should be given to the establishment of 
issue-networks among organisations representing the self-
employed, neighbourhood groups and non-governmental 
voluntary organisations that have sprung up through the region.  
They have valuable experience and expertise to share on how to 
get organised and how to deal with daily problems of economic, 
physical, and environmental survival.  More importantly, their 
trans-border activities lend new meaning to regions and the notion 
of regional communities.  Their activities, thus, allow them to form 
a transnational community from ‘below’.     
 
Glenn Farred argues that the type of networking around small 
scale farming, indigenous people, and trans-frontier parks allow 
local communities to contribute to building a sustainable civil 
society in SADC345.  Gathered together in some regional force, it is 
hoped that NGOs in particular will transcend the national outlook 
on problems that confront the region. The hope, according to 
David Korten and Antonio Quizon is that: “The very formation of 
these networks and coalitions is creating social reality as NGO's 
experiment with the creation of new organizing structures based 
on consensus, equality and mutual accountability.” (1995:160).  
 
Ansu Datta views the role to be played by NGO's differently from 
the above. Datta contends that we need to promote the growth of 
civil society on a national level, before we can secure its growth on 
a regional level.  In supporting his claim that NGOs can be 
organised more easily and on a small scale, Datta has this to say: 
“...Non-governmental cooperation can be organized on a small 
scale with a modest beginning, but gradually growing into a more 
ambitious framework.”  These small-scale organisations around 
issue-networks on democracy, migration and human rights, 
                                      
345
   Glenn Farred, Personal Communication, 16th October, 2002. 
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amongst others, must form the platform upon which functional 
linkages on a regional scale can be built346.   
 
She argues further  that the second advantage to be derived from 
non-governmental co-operation on a national level first, stems 
from the fact that they are largely free from the formalities 
associated with protocol and related issues.  This she contends 
enables NGOs to: “... foster local initiative and harness the vast 
source of experience and energy available at the grassroots level. 
Because it is not constrained by protocol, co-operation through 
NGOs can be also selective, emphasizing the role of certain 
organizations while leaving out other organizations which do not 
conform to the goals set before the specific process of 
cooperation.” (In Odén and Othman, 1989:95-96).  Once these 
NGOs can “stand on their own ‘feet’ they can regionalise their 
activities. 
 
What should be of special interests are voluntary organisations in 
which women participate.  Indeed, women represent a key social 
force for southern Africa co-operation at the grassroots level, for 
they are able to find easily a common language across borders 
and continent, united by the same similarity of their experiences 
and roles in society.  Fredrik Söderbaum and Ian Taylor, writing on 
the informal market in Mozambique, point out that: “The informal 
market expanded to all corners of the country as well as linking up 
with neighbouring countries, marking the beginning of the 
institution of mukhero, a largely informal movement of people, 
mostly women, buying and transporting all types of goods, 
vegetables, fruits, clothes and small home appliances, between 
Mozambique and South Africa and Swaziland to buy products to 
sell on the informal market.” (2003:5).  By allowing women to play 
a more proactive role in the economic, political and social spheres 
                                      
346
  Institutional co-ordination as a form of networking is of particular importance for 
the enhancement of South-South co-operation.  Anne Brabel argues that these 
network can perform three functions: (1) to give voice to NGOs vis-à-vis 
governments and the public; (2) to gather information on the NGO community and to 
disseminate it; (3) to provide a forum for members to discuss issues and problems.” 
(1987:x11).   
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(the all-embracing security scope), provides them with an 
opportunity to advance and protect their interests.  
Towards this end, the education of women is a precondition to 
building a sustainable civil society in southern Africa.  According to 
Ken Booth and Peter Vale educating women is “... a necessary 
building block in a security policy which aims to reduce population 
growth; to combat the social and economic difficulties that arise 
from disease; and to overcome the problems that arise from 
inadequate economic development.”347 They rightly conclude that: 
“Without the emancipation of women there will not be lasting 
regional security [and development] in Southern Africa.” 
(1995:301).  The exclusion of women would make the process of 
regionalism less comprehensive and multifaceted. 
Recently, some national based organisations are forging regional 
links.  The local Educational Research Associations in Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland are all branches of a regional organisation.  
Most significantly, the formation of regional environmental and 
human rights networks348, all point to growing NGO involvement in 
the region.  The contention here is that a regional civil society, 
which transcends state-led notions of regionalism, can be best 
built on the political space between constituted authority and the 
people.   
 
As Francis Kornegay (2001) illustrates, the impulses for 
reconstituting state-civil society relations in southern Africa already 
exists.  This is demonstrated by: “The recent unprecedented letter 
by the Catholic bishops indicting Mugabe’s government, and the 
                                      
347
  Although the WID debate has been a prominent theme on the NGO schedule in 
general, the spill-over” effects of such debate are not yet discernible in Southern 
Africa. 
  
348
 A defining moment was witnessed when organised South African gay community 
in 1995 protested against the presence of Robert Mugabe in that country, after he had 
violated the common law rights of gays in Zimbabwe.  This event can provide the 
impulse for effective pressure at inter-state level, Peter Vale, Personal 
Communication, 20th November, 2002.     
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forward position of the church communities in Zambia and Malawi 
in opposing life presidencies, indicate that an outline of a 
multifaceted strategy to reverse the [anti-democracy] trend in the 
region is beginning to suggest itself.” (The Star, 14 May 2001).  
Kornegay suggests further that the ecumenical group in southern 
Africa should support the search and sustenance for democracy 
on a regional scale.  In such a way, these groups could positively 
contribute to the establishment of durable structures of 
governance and increase regionness.  In addition to the above 
organisations, more spontaneous informal networks have also 
taken root in the region. 
 
Writing on southern Africa, Sandra McClean asserts that: “…. 
Informal groups… have formed various liaisons in the region as 
protective gestures as well as various nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) that operate at a regional level for the 
redirection of policy in areas of environment, human and economic 
rights, basic needs, and gender equity.” (2001:128)349.  Although 
most of these strategies are related to the struggle for survival, 
they contribute significantly to processes of regionalisation ‘from 
below’ and increased regionness.  These spontaneous 
transnational processes also illustrate that regionalism in southern 
Africa are also re-defined by ‘the people’ who are conscious of 
their transnational past and form a transnational community in 
doing so.  However, NGOs in southern Africa, like elsewhere in 
the South, face a number of obstacles.  The most critical of these 
problems are that regional governments have an innate distrust of 
civil society and often undermine their ability to play a meaningful 
role in regional development.     
 
                                      
349
   Carol Thompson argues that: “Theories of new regionalism also propose that 
regional interactions are not structured by a single market.  In many parts of Southern 
Africa, for example, it is local, rural market which sustain.  These rural markets do 
not acknowledge formal borders, but create their own logic of innovative supply to 
local demand…” (2000:43-44).  This implies that regions and the notion of regional 
communities are also re-defined by ordinary people, who form a transnational 
community in doing so. 
.  
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The exclusion of NGOs by SADC member states when the Organ 
for Politics, Defence and Security was adopted casts doubt about 
the gravity of SADC governments to embrace a broader spectrum 
of stakeholders into the security arena. Earlier agreements 
between SADC and regional NGOs to include a human rights 
monitoring mechanism into the Organ were discarded shortly 
before formalisation of the body (South Scan, 5 July 1996). This 
state of affairs seems to verify Fredrik Söderbaum’s conclusion 
that: “The SADC organ as such is also state-centric and designed 
to promote the national interests and enhance the political stability 
of the existing regimes.” (1998:81).  New approaches to the study 
of regionalism, view the security of states and non-state actors as 
mutually inclusive.      
 
In recent times NGOs have also pronounced that they: “... still 
have no access to the SADC national contact point, nor are they 
allowed access to SADC summit meetings or discussions 
concerning the organ on politics, defence and security.” (Sunday 
Independent, February, 1999).  In 2005, NGOs have also come 
under attack in both Zimbabwe and South Africa, where questions 
were raised about independence, by the presidents of those 
respective countries350.  This perception, James Mittelman argues, 
is fuelled by an understanding that: “Nationally based NGOs serve 
as proxies for international agencies, with little or no organic 
connection to the roots of society.” (1998:860)351.  What this 
suggests is that NGOs, like governments of the region, may also 
be under pressure to placate donors, instead of serving as: “… 
bonding agents in bottom-up struggles.” (Bischoff, 2006:4) of the 
                                      
350
   In the case of South Africa, foreign donor assistance for democracy: “… forms a 
major part of foreign aid to South Africa. The principal objective of aid programmes 
to the country is to influence the political transition and to focus on democratic 
consolidation.” (Hearn, 2000:819). 
 
351
   To ensure that suspicion about the motives of NGOs is eliminated, the SADC-
CNGOs: “… are in the process of developing a Development Charter and Code of 
Ethics for Southern Africa…” (Abie Dithlake, Personal Communication, 25th 
January, 2006).  This would ensure that a framework for dialogue between NGOs and 
governments in southern Africa is established.  
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poor and the marginalised.  In addition to being agents that 
appease donors, NGOs also at times receive funds meant for 
governments. 
       
This makes the relationship between national NGOs and national 
governments acrimonious at best (see table 7).  This difficult 
relationship between NGOs and governments is replicated on a 
regional scale.  This was reiterated by Glenn Farred who points 
out that civil society in SADC are not yet clear on the objectives it 
want to achieve from formal participation in the SADC 
structures352.  To set-out clear objectives the SADC Council of 
NGOs: “… brings all the regional organisations together every 
year through the SADC Civil Society Forum This is to facilitate for 
planning and sharing perspectives.”353.      
 
SADC’s treatment of NGOs has serious implications for future 
inter-governmental and non-governmental relations.  James 
Mittelman argues that regional institutions in southern Africa, so 
far: “… articulate only sporadically with the bearers of change 
within civil society- women’s movements, peasant organizations, 
environmental groups, prodemocracy advocates, etc.” (1996:196).  
This points to a need develop fragile political institutions and the 
nascent civil societies regionally.  Moreover, it provides ample 
evidence that the democratic dimensions needed to incorporate 
the regions’ civil society are absent.  
 
The solution to this obvious predicament, according to Peter Vale, 
is the following: “When SADC... gathers in formal conference, civil 
society needs to set up its own stall. A loud and very messy talk-
shop which can air the increasing amount of disquiet which the 
region's people- as opposed to their governments- feel about the 
processes which democracy and development through Southern 
Africa. Energy, environment, development, human rights, gender 
questions: there must be no end to the talking.”354.  This could 
                                      
352
 Glenn Farred, Personal Communication, 16th October, 2002. 
 
353
   Abie Dithlake, Personal Communication, 25th January, 2006. 
 
354
 A defining moment was witnessed when organised South African gay community 
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provide the impetus for regionalism from ‘below’, a central feature 
of new approaches to regionalism. 
 
It is around issues such as human rights and the environment, 
where the leverage of transnational social movements will have a 
particular bearing on regionalism from ‘below’. However, unlike 
Europe where social forces are perhaps stronger and better 
organised, southern Africa has a moderate history of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) working within a regional 
framework355.  Ansu Datta’s reminder that: “Many non-
governmental regional organisations in Southern Africa have 
function only sporadically.” (1989:97), attests to this.   
     
 Writing on transnational actors in general, Louise Vincent notes 
that they: “... have the capacity to act directly and independently 
and to initiate genuine international co-operation in ways that can 
often supersede the abilities of states.” (1997:125).  Towards this 
end, a framework for social dialogue and mutual enablement 
between NGOs and governments in southern Africa has been 
established in the form of the SADC NGO Council.  
 
The SADC secretariat established an NGO desk in 1994 that is 
located in the Secretariat. To deepen the process of social 
dialogue on a national and regional scale, a SADC NGO Council, 
an environmental sector, a gender unit and a human rights NGO 
network have been established. It is disturbing though that neither 
                                                                                                         
in 1995 protested against the presence of Robert Mugabe in that country, after he had 
violated the common law rights of gays in Zimbabwe.  This event can provide the 
impulse for effective pressure at inter-state level.  Peter Vale, Personal 
Communication, 20th November, 2002.  This conclusion is supported by Jean-
Francois Bayart who opines that the creative energies of African civil societies in 
general, and Southern Africa in this instance, can be more productively unleashed: 
“... by the creation of small collectives established and controlled by rural of urban 
groups (such as local associations) than by parliaments and parties, instruments of the 
state...” (1986:125). 
  
355
  Ansu Datta (1989) has suggested that even though non-governmental co-operation 
is desirable, it should not undermine inter-governmental ventures aimed at 
sustainable development and the provision of security. 
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the unit, nor the sector, or the human rights networks have been 
admitted to SADC Summit meetings. This serves as a reminder 
that governments will not voluntarily broaden the platform for 
regional engagement with non-state actors. 
 
By working beyond the parameters accorded by state-centric 
definitions of regions and regional communities, NGOs contribute 
to increasing the quality of regionness in southern Africa.  Sandra 
McClean observes that: “To the extent that these various NGOs 
build horizontal and vertical networks for communication, 
advocacy and knowledge-sharing purposes, they appear to 
contribute to an emerging sense of… regional citizenship.” 
(1999:950).  NGOs, therefore, fulfil a critical role as builders of a 
region and regional community that transcends state-centrism ad 
enhances regionalism “from below”. Moreover, a social identity 
beyond the territorial state in southern Africa is considerably 
enhanced by increased social contacts and informal economic 
transactions, which not only create a social system, but also 
facilitates some sort of regionness.  By sharing a social identity, 
communities are allowed to broaden the definition of a region.   
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5.3.2. Transcending State-Centrism: Informal regionalism in 
Southern Africa 
 
 
 
It has been argued elsewhere that contemporary studies of regions 
and regionalism recognise the need to transcend purely state-
centric notions of regionalism.  Non-state actors also have a role to 
play in the construction of regions and regional community.  This 
suggests that social and political forces beyond the state also drive 
regionalism.  Beyond the expansion of the region in its institutional 
form, opportunities have also opened up for non-state informal 
actors to broaden the conception of the region and the notion of a 
regional community in southern Africa.  Already developments 
within the region accords ordinary people the change to construct 
a southern Africa that lies beyond the geometry of state-
sovereignty. 
 
For Peter Vale the above suggests: “… that southern Africans 
believe that the state system no longer offers solutions to their 
everyday problems: it neither delivers security nor satisfies a 
desire for community.  As a result, they are driven to find fresh 
terrains of regional intercourse, like cross-border trading, and to 
explore old ones, like cross-border migration.” (2003:135).  This 
suggests that southern Africans are conscious of their 
transnational past and use it to reconstruct a regional community 
that transcends the geometry of state sovereignty.  The migration 
and cross-border informal economic activities of the people of 
southern Africa, also allows them to form a transnational 
community that lies outside the confines of states in the region. 
 
The migration and cross-border informal economic activities of the 
people of southern Africa, suggests that equitable and sustainable 
development can only be achieved on the basis of full economic 
and political participation of the poor.  In addition, informal trade 
and socio-cultural, which takes place across borders in southern 
Africa, could also assist in deepening regional integration and a 
sense of regionness.  This suggests that the trans-border activities 
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of these informal actors lend new meaning to conception of a 
southern African region and what constitute a regional 
community356. 
Peter Vale and Khabele Matlosa argue that: “Southern Africa’s 
people belong together more than just by dint of geography; 
ancient ties of kinship straddle each of the region’s innumerable 
boundaries.  These ties have been reinforced by the porous nature 
of these national boundaries, which has created a single unified 
economy.” (1995:6).  This single unified economy is held up by 
mining labour, illegal migrants, cultural transactors and informal 
traders in southern Africa.    Thus, the economic, cultural and 
social interactions and interdependencies of workers, consumers, 
informal traders and a host of other social agents at the regional 
level should also shape our conception of the region and 
regionalism.  The above suggests that southern Africa’s people 
have contributed to a sense of regionness that transcends nation-
states and national boundaries in the region.  Informal trade 
patterns in the region, supports the contention that southern 
Africa’s people have contributed to a sense of regionness that 
transcends nation-states and national boundaries.  
Fredrik Söderbaum observes that: “There exists also a more 
informal economic and sociocultural cross-border interaction 
among small and private business, traders and people, ethnic and 
cultural networks, and so forth more or less all over Southern 
Africa.  Well-known examples include the cross-border interaction 
in Southern Malawi and Mozambique, eastern Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique; southern DRC and Zambia, or, to use a more 
specific case, the Zimbabwean women traders connecting Harare, 
Gaborone, and Johannesburg in an informal trading network.  
Some of these cross-border activities arise for sociocultural and 
historical reasons, as a consequence of the irrelevance of current 
national borders, while others are based on price and institutional 
                                      
356
   James Mittelman suggests that: “Creative potential for bringing about sustainable 
growth and democracy lies in popular support and a sense of involvement of multiple 
strata of the population.” (1996:208). 
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differences between countries with common borders.” 
(Söderbaum, 2001:111-112)357.  Such social contacts and 
transactions not only contribute to increase regionness, but also 
illustrate that regions are created and re-created by the actions of 
non-state actors as well. 
Peter Vale and Khabele Matlosa note that beyond the geometry of 
state-sovereignty in southern Africa: “The search for a better life 
has also recently forged new patterns of migration.  Literally 
thousands of traders are ignoring borders to broaden their 
economic prospects.  Fishermen are moving across borders in 
search of new catches, while farmers are moving to escape 
drought and pestilence.  Others, such as the female traders who 
travel daily between Zimbabwe and South African, represent 
important new forms of employment in a region desperately short 
of jobs.” (1995:5).  Such spontaneous networks of individuals and 
groups, that often use historically forges cultural and social ties, 
transcend state-centric notions of regions and regionalism358.  As 
such, they form a transnational community that lies beyond the 
narrow conception of regionalism by states.  
 
Zimbabwean rural dwellers who regularly cross the Mozambican 
border, James Mittelman assert that: “The attitude among these 
peasant farmers is that borders are a nuisance that interfere with 
both their livelihood and relations with kind, redound to the 
advantage of the well-to-do, and are another way that the political 
authorities seek to impose control.  In this instance, the state is 
seen as constraining crossborder flows- of fish, ivory, meat, 
marijuana and spirits- rooted in culture and economy.” (1998:854).  
These economic and cultural ties point to the existence of regional 
formations that pre-date the establishment and conception of a 
region by state-markers in southern Africa.  Through their actions, 
                                      
357
   Ken Booth and Peter Vale observe that: “The story of southern Africa’s economic 
development has been the story of the migration of its peoples.” (1995:286). 
 
358
   Peter Vale postulates: “… that southern Africans are searching for understandings 
of community that lie beyond struggles that until now have centred on the unfolding 
discourse of colonialism, statist power and more recently, economic liberalism.” 
(2003:156).     
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therefore, these actors transcend state-centric notions of 
regionalism.               
 
In addition to the above, the migration and cross-border informal 
economic activities of the people of southern Africa have lent new 
meaning and value to the region and notions of regional 
community and in doing so contribute to regionness.  Mozambican 
and Zimbabwean traders are as proximate as Johannesburg, 
South Africans and as far as Oshakati, Namibia.  The actions of 
these people illustrate that regions are also re-defined by ‘the 
people’ who are aware of their transnational past and form a 
transnational community in doing so.  Not only do these actors 
through their actions contribute to regionness, they add a new 
dimension to understanding state-society relations in the region. 
 
The above networks illustrate that an expanded conception of 
region and the notion of a regional community that transcend 
state-centrism: “… owes its origins to the efforts of civil society 
actors- both informal groups that have formed various liaisons in 
the region as protective gestures as well as various NGOs that 
operate at a regional level for the redirection of policy in areas of 
environment, human and economic rights, basic needs and gender 
equity. (McClean, 1999:948).  In the search for a new approach to 
regionalism in southern Africa it also indicates that: “… southern 
Africans are searching for understandings of community that lie 
beyond struggles that until now have centered on the unfolding 
discourse of colonialism, statist power, and more recently, 
economic liberalism.” (2003:156).    The search for such a 
community requires both a higher degree of internal societal 
participation and the intra-regional participation of non-
governmental forces. 
 
Larry Swatuk and Peter Vale note that: “A peaceful and secure 
Southern Africa would be one in which resources use is 
sustainable and equitable; where the region’s people have an 
equal opportunity to move, unrestricted, throughout the region on 
the basis of informed choices in order to enhance their life 
chances… and, in so doing, choose a more inclusive kind of 
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regional, humanistic identity.” (2001:48)359.  Such society-induced 
forms of regionalisation are critical for the success of new 
approaches to regionalism, and the building of a trans-regional 
economy and civil society. 
 
Ultimately, new forms of regionalism are thus a pluralist 
phenomenon that concerns itself with various fields of activity and 
at various levels.  This creates the opportunity for both state and 
non-state actors to build new regional economic and political 
capacity.  The regional institutions listed below have a critical role 
to play in advancing regional integration from ‘below’ in southern 
Africa.  Through monitoring the activities of SADC, they provide 
the impulses upon which a region-wide public debate about the 
direction of SADC should be based.   
   
 
                                      
359
 Larry Swatuk and Peter Vale remind us, however, that: historically: “The region’s 
resources and its people have been exploited in an unsustainable fashion.  More 
recently, there have been attempts to redefine development on the region’s own 
terms.  One such attempt involves the community-based management of natural 
resources.  Should this endeavour prove successful, it may in the future lay the basis 
for broader, non-state-centric forms of cooperation in the region.” (Vale and Swatuk, 
2001:39; Thompson, 2000).  For Developmental regionalism to succeed in southern 
Africa, there is a need to forge viable economies, by, inter alia, judiciously exploiting 
common natural resources.    
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Table 5. Regional Non-Governmental Organisation in SADC 
 
Monitoring SADC 
 
A number of organisations were established with the expressed 
purpose of monitoring SADC and regional co-operation.   
 
Organisation Location Activity 
Southern Africa 
Research and 
Documentation Centre  
Harare, Zimbabwe They produce SADC’s 
official quarterly 
publication, SADC 
Today.  The regional 
economic development 
and integration 
programme, also 
prepares working 
papers on a number of 
issues, especially a 
series termed 20 years 
of Development in 
Southern Africa.  The 
democracy programme 
produces the quarterly 
Renaissance, A 
Review of Democracy 
and Governance in 
Southern Africa.  The 
gender programme 
(The Women in 
Development Southern 
Africa Awareness) 
works closely with the 
SADC Gender Unit and 
produces, amongst 
others, the annual 
SADC Gender Monitor 
and a newsletter on 
gender and 
development- GAD 
Exchange.  Their 
Communicating the 
Environment 
Programme puts out a 
CEP Fact Sheet six 
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times a year.     
Electoral Institute of 
Southern Africa  
South Africa Plays a key role in 
shaping debates about 
electoral legislation 
and election 
observation in the 
region.  They also 
acted as the interim 
secretariat of the 
SADC Electoral 
Commission Forum.  
The Institute of Global 
Dialogue 
South Africa The institute, a foreign 
policy think-tank, now 
conduct research 
projects on 
democratisation in 
southern Africa and on 
trade/competition 
policy.   
The Namibian 
Economic Policy 
Research Unit 
Namibia The Unit has been 
holding annual 
research workshops on 
aspects of SADC and 
regional integration. 
SAPES Zimbabwe The regional research-
cum-network institute 
historically played an 
important role in the 
scholarly debate on 
SADC and regional co-
operation. 
The Institute for 
Security Studies 
South Africa This institute produces 
much on the evolving 
security architecture 
and security policies 
through its journal 
African Security 
Review, and a range of 
other publications. 
The South African 
Institute of International 
Affairs  
South Africa The institute has 
hosted a number of 
conferences and 
workshops on various 
dimensions of regional 
co-operation. 
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Source: Isaksen, J. 2002. Restructuring SADC- Progress and 
Problems. Bergen, Norway: Chr Michelsen Institute. 
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Table 6. Sector Network in SADC 
Organisations Activities 
The Southern African Human Rights 
NGO Network 
Established in 1997, the main activities 
of this network appear to be focussed 
on campaigning against police brutality, 
promotion of freedom of expression, 
and capacity building in human rights 
education. 
The Media Institute of Southern 
Africa   
Established in 1992, it focuses 
primarily on the need to promote free, 
independent and pluralistic media.  It 
seeks ways in which to promote the 
free flow of information and co-
operation between media workers, as a 
principal means of nurturing democracy 
and human rights.    
The Food, Agriculture and Natural 
Resources Policy Analysis Network 
(FANRPAN) 
It brings together a number of the key 
non-state actors, but there appears to 
be limited activity at the regional level. 
The Project Support Group Comprises NGOs that work in the fields 
of health and social work, and related 
HIV/AIDS activities. 
Women and Law in Southern Africa 
and Women in Law and 
Development in Southern Africa 
See sardc.net 
Economic Justice Network 
(Zimbabwe); the African Forum and 
Network on Debt and Development 
(Zimbabwe); the Southern and 
Eastern African Trade, Information 
and Negotiation Initiative 
(Zimbabwe); Jubilee South Africa 
and the Alternative Information and 
All these networks campaign against 
corporate globalisation, focussing on 
issues such as international finance, 
trade and debt.  
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Development Centre (AIDC)  
The Southern African Defence and 
Security Management Network 
(SADSEM) 
They offer training courses in 
democratic civil-military relations and 
management of peace support 
operations to senior defence officials 
and military officers. 
Macroeconomic and Financial 
Management Institute of Eastern 
and Southern Africa (MEFMI) 
Its activities are targeted at building 
capacity in critical areas of 
macroeconomic and financial 
management. 
Mweleko wa NGO (MWENGO) It was established in 1999 as a 
reflection and development centre to 
enhance the capacity of NGOs in 
Eastern and Southern Africa.  It is 
currently playing an important role in 
equipping NGOs to respond to the new 
challenges opened-up by the European 
Union/ACP Cotonou Agreement.   
 
Source: Source: Isaksen, J. 2002. Restructuring SADC- Progress and 
Problems. Bergen, Norway: Chr Michelsen Institute. 
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Table 7. Non-Governmental Organisations and their relationships with 
governments in the region 
 
Country Organisations Government-NGO 
Relations 
Angola Forum for Angolan NGOs is 
the umbrella body.  
Because of the nature of 
politics and political 
institutions in that country, 
very little interaction 
occurs between Angolan 
NGOs and their 
government. 
Botswana Council of NGOs umbrella 
body. 
Government consults 
NGOs about policies. 
DRC No umbrella organisation 
for NGOs exists in this 
country. 
The precarious nature of 
the political regime in the 
DRC contributes to the 
weak relationship between 
the government and 
NGOs. 
Lesotho The Lesotho Council of 
NGOs established in 
1990,is the umbrella body.  
It concentrates on human 
rights and drought relief. 
Relationship with 
government is limited to 
participating in economic 
forums and contributions 
to elections preparations. 
Malawi Council for NGOs umbrella 
body in Malawi. 
The NGO umbrella body 
has representation at all 
levels.  Its relations with 
government can be seen 
as good. 
Mozambique No NGO umbrella body 
exists in this country. 
Coordination body called 
link: 50% national and 50% 
international NGOs. 
Because of the 
fragmented nature of the 
NGO community in this 
country its relations with 
government is weak, and 
hence its policy influence 
minimal. 
Mauritius No NGO umbrella body 
exists in Mauritius.  
NGO and the government 
relations are non-existent. 
South Africa SANGOF is the umbrella 
body. 
Strong policy dialogue and 
influence with 
government: many SA 
government functionaries 
and leaders from NGO 
sector. 
Swaziland Coordinating Assembly of 
NGOs formed in 1983. 
Government has a 
precarious relationship 
with NGOs.  
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Tanzania TANGO co-
ordinating body 
works 
NGOs have a dialogue with government, but 
not yet a development partnership.  The 
recently formed NGO debt coalition in Tanzania 
seeks to establish such a development 
partnership. 
Zambia Two co-ordinating 
bodies: NGOCC 
(gender) and 
ZCSD (all) 
Government-NGO relations are good. Indeed 
the Zambian government finances for some 
NGOs, and also seconds technical staff to 
NGOs, amongst others.  However, civil society 
actors’ vehemently opposed recent calls for a 
third term by the Chiluba government.  
Moreover, civil society in that country are also 
actively involved in drafting plans for spending 
money made available by debt relief on 
reducing poverty. (Mail and Guardian, January 
12 to 18, 2001).   
Zimbabwe National 
Association of 
NGOs 
Relations between especially the trade union, 
which is now the official opposition and the 
government, are tenuous. 
 
 
Source: National Economic Development and Labour Council, 
March 1999. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
 
 
It has been illustrated that in the 1990s, the character and 
functions of regions have experienced a major transformation.  
Similarly, the process of uneven globalisation, which excludes 
some sectors from the global production system, have opened-up 
political space in which civil society activities could be expanded.  
In the context of southern African regionalism, the argument is that 
social and political forces that transcend the state, also contribute 
to an expanded conception of regions and the notion of 
regionalism in southern Africa.   
 
The implications of the above for southern Africans are that they 
are now being granted the opportunity to become agents in the 
regional integration process.  Indeed, informal economic and 
socio-cultural cross-border interaction among small and private 
business, traders and people, ethnic and cultural networks, and so 
forth, are formed more or less all over southern Africa.  These 
linkages are historically embedded provide the impulses upon 
which a better understanding of a southern African community 
beyond national borders, could be built.   
 
Trans-border activities of the people of southern Africa, which 
predates colonialism, lend new meaning and value to the region 
and the notion of regional communities, and, in doing so, provide 
or make allowance for the conception of regionalism, which 
transcends state-centrism.  The shared history and culture of the 
people of southern Africa, already provides the impulses around 
which these economic and cultural networks can be developed 
regionally.  This allows southern Africans the opportunity to 
establish a regional system that transcends state-centred 
understanding of community in southern Africa. 
 
New approaches to the study of regionalism also recognise the 
specific historical experience of a particular space.  This inherent 
regionness presupposes that regions are also re-defined by ‘the 
people’ who are conscious of their transnational past and form a 
transnational community in doing so.  This suggests that 
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alternative conceptions of the region do exist and finds 
manifestation in increasing cross-regional contact of ordinary 
people.  New regionalism incorporates and explains these 
empirical phenomena.     
 
The construction of a new regional community need to be based 
on understanding these spontaneous intercourses, which have 
been borne from the mingling brought about by increasing cross-
border contact.  Such spontaneous networks of individuals and 
groups that often use historically embedded cultural and social ties 
transcend state-centric notions of regions and regionalism.  As 
such, they form a transnational community that lies beyond the 
narrow conception of regionalism by states.  Cross-regional 
contact of ordinary people illustrates that a nascent community is 
being formed beyond the frontiers of southern African states.  With 
the re-construction of organisations of the sub-region, it was 
hoped that these organisations were to become more responsive 
to both spontaneous processes unfolding in the region and more 
organised sectors of civil society, such as NGOs.  
 
 The provision made by SADC for NGO participation in the region 
is the interface at which bottom-up civil society gets recognise by 
the state body.  This has allowed these NGOs to provide 
meaningful input to building a regional community that is not state-
dominated and elite-driven.  The Southern African Human Rights 
NGO Network, The SADC Parliamentary Forum and the Electoral 
Institute of Southern Africa360 are all- through monitoring the 
activities of SADC- providing the impulses upon which a region-
wide public debate about the direction of SADC should be based. 
     
The actions of regional NGOs and the ordinary people in the 
struggle for democracy in countries such as Swaziland and 
                                      
360
  While these two organisations provide an invaluable service to the region, it has 
limitations.  For instance, the SADC-PF is not a regional parliament with legislative 
powers to hold the SADC Summit accountable. It ostensibly function, therefore, is to 
serve as a watch-dog body, while regional elites shape and drive regional integration. 
Similarly, Electoral Commission Forum strives to enhance the effectiveness of the 
election commissions in managing elections and ensuring democratic quality 
elections. The Forum has so far played a limited role in influencing SADC in striving 
towards quality elections and institutionalising democracy.         
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Zimbabwe suggests that the route to community in the region lie 
outside the discourses of power which have constructed the 
region’s current state system.  The actions of these non-state 
actors not only lead to transforming the region’s economic and 
political landscape, but also imply that social relations include a 
regional dimension.  Moreover, it represents a compelling example 
of both developing identity and community in formation beyond 
national borders.  It also suggests that the route to community in 
the region may well lie beyond the discourses of power which 
have constructed the region’s current state system.  As such, 
using state-centric lenses to define southern Africa, suggest a 
poor basis for understanding the region.     
 
 It also shows that local goals can be achieved by reaching out to 
the broader region in order to realise ostensible national goals.  
This offers southern Africans the opportunity to construct a 
regional community based on shared concerns and charted by 
human-centred politics.  The establishment of regional sub-
networks on debt and poverty in southern Africa means that 
organised civil society actors as agents for a new region are 
engaging regional governments to ensure that the poor and the 
marginalised in southern Africa benefit from it.  This suggests that 
the dominant conception of a regional community in southern 
Africa driven by states alone is increasingly at odds with events on 
the ground.  
 These linkages represent both an opportunity and challenge in the 
search for a developmental regional civil society in southern 
Africa.  What has been demonstrated is that there are both 
attempts at radically transforming society- an alternative regional 
order- and attempts at simply reforming the existing regional 
order. The division between the Landless Peoples Movement, 
APF, Jubilee on one side, and SANGOCO on the other, at the 
World Summit on Development march, because of accusations 
that SANGOCO is giving in to government pressure, illustrates the 
difficulties that society based actors have to overcome in a 
national setting361.   
 
                                      
361
  I am indebted to Aswin Desai for this point.  
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Moreover, this suggests that a process of political struggle is 
underway in the region, which weighs heavily in favour of the 
dominant capitalist classes.  This is because dominant interests 
are powerful in organisational terms and tends to penetrate and 
influence state policy far more than community movements or 
even institutionalised non-governmental organisations.  This 
suggests that the disposition of states in the region remain critical 
in determining the scope and content of both inter-state and 
transnational relations.  Moreover, it implies that even the reform 
of organisations in the sub-region is not wholly responsive to 
bottom-up regionalism developing outside the confines of regional 
states.  What is needed to enhance and sustain this process of 
bottom-up regionalism among NGOs is to establish networks with 
their Northern counterparts.       
 
NGOs also have much to gain from forging North-South linkages.  
The coalition formed by South African NGOs and former anti-
apartheid groups in Germany, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom are indicative of the potential for building North-South 
NGO alliances.  The conference that was held in December 2000 
in Bonn, Germany, called on foreign banks to compensate the 
people of Southern Africa for the brutal repression they helped 
finance (Mail and Guardian, December 8 to 14, 2000).  This 
initiative is part of a broader movement called the International 
Campaign on Apartheid-Caused Debt in southern Africa. 
What is ultimately happening is that across the region progressive 
elements in civil society are challenging the state on several 
fronts: on gender issues, the rights of minorities, industrial 
democracy and its failure to deliver redistributive justice.  It is 
around these issue-areas and informal networks, which occur 
beyond the geometry of state influence that a developmental 
regional civil society can best be built.  These struggles, mute as 
they are, could be the precursors of a more intense and sustained 
struggle for a developmental regional civil society in southern 
Africa.  
 
Ultimately, the delimitation of the region will have to decidedly be 
determined by actual practice, and not just (physical) geography 
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or formal political and economic co-operation.  Civil societies, like 
governments and transnational forces, have the ability to 
penetrate and transcend national economies and societies as is 
the case in contemporary southern Africa.  Solutions to issues 
such as disease, the displacement of people, developmental 
democracy and migration, will only be properly addressed if there 
is increased interaction between and among peoples of the region 
through the establishment of trans-regional issue-networks. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, regions and regional concerts 
were seen as the basis upon which a new international order was 
to be built.  In the post-Cold War period, the study of regions and 
regionalism need to recognise that only states participate in the 
construction of regions and the practice of regionalism.  The 
definition of regions and regionalism needs to recognise that other 
actors also participate in the construction of regions and the 
practice of regionalism.  A broader definition of regions and 
regionalism, which such a re-conceptualisation would entail, 
presupposes an inclusive typology of both state-based and 
society-based actors.  
      
Such an expanded regional space provides for a different and 
multifaceted conception of regions and the notion of regional 
communities.  This suggests that what is needed, in the 1990s and 
beyond, is a new type of regionalism that is, among others, open 
and inclusive and driven by both state and non-state actors.  
Social constructivism, which informs definitions of regionalism in 
the 1990s, and as such has displaced previous approaches, views 
regions as social and political constructs, formed by both states 
and non-state actors.  The study of regional integration in southern 
Africa has largely been conducted within the confines of inter-state 
integration.  As such integration in the region has not catalogue 
non-state actor integration. 
In the context of southern Africa, a ‘new’ approach to the study of 
regionalism opened-up possibilities for recognising that 
regionalism in its contemporary form is a multifaceted process that 
involves both state and non-state actors and occurs within the 
institutional space provided by states, but also outside of such 
space.  This would entail re-configuring the definition of southern 
Africa, to make allowance for such insights.  In the context of 
southern Africa, a ‘new’ approach to the study of regionalism 
open-up possibilities for recognising that regionalism in its 
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contemporary form is a multifaceted process that involves both 
state and non-state actors, and covers a range of issues. 
Up to now, mainstream theories of integration have historically 
concern itself only with the role of the state.  It is, however, 
necessary to probe how integration theory accounts for a change 
in regionalism in the 1990s and beyond.  Theories of neo-
functionalism and Transactionalism, deal incompletely with 
outcomes appropriate to developing countries.  State-centric 
conceptions of regionalism inadequately deal with issues of a 
transnational nature, such as poverty and unemployment.  As a 
result, people remain vulnerable to top-down forms of regionalism 
driven by the forces of globalisation.  This calls for a new 
approach in the analytical study of regionalism in a transnational 
context.  The transformation of the world economy, in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, has contributed to renewed calls for a 
new approach in the analytical study of regionalism in a 
transnational context.   
Historically, however, SADCC used neo-functionalist precepts 
since its formation, while SACU has also been an inter-state 
regional grouping.  One of the positive spin-offs from following 
neo-functionalist logic since its formation was that the countries in 
southern Africa collectively mobilised resources for infrastructural 
development based on co-ordinated and mutually perceived 
common interests.  
Furthermore, the usefulness of state-centric Neo-Functionalism in 
southern Africa was obvious at the level of the integration and 
socialisation of regional elites.  This produced a strong sense of 
political solidarity and co-operation among these elites.  It should 
be used to deepen the integration process in southern Africa.  
However, political solidarity and co-operation alone will not lead to 
supranationality.  This would require the capacity of both state and 
non-state actors.  
The prime failure of Neo-functionalism in southern Africa, 
therefore, is that non-state actors have been excluded in regional 
integration efforts.  For regionalism in southern Africa to cater for 
broad-based development, there is a need to involve states, 
markets and civil society, since these are already expanding on 
their own and creating ‘facts on the ground’.  This suggests that 
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regionalism needs to capture the activities of non-state actors as 
well. 
The rise of transactionalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
presupposed that cultural, economic and political aspects of 
integration could no longer be understood within the bounds of 
states alone.  Though it takes a less rigid view, transactionalism as 
another approach to the study of integration, is similarly state-
centred in its definition of regional organisation.  Here integration 
concerns itself with processes in which supranational institutions 
possessing binding decision-making power emerge from a 
convergence of self-interest on the part of various significant 
groups in society.  While both SADCC and SACU made significant 
progress in the establishment of institutions possessing binding 
decision-making power, both excluded societal groups in their 
decision-making process.     
The exclusion of societal groups in the decision-making processes 
of both SACU and SADCC occurred despite the technological 
developments that have produced world-wide information and 
communication networks.  Furthermore, this exclusion also 
occurred despite the growth of transnational networks in the 
region. The growth of transnational relations in the region was 
exemplified by labour migration in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Transnational labour migration patterns during the 1970s and 
1980s mirrored the trends in economic interdependencies among 
the nations in the region.  The cobweb of relations that resulted 
from these technological developments has produced a deepening 
of social relations.  In southern Africa the liberation struggles 
waged by the peoples of the region resulted in a deepening of 
social relations.  Furthermore, cross-border economic exchanges 
and migration, brought about by worsening economic conditions in 
the 1980s have further reinforced these relations.  However, all 
these have as yet not been developed into regional loyalties.   
Whilst a nascent regional consciousness and identity, which was 
fostered, inter alia, by a common British colonial past, the 
liberation struggle and informal trade, exist in southern Africa, the 
regional inter-governmental bodies have failed to bring all sections 
of the region’s societies into the mainstream of regional economic 
and political integration efforts.  Regional integration needs to 
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touch the lives of the ordinary citizens of the region, since the 
building of new loyalties in the context of regional institutions can 
also contribute to pre-empting physical conflict.   
This presupposes that we expand the conception of security to 
accommodate the marginalised, and as such begin to address 
broad-based development. Indeed, the poor and the marginalised 
should become involved in determining the content and form of 
regionalism.  Thus, the building of a transnational community in 
the region that embrace both state and non-state actors, should 
encompass the most fundamental regional development.  The 
New Regionalism approach can considerably contribute to 
achieving this.  New regionalism, on the other hand, provides a 
framework for both state and non-state actors to set parameters 
for building new regional economic capacity. 
New Regionalism as the creation of facts on the ground, amounts 
to an uncontrolled growth in transnational forces which has 
unintended consequences, like polarization.  This makes a 
regional redistributive mechanism necessary or justifiable.  It is 
now recognised that regional development is contingent on co-
ordinated development, which implicitly necessitates a regional 
intervention mechanism. In southern Africa, this intellectual shift is 
most clearly visible in the move from a Co-ordinating Conference 
to a Development Community. 
 
This shift in thinking necessarily implies renewed thinking on how 
to address the issues of a lasting regional order, against the 
background of changing national, regional and international 
realities. Market mechanisms, it is widely acknowledged, cannot 
address the issue of the fair distribution of benefits resulting from 
regional integration. Neither can it shed light on the vexing 
question on how to ensure that industrialisation should or could 
benefit the less-developed members of the integrating community 
in southern Africa.  
Furthermore, the role to be played by non-state actors - and the 
framework needed to clarify that role - will have to be the product 
of increased engagement between the states of southern Africa 
and non-state actors.  This would require popular participation in 
and control of national and regional decision-making by citizens 
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through their representative bodies such as political parties, trade 
unions and others.  The establishment of democratic and vibrant 
civil societies throughout the region is an essential precondition for 
this.   
In this regard, state and non-state actors have a critical role to 
play in transforming regional institutions, to confront the challenge 
of integration in the next century.  Developmental Regionalism, as 
a critical element of New Regionalism, has important lessons to 
offer, and indeed aptly articulates the process of regionalism 
unfolding in southern Africa.  Historically, the political nature of 
regionalism, still make it difficult for states to make allowance for 
non-state actors in their attempts to deepen regional integration in 
southern Africa.      
The history of regionalism in southern Africa, up to 1994, was 
premised on political considerations, not developmental ones.  In 
the case of SACU, for instance, South Africa promoted regional 
development centred on its own parochial national economy.  This 
is illustrated by South Africa’s development of its manufacturing 
capacity since the mid-1920s. Furthermore, the trade balance that 
weighs heavily in favour of South Africa in the Customs Union 
bears testimony to lopsided economic development in SACU.  
The goal of overall economic development was never part of the 
logic that underscored SACU.  To the contrary, South Africa was 
more concerned with counter-acting the trade diversion suffered 
by smaller member countries, as a result of it pursuing its own 
economic goals.  This prompted the introduction of a 
compensatory mechanism and distribution of additional revenue.   
The reliance of these smaller countries on this revenue, which 
constitutes a major portion of their public revenue, further 
entrenched their dependence on South Africa (See table 1).  
Furthermore, not only does South Africa dwarf these countries in 
terms of population (see table 3), they also rely heavily on South 
Africa’s telecommunication channels, its road and rail routes, 
especially to the sea.  Moreover, one of the essential dimensions 
of the dependent relation between South Africa and smaller 
Customs Union members remains labour migration. 
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Moreover, both SACU Non-SACU member states were reliant on 
the apartheid Republic for transport and export routes (rail and 
port traffic).  South Africa also had control over the service sector 
and (the marketing of regional agricultural produce.  In the 1970s 
and 80s apartheid South Africa made political use of its economic 
dominance by establishing CONSAS.  Historically thus, SACU can 
be viewed as a political arrangement used by South Africa to 
advance its own development through the creation of its own 
market and economic hinterland.  
SACU, in the final analysis, emerged as a pragmatic trade and 
payment arrangement.  It was never a development or growth 
oriented integration programme.  What held SACU together was 
largely due to the revenue that it provided the BLS countries.  The 
distribution of these customs and excise revenue in favour of BLS 
countries was intended to compensate them for the loss of 
sovereignty in setting their own tariffs, for the polarisation effect of 
the Customs Union and for higher prices resulting from 
protectionist policies of South Africa.  Both the 1910 and 1969 
agreements illustrate South Africa’s highhandedness and 
unilateralism, the power of its industrial lobby and the general 
hostage situation of the BLS countries.  The SACU agreements of 
1910 and 1969 were, thus, political not developmental projects.  
The formation of SADCC was, similarly, politically-oriented and not 
developmentally focussed. 
SADCC succeeded in bringing together widely different economic 
and political systems.  Significantly and particularly due to its 
opposition to apartheid, the region alongside the Frontline states 
developed political cohesiveness and forged a regional identity.  
Notwithstanding its reliance on international donor support, it 
achieved limited success in the regional rehabilitation of 
infrastructure.  Lastly, its reliance on donor support produced a 
paradox: SADCC became aid dependent, but managed to retain 
the attention of the international community on southern Africa.  
As such it contributed to ensuring that southern Africa in the 
struggle against apartheid and in responding to regional 
destabilisation does not become marginalised internationally.  
However, SADCC has achieved only limited regional integration 
for a number of reasons. 
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The logic that underpins the existence of SADCC was premised 
on a political goal: to counter South Africa’s economic and military 
hegemony.  As such, governments and political considerations 
drove its instruments of co-operation.  Moreover, the promotion of 
regional development was not clearly encapsulated in the SADCC 
framework for regional co-operation.  Not surprisingly therefore, 
the levels of economic development and industrialisation, were 
low.  Moreover, development priorities, production structures, 
resource allocation and resource endowments, inter alia, were 
diverse.  The lack of higher levels of integration and 
industrialisation, were also influenced by SADCC’s institutional 
structure, which does not compel compliance with regional 
objectives. 
SADCC failed to promote equitable economic integration in the 
region, because it was ostensibly driven by political 
considerations.  Also it was a statist project that did not involve 
non-state actors.  SADCC, thus, failed to co-ordinate national with 
regional development, largely because it was so loosely 
organised, politically diverse, and donor driven, which meant that it 
could never put forward a comprehensive plan for redeveloping 
the region. 
 
Regionalism in the 1990s and beyond needs to account for these 
changing realities.  Political factors in the international relations of 
the region, such as the end of the Cold War, and the weakening of 
states in the region, manifested in less outside aid and support, all 
allows for a more developmental focus.  In addition, weakening 
economies- due to debt and SAPs- gave rise to non-state 
transnational activity.  Cross-border regional contact in the 
aftermath of apartheid, have also opened-up opportunities for 
deeper community building in the region.  
The downfall of apartheid and the end of the Cold War has 
resulted in the quest the promotion of deeper regional co-
operation and integration.  This has led to calls for deeper 
institutionalisation in southern Africa.  Specifically, the BLNS 
countries have argued that that SACU is undemocratic and that 
they were industrially underdeveloped.  South Africa, on the other 
hand, has pointed out that it was no longer willing to subsidise the 
BLNS countries and called for a new revenue-sharing formula.  
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The democratisation of the organisation led to the establishment 
of an inclusive Secretariat, based in Windhoek, Namibia. 
The revenue formula was also reformed, to include an economic 
component which caters for the economic of smaller member 
states.  This is in line with new approaches to regionalism, which 
seek to ensure that members of a regional grouping develop 
collectively.  However, doubts have been expressed on whether 
the reformulated revenue-sharing formula will lead to equitable 
regional development.  Despite the changes to the revenue-
sharing formula and the fact that the institutions of SACU have 
been democratise, the disposition of member states remains 
central to regional integration efforts.  In other words, states 
remain the only actor in the regionalisation and regional 
integration process.  This remains a crucial institutional deficit. 
Nowhere does the institutional reform of SACU cater for the 
involvement of actors outside the institutional structure of the 
organisation.  This suggests that there is as yet no realisation on 
the part of SACU that regional organisations and regions are 
social constructs, which can be moulded to address broad-based 
development.  The non-involvement of non-state actors also 
neglects the fact that people in SACU share a common cultural 
and historical background build on migrant labour, which manifest 
itself in trans-border activities.  These trans-border activities lend 
new meaning to regions and the notion of regional communities.  
In doing so, it contributes to regionness in SACU.  What is 
needed, therefore, is to change the institutional structure of SACU 
to make allowance for informal regionalism, which takes place 
spontaneously throughout the region.  In such a way, SACU as an 
institution can build durable and sustainable regionalism.  The 
early 1990s also saw the reform SADCC into SADC.  
The reconfiguration of SADCC into SADC fuelled the perception 
that a new enthusiasm for regional integration as an essential 
strategy for the achievement of economic development was 
discernable.  Developments in the SADC region have done much 
to heighten such expectations.  SADC constituted itself as a 
legally binding treaty with powers to enforce compliance with 
decisions taken.  It differs thus much from SADCC at the outset.  
However, it was recognised that the institutions of SADC remained 
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weak, because national priorities enjoyed preference over regional 
concerns.  
What compounded this problem was the fact that, whilst SADC is 
a legally binding treaty, member states still seems to focus on 
national as opposed to regional development.  This is a direct 
consequence of the SADC/C’s reliance on consensus in the realm 
of decision-making.  The development integration approach 
adopted by SADC in 1992, posited that the organisation was 
committed to a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to 
regionalism.  This approach, arguably, contributed to the success 
the organisation had in the domains of infrastructural 
development.  SADC was also reasonably successful in securing 
donor funding for developmental projects.  However, such funding 
did not secure the development of regional initiatives, but was 
rather used for national development purposes. 
In addition to the above, the SADC Secretariat remained weak, as 
was pointed out by the review of the organisations’ programmes in 
1997.  The involvement of non-state actors in the SADC 
Programme of Action also evolved considerably since the mid-
1990s.  Recent institutional reforms, suggested that SADC did not 
achieve all its objectives.  It pointed to low levels of integration, 
weak institutional capacity, a reliance of donor aid, which was 
exacerbated by the inability to attract foreign direct investment and 
the non-involvement of sectors outside the organisations’ 
institutional structure. 
SADC be able to heighten its levels of integration if it take 
cognisance of the fact that new approaches to regionalism is a 
comprehensive and multifaceted process that takes place on 
various levels and involve both state and non-state actors.  
Heightening levels of integration presupposes the ‘marriage’ of 
formal and informal processes of integration.   The replacement of 
the sectoral co-ordinating units by directorates, points to previous 
institutional inefficiency. It also must be viewed as an attempt by 
SADC to address the lack of synergy between national and 
regional concerns.  Strengthen the institutional structure of the 
organisation, would ensure that regional institutions become 
durable and sustainable.  The new SADC structure is, thus, a 
major attempt to address the weaknesses, which have 
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characterised SADC institutions since the establishment of the 
Community in 1992. 
To achieve the objectives of region-wide GDP growth of 7 per cent 
SADC as an institution will have to attract considerable foreign 
direct investment.  The organisation also intends to finance some 
of operations of SADC itself.  This does not mean that the 
organisation will not need foreign aid.  Foreign aid will continue to 
play a significant role in, especially, the development of social 
infrastructure, such as in the transport and communication 
sectors. 
SADC had made a concerted effort to involve the private sector in 
regional development, through public-private partnerships.  There 
is, however, as yet, no recognition that societal actors outside of 
its institutions could play a decisive role in deepening regionalism 
and increasing regionness.  As yet, reconstructed organisations of 
the sub-continent have not been sufficiently responsive to bottom-
up regionalism.  What is needed, therefore, is for civil society 
actors to deliberately enhance their capacity for engaging regional 
bodies.  At a formal level, this means strengthening their cross-
border collaboration capacities.  To achieve this, civil society must 
also create the potential economic and social space to play an 
important role in determining the content and scope of regionalism 
in southern Africa. 
 
The character and functions of regions have experienced a major 
transformation.  Similarly, the process of uneven globalisation, 
which excludes some sectors from the global production system, 
have opened-up political space in which civil society activities 
could be expanded.  In the context of southern African 
regionalism, the argument is that social and political forces that 
transcend the state, also contribute to an expanded conception of 
regions and the notion of regionalism in southern Africa.   
 
The implications of the above for southern Africans are that they 
are now being granted the opportunity to become agents in the 
regional integration process.  Indeed, informal economic and 
socio-cultural cross-border interaction among small and private 
business, traders and people, ethnic and cultural networks, and so 
forth, are formed more or less all over southern Africa.  These 
linkages are historically embedded provide the impulses upon 
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which a better understanding of a southern African community 
beyond national borders, could be built.   
 
Trans-border activities of the people of southern Africa, which 
predates colonialism, lend new meaning and value to the region 
and the notion of regional communities, and, in doing so, provide 
or make allowance for the conception of regionalism, which 
transcends state-centrism.  The shared history and culture of the 
people of southern Africa, already provides the impulses around 
which these economic and cultural networks can be developed 
regionally.  This allows southern Africans the opportunity to 
establish a regional system that transcends state-centred 
understanding of community in southern Africa. 
 
New approaches to the study of regionalism also recognise the 
specific historical experience of a particular space.  This inherent 
regionness presupposes that regions are also re-defined by ‘the 
people’ who are conscious of their transnational past and form a 
transnational community in doing so.  This suggests that 
alternative conceptions of the region do exist and finds 
manifestation in increasing cross-regional contact of ordinary 
people.  New regionalism incorporates and explains these 
empirical phenomena.     
 
The construction of a new regional community need to be based 
on understanding these spontaneous intercourses, which have 
been borne from the mingling brought about by increasing cross-
border contact.  Such spontaneous networks of individuals and 
groups that often use historically embedded cultural and social ties 
transcend state-centric notions of regions and regionalism.  As 
such, they form a transnational community that lies beyond the 
narrow conception of regionalism by states.  Cross-regional 
contact of ordinary people illustrates that a nascent community is 
being formed beyond the frontiers of southern African states.  With 
the re-construction of organisations of the sub-region, it was 
hoped that these organisations were to become more responsive 
to both spontaneous processes unfolding in the region and more 
organised sectors of civil society, such as NGOs.  
 
 The provision made by SADC for NGO participation in the region 
is the interface at which bottom-up civil society gets recognise by 
the state body.  This has allowed these NGOs to provide 
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meaningful input to building a regional community that is not state-
dominated and elite-driven.  The Southern African Human Rights 
NGO Network, The SADC Parliamentary Forum and the Electoral 
Institute of Southern Africa are all- through monitoring the 
activities of SADC- providing the impulses upon which a region-
wide public debate about the direction of SADC should be based. 
     
The actions of regional NGOs and the ordinary people in the 
struggle for democracy in countries such as Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe suggests that the route to community in the region lie 
outside the discourses of power which have constructed the 
region’s current state system.  The actions of these non-state 
actors not only lead to transforming the region’s economic and 
political landscape, but also imply that social relations include a 
regional dimension.  Moreover, it represents a compelling example 
of both developing identity and community in formation beyond 
national borders.  It also suggests that the route to community in 
the region may well lie beyond the discourses of power which 
have constructed the region’s current state system.  As such, 
using state-centric lenses to define southern Africa, suggest a 
poor basis for understanding the region.     
 
 It also shows that local goals can be achieved by reaching out to 
the broader region in order to realise ostensible national goals.  
This offers southern Africans the opportunity to construct a 
regional community based on shared concerns and charted by 
human-centred politics.  The establishment of regional sub-
networks on debt and poverty in southern Africa means that 
organised civil society actors as agents for a new region are 
engaging regional governments to ensure that the poor and the 
marginalised in southern Africa benefit from it.  This suggests that 
the dominant conception of a regional community in southern 
Africa driven by states alone is increasingly at odds with events on 
the ground.  
 These linkages represent both an opportunity and challenge in the 
search for a developmental regional civil society in southern 
Africa.  What has been demonstrated is that there are both 
attempts at radically transforming society- an alternative regional 
order- and attempts at simply reforming the existing regional 
order. The division between the Landless Peoples Movement, 
APF, Jubilee on one side, and SANGOCO on the other, at the 
 278
World Summit on Development march, because of accusations 
that SANGOCO is giving in to government pressure, illustrates the 
difficulties that society based actors have to overcome in a 
national setting.   
 
Moreover, this suggests that a process of political struggle is 
underway in the region, which weighs heavily in favour of the 
dominant capitalist classes.  This is because dominant interests 
are powerful in organisational terms and tends to penetrate and 
influence state policy far more than community movements or 
even institutionalised non-governmental organisations.  This 
suggests that the disposition of states in the region remain critical 
in determining the scope and content of both inter-state and 
transnational relations.  Moreover, it implies that even the reform 
of organisations in the sub-region is not wholly responsive to 
bottom-up regionalism developing outside the confines of regional 
states.   
 
What is ultimately happening is that across the region progressive 
elements in civil society are challenging the state on several 
fronts: on gender issues, the rights of minorities, industrial 
democracy and its failure to deliver redistributive justice.  It is 
around these issue-areas and informal networks, which occur 
beyond the geometry of state influence that a developmental 
regional civil society can best be built.  These struggles, mute as 
they are, could be the precursors of a more intense and sustained 
struggle for a developmental regional civil society in southern 
Africa.  
 
Ultimately, the delimitation of the region will have to decidedly be 
determined by actual practice, and not just (physical) geography 
or formal political and economic co-operation.  Civil societies, like 
governments and transnational forces, have the ability to 
penetrate and transcend national economies and societies as is 
the case in contemporary southern Africa.  Solutions to issues 
such as disease, the displacement of people, developmental 
democracy and migration, will only be properly addressed if there 
is increased interaction between and among peoples of the region 
through the establishment of trans-regional issue-networks. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: The Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) 
 
 
Country Independence 
Date 
Government 
Form 
Official 
Language  
Angola 11 November 1975 Unitary Republic Portuguese 
Botswana 30 September 1966 Unitary Republic English, Tswana 
DR Congo 30 June 1960  Unitary Republic French 
Lesotho 4 October 1966 Unitary Kingdom English, South 
Sotho 
Malawi 6 July 1964 Unitary Republic English, Chewa  
Mauritius 12 March 1968  Unitary Republic English, French 
Mozambique 25 June 1975 Unitary Republic Portuguese 
Namibia 21 March 1990 Unitary Republic English 
Seychelles 26 June 1976 Unitary Republic English, French-
Kreole 
South Africa 31 May 1910 Federal Republic English362 
Swaziland 6 September 1968 United Kingdom English, Seswati 
Tanzania 9 December 1961 Unitary Republic English 
Zambia 24 October 1964 Unitary Republic English 
Zimbabwe 18 April 1980 Unitary Republic English 
 
Source: McGowan, P. 1998. “The regional sub-system of 
Southern Africa” in P. Nel and P. McGowan (eds.). Power, Wealth 
and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. 
Rondebosch: UCT Press.  
                                      
362
   South Africa has eleven official languages: Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, North 
Sotho, South Sotho, Siswati, Tsinga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu. 
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Appendix 2: Sectoral Responsibilities of SADC Countries 
 
Country Sectoral Responsibility 
Angola Energy 
Botswana Agricultural Research, Livestock 
Production, Animal Disease 
Control 
Lesotho Environment and Land 
Management, Water 
Malawi Inland Fisheries, Forestry, 
Wildlife 
Mauritius Tourism 
Mozambique Culture, Information and Sport, 
Transport and Communication 
Namibia Marine Fisheries and Resources 
South Africa Finance and Investment, Health 
Swaziland Human Resource Development 
Tanzania Industry and Trade 
Zambia Employment and Labour, Mining 
Zimbabwe Crop Production, Food, 
Agriculture and Natural 
Resources 
 
 
Source: The Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment 
Review, 1999.
 316
Appendix 3 
 
 
Functions of the SADC Directorates 
 
 
Trade, finance, industry and investment: 
 
Harmonisation of policies, strategies and programmes in the 
following areas: 
 
a) Market Integration; 
b) Macroeconomic domain; 
c) Investment promotion; 
d) Industrial development, particularly SMEs; 
e) Development of mining and beneficiation of mineral 
resources; 
f) Sustainable and equitable economic development; 
g) Inter-regional and multilateral economic cooperation; 
h) Functional, efficient and development-oriented financial 
sector; and 
i) The acquisition, adaptation and application of science and 
technology to enhance competitiveness 
 
Infrastructure and services: 
 
a) Harmonization of transport and communication policies; 
b) Coordination of development, maintenance and administration 
of transport, water and energy infrastructure; 
c) Promotion of an enabling environment for investment; 
d) Promotion of the development of physical and social 
infrastructure that contributes to poverty alleviation; 
e) Harmonization of energy policies, strategies and programmes; 
f) Coordinate the development of tourism infrastructure and 
related services. 
 
Food, agriculture and natural resources: 
 
a) Ensuring sustainable food security policies and programmes; 
b) Harmonization in phytosanitary, sanitary, crop and animal 
husbandry policies; 
c) To develop measures to increase agricultural output and the 
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development of agro-based industries; 
d) Harmonization of policies and programmes aimed at effective 
and sustainable utilization of natural resources such as water, 
wildlife, fisheries, forestry etc; 
e) Development and harmonization of sound environmental 
management policies. 
 
Social and human development and special programmes: 
 
a) Harmonization of educational, skills development and training 
policies, strategies and programmes; 
b) Harmonization of policies towards social welfare for the 
vulnerable groups; 
c) Harmonization of health care policies and standards; 
d) To harmonize employment policies and labour standards; 
e) To coordinate the development of policies to effectively 
combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic and all other communicable 
diseases; 
f) To manage special programmes such as combating illicit 
drugs, small arms trafficking as well as demining; 
g) To ensure the management of SADC regional disaster 
management centre; 
h) To harmonize and coordinate cultural, information and sports 
policies and programmes; 
i) Harmonization of policies at local, national and regional level. 
 
Source: Lee (2003:54-55) 
 
 
 
